













































This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Bretton	Woods	 Institutions	 (BWIs)	 in	 the	
development	of	three	former	French	colonies.	Comparing	the	experiences	of	Chad,	
Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti,	it	explores	the	ways	in	which	the	development	trajectory	
of	 postcolonial	 countries	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	 international	 institutions	 and	
neoliberal	 ideology.	 It	does	 this	by	examining	 two	key	periods	of	development	
lending:	structural	adjustment	and	poverty	reduction	strategies.	Adopting	a	neo-
Gramscian	 theoretical	 approach,	 this	 study	 understands	 neoliberalism	 as	 an	
ideological	 hegemonic	project	 as	well	 as	 a	 development	paradigm.	 It	 examines	




are	 therefore	 both	 spatially	 and	 temporally	 significant.	 Over	 the	 thirty-year	
period,	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	imposed	a	common	neoliberal	policy	matrix,	
which	centred	on	austerity,	export	markets,	deregulation	and	privatisation.	The	
SAPs	 undermined	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 state,	 deepened	 dependency	 and	
impeded	economic	and	social	development.	The	poverty	reduction	strategies,	in	
spite	of	claims	of	country-ownership	and	participation,	continued	to	adhere	to	the	






are	 both	 coercive	 and	 consensual.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 conceptual	 premise	 and	
operational	framework	of	international	development	reflects	continuity	with	the	
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ARCC	 	 	 Autorité	de	regulation	du	café	et	du	cacao	
BCC	 	 	 Bourse	du	café	et	du	cacao		
BWI	 	 	 Bretton	Woods	Institution		
CAISTAB	 Caisse	de	Stabilisation	et	de	Soutien	des	Prix	des	Productions	
Agricoles	
CAS	 	 	 Country	Assistance	Strategy	
CBP	 	 	 Capacity	Building	Project	
CDA	 	 	 Critical	Discourse	Analysis	
CFA	 	 	 Communauté	Financière	d’Afrique	
CFAF	 	 	 CFA	Franc	
CMT	 	 	 Conceptual	Metaphor	Theory	
CPI	 	 	 Corruption	Perceptions	Index	
CPS	 	 	 Country	Partnership	Strategy	
DHA	 	 	 Discourse	Historical	Approach	
DUS	 	 	 Droit	Unique	de	Sortie	
EPCA	 	 	 Emergency	Post-Conflict	Assistance	
EERP	 	 	 Emergency	Economic	Recovery	Programme	
ERP	 	 	 Economic	Recovery	Programme		
EPA	 	 	 Economic	Partnership	Agreement	
EPZ	 	 	 Export	Processing	Zone	
ESAF	 	 	 Enhanced	Structural	Adjustment	Facility	
EXIM	 	 	 Export-Import	Bank	of	the	United	States	
FDPCC	 Fonds	de	développement	des	activités	des	producteurs	de	café	
et	cacao		
FFP	 	 	 Fund	For	Peace	
FRC	 	 	 Fonds	de	Régulation	et	de	contrôle		
FSI	 	 	 Fragile	States	Index	
GDP	 	 	 Gross	National	Product	
GNI	 	 	 Gross	National	Income	
GPB	 	 	 Pound	Sterling	
HDI	 	 	 Human	Development	Index	
HIPC	 	 	 Highly	Indebted	Poor	Countries	
HOPE	 Haitian	 Hemispheric	 Opportunity	 through	 Partnership	
Encouragement	
HTG	 	 	 Haitian	Gourde	
IDB	 	 	 Inter-American	Development	Bank	
IDA	 	 	 International	Development	Association	
IEG	 	 	 Independent	Evaluation	Group	
IMF	 	 	 International	Monetary	Fund	
IPE	 	 	 International	Political	Economy	
I-PRSP		 	 Interim	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	
IR	 	 	 International	Relations	
JSA	 	 	 Joint	Staff	Assessment	
JSAN	 	 	 Joint	Staff	Advisory	Note	
MDG	 	 	 Millennium	Development	Goals	
MDRI	 	 	 Multilateral	Debt	Relief	Initiative	
MINUSTAH	 	 Mission	des	Nations	Unies	pour	la	stabilisation	en	Haïti	
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MPEP	 	 	 Management	of	the	Petroleum	Economy	Project	
MSPP	 	 	 Ministère	de	la	Santé	Publique	et	de	la	Population	
NGO	 	 	 Non-governmental	Organisation	
NPRS	 	 	 National	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	
OPEC	 	 	 Organisation	of	Petroleum	
PDPP	 	 	 Petroleum	Development	and	Pipeline	Project	
PER	 	 	 Public	Expenditure	Review		
PFP	 	 	 Policy	Framework	Paper	
PRGF	 	 	 Poverty	Reduction	Growth	Facility	
PRSP	 	 	 Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	
PRS	 	 	 Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	
PWC	 	 	 Post	Washington	Consensus	
RTA	 	 	 Regional	Trade	Agreement	
SAL	 	 	 Structural	Adjustment	Loan	
SAP	 	 	 Structural	Adjustment	Programme	
SBA	 	 	 Stand-By	Arrangement	
SMP	 	 	 Staff	Monitored	Programme	
TDS	 	 	 Total	Debt	Service	
TNC	 	 	 Transnational	Corporation	
TOTCO	 	 Tchad	Oil	Transportation	Company	S.A.	
UNDP	 	 	 United	States	Development	Programme	
UNOCI		 	 United	Nations	Operation	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	
US	 	 	 United	States	
USAID		 	 United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	
USD	 	 	 United	Stated	Dollar	
WTO	 	 	 World	Trade	Organisation	
















In	 January	 2016,	 Oxfam	 calculated	 that	 the	 world’s	 richest	 1%	 own	 as	 much	
wealth	as	the	rest	of	the	world	combined	(BBC,	2016).	In	recent	years	there	has	
been	much	talk	both	in	academic	scholarship	and	in	the	media	about	the	bottom	
billion	 in	 reference	 to	 the	global	poor	who	 live	under	 the	poverty	 threshold	of	
$1.25	per	day.1	A	 growing	wealth	of	 literature	has	 sought	 to	 answer	questions	
about	 social	 and	 economic	 equality	 on	 both	 the	 local	 and	 international	 stage,	




in	 the	 literature	as	 the	process	of	globalisation,	has	 led	 to	a	significant	 role	 for	
international	 institutions	 in	regulating	trade,	maintaining	global	 financial	order	
and	facilitating	economic	development.	Trillions	of	dollars	have	been	channelled	
through	 the	Bretton	Woods	 Institutions	 (BWIs)	over	 the	 last	half	a	 century	via	
concessional	 and	 non-concessional	 loans	 and	 grants	 in	 the	 name	 of	 economic	
development.	 This	 culminated	 in	 a	 debt	 crisis	 in	 the	 late	 1970s,	 with	 many	
peripheral	nations	facing	severe	financial	difficulties.2	Consequently,	beginning	in	
the	1980s,	the	World	Bank	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	stepped	in	
to	 provide	 credit,	 attached	 to	 economic	 policy	 programmes	 that	 borrowing	
nations	 committed	 to	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 crucial	 funds.	 These	 programmes	
consisted	 primarily	 of	 reforms	 that	 sought	 to	 open	 up	 economies	 to	 foreign	
investment	 and	 unrestrained	 financial	 flows	 across	 borders	 (including	 the	
repatriation	of	 profits),	 as	well	 as	 to	 shrink	 the	 size	 of	 the	 state	 through	 fiscal	
austerity	 policies.	 This	 policy	 paradigm	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	Washington	
Consensus,	 linked	 to	 the	crystallisation	of	neoliberalism	 in	policymaking	 in	 the	












and	 economic	 indicators	 and	 others	 saw	 little	 to	 no	 improvement	 during	 this	
period.	 Instead	 of	 providing	 a	 route	 to	 economic	 development,	 extensive	












to	 debt	 relief	 and	 concessional	 financing	 for	 low-income	 countries.	 Like	 the	
Structural	 Adjustment	 Programmes	 (SAPs),	 the	 PRSPs	 were	 prerequisites	 for	
financing.	According	to	the	BWIs,	the	PRSPs	were	a	new	way	of	doing	development	
that	valued	country	ownership	and	the	participation	of	civil	society	organisations	
in	 the	 formulation	 of	 development	 strategy.	 This	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Post-
Washington	 Consensus	 (PWC).	 The	 launch	 of	 the	 new	 lending	 framework	was	
received	with	 scepticism	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	PRSPs	 represented	
change	or	 continuity	 from	 the	SAP	 era.	Many	point	 to	 evidence	 that	 neoliberal	










new	 lending	 framework	 has	 simply	 been	 a	 way	 of	 rebranding	 structural	





the	 programmes	 (a	 view	 espoused	 by	 proponents	 of	 the	 BWIs	 and	 the	 BWIs	
themselves);	and	those	who	highlight	the	inappropriateness	of	their	policies	(an	







Every	 country	 that	 underwent	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 its	 21st	 century	
equivalent	 is	 a	 postcolonial	 nation. 4 	Despite	 this	 reality,	 few	 scholars	 have	
approached	 the	 subject	 of	 World	 Bank	 and	 IMF	 interventionism	 through	 a	
postcolonial	lens.5	This	is	a	serious	oversight	and	neglects	the	crucial	question	at	
the	 heart	 of	 development:	 what	 is	 it	 about	 the	 postcolonial	 condition	 and	 its	
intersection	with	neoliberalism	that	makes	countries	more	susceptible	to	financial	
and	 economic	malaise	 in	 the	 first	 place?	By	 contextualising	 these	programmes	
within	the	legacy	of	colonialism,	this	study	emphasises	their	political	nature	and	
accords	 them	 greater	 significance	 than	 mere	 instruments	 for	 development	
financing.	Situating	 these	programmes	 in	such	a	way	explicitly	challenges	 their	











Across	 international	 ratings	 and	 rankings	 of	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	
indicators,	 former	 colonies	 continue	 to	 fill	 the	 lower	 echelons	 year	 after	 year.	
Postcolonial	countries	are	more	 frequently	embroiled	 in	conflict	and	subject	 to	
bilateral	and	multilateral	military	interventions.6	This	thesis	will	explicitly	locate	
structural	 adjustment	 within	 this	 context,	 understanding	 it	 as	 reflective	 of	 an	
unequal	and	inequitable	international	order	that	emerged	directly	as	a	legacy	of	
colonialism.	Many	postcolonial	states	remain	dependent	on	financial	flows	from	
their	 former	 metropolitan	 centres,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 private	 capital	 investment,	
publicly	guaranteed	debt	and	concessional	resource	transfers	(contingent	upon	







theorists	 and	 development	 scholars	 alike,	 is	 a	 comprehension	 of	 how	 the	
neoliberal	development	paradigm	has	achieved	hegemonic	status	and	sustained	
itself	through	SAPs	and	PRSPs,	despite	its	fundamentally	poor	track	record	in	the	
developing	 world.	 In	 focussing	 primarily	 on	 the	 materiality	 of	 development	
programmes,	the	existing	scholarship	on	BWI	programmes	tends	to	reinforce	the	
authority	of	the	neoliberal	development	paradigm	upon	which	these	programmes	




material	 manifestations,	 from	 the	 Marxian	 poststructuralist	 tradition	 that	
understands	 it	 as	 a	 hegemonic	 ideology	 (Harvey,	 2005)	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
	
6	Notable	 examples	 in	 Latin	America	 include	 Paraguay	 and	 Panama	 in	 1989	 (Madsen,	
2012;	 Gilboa,	 1995)	 and	 Honduras	 in	 June	 2009	 (Weisbrot,	 2014).	 On	 the	 African	
continent,	 recent	 interventions	have	 taken	place	 in	Mali,	 the	Central	African	Republic,	
Chad,	and	Côte	d’Ivoire	(Eads,	2014).	
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an	 investigation	 into	 the	 various	 discursive	 strategies	 of	 neoliberalism,	















economic	 development	 of	 postcolonial	 nations	 has	 been	 and	 continues	 to	 be	
shaped	by	 international	 institutions	and	neoliberal	 ideology.	The	enduring	and	
evolving	influence	of	neoliberalism	is	explored	on	two	levels.	At	the	policy	level,	I	
explore	the	modalities	of	the	SAPs	and	the	PRSPs,	comparing	across	countries	and	
over	 time.	 This	 examination	 of	 the	 practical	 content	 of	 IMF	 and	World	 Bank-
sponsored	 programmes	 reveals	 how	 they	 align	 with	 or	 diverge	 from	
neoliberalism.7		
	
The	 second	 level	 of	 analysis	 is	 discursive,	 drawing	 on	 a	 careful	 reading	 of	
development	 discourse,	 as	 articulated	 in	 these	 programmes.	 This	 critical	
	
7 	This	 thesis	 approaches	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 development	 paradigm	 and	 a	 ideological	




The	 methodology	 borrows	 insights	 from	 Critical	 Discourse	 Analysis	 (CDA),	
particularly	 the	 Discourse	 Historical	 Approach	 (DHA),	 developed	 by	 Ruth	 and	
Michael	Meyer,	 as	well	 as	 Conceptual	Metaphor	 Theory	 (CMT)	 and	 techniques	
developed	by	Norman	Fairclough.	 This	 approach	 seeks	 to	 understand	how	 the	
discourse,	and	not	just	the	policies,	embodies	the	potential	for	unjustified	exercise	
of	 power.	 Importantly,	 this	 approach	 understands	 discourse	 as	 both	 socially	
constituted	 and	 constitutive,	 i.e.	 there	 is	 a	 dialectical	 relationship	 between	
discursive	 events	 and	 the	 social	 institutions	 and	 structures	 that	 frame	 them	
(Wodak	&	Meyer,	2009).	In	this	context,	it	seeks	to	excavate	the	real	dynamics	of	
power	 that	 reside	 within	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 poverty	 reduction	







This	 thesis	 attempts	 this	 exploration	 of	 neoliberal	 development	 on	 these	 two	
levels	(policy	and	discourse),	via	a	comparative	examination	of	the	experiences	of	
three	 Francophone	 former	 colonies:	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti.	 The	 French	
postcolonial	 context	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 due	 to	 France’s	 reluctance	 to	








Haiti	 achieved	 independence	 in	 1804,	 following	 a	 long	 and	 bloody	 war	 of	
independence	 against	 the	 French	 colonialists.	 After	 two	 centuries	 of	




postcolonial	development	 and	 the	 aforementioned	question	of	 the	postcolonial	
condition	and	susceptibility	to	financial	and	economic	malaise.	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	
Chad	were	granted	legal	autonomy	in	1960	but	have	both	been	sites	of	bilateral	







growth	 and	 poverty	 reduction.	 In	 comparing	 their	 experiences,	 this	 project	
explores	the	relationship	between	the	postcolonial	condition	and	the	neoliberal	
development	 trajectory.	 Key	 research	 questions	 are:	 1)	 how	has	 neoliberalism	
shaped	development	policy	across	the	three	case	studies	and	over	the	SAP/PRSP	
eras	(i.e.	do	PRSPs	differ	in	content	and	rationale	from	earlier	SAPs);	2)	how	do	the	
donors	 legitimise	 these	 programmes	 –	 what	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 neoliberal	
development	discourse;	3)	are	there	power	imbalances	embedded	in	the	structure	
and	ideological	orientations	of	the	international	donor	institutions	and	how	are	




The	 first	 chapter	 reviews	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 associated	 with	 the	 key	
concepts	 within	 the	 aforementioned	 research	 questions:	 neoliberalism,	
globalisation,	sovereignty	and	the	colonial	legacy.	In	the	methodological	chapter,	
I	 outline	 some	 philosophical	 considerations	 and	 provide	 a	 rationale	 for	 the	
comparative	approach	and	the	selection	of	case	studies.	This	chapter	develops	the	
argument	that	the	combination	of	discourse	approaches	I	adopt,	grounded	in	the	







chapters	are	divided	along	thematic	 lines.	Chapters	 three	and	 five	compare	the	
financial	 policy	 framework	 of	 development	 programmes	 over	 the	 two	periods.	
Discussion	 is	 focussed	 on	 the	 public	 sector,	 looking	 at	 developments	 with	
government	borrowing	and	public	spending.	Fiscal	austerity,	a	key	 tenet	of	 the	
neoliberal	 thesis,	 is	 a	 central	 theme	 of	 these	 chapters.	 Chapters	 four	 and	 six	
examine	trade	policymaking	in	the	SAPs	and	PRSPs.	These	chapters	focus	on	the	
principal	export	industry	of	each	country,	looking	at	the	way	that	trade	policies	
have	been	 implemented	 to	restructure	or	establish	 the	oil,	 cocoa	and	assembly	
industries	 in	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti,	 respectively.	 These	 fields	 of	
policymaking	were	deliberately	chosen	due	to	their	importance	in	influencing	key	




three	 case	 studies	 and,	 where	 data	 allows,	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 economic	 and	
social	 impacts	 of	 SAPs	 is	 explored.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 discourse	 follows,	
highlighting	commonalities	and	differences	in	the	discourse	across	the	three	case	










ambitions,	 policy	 content	 and	 consequences.	 A	 common	discourse	 is	 identified	
across	 the	 three	case	studies	 in	 the	way	 that	 the	BWIs	seek	 to	 legitimise	 these	




provides	 a	 narrative	 that	 unceasingly	 promotes	 marketisation	 therefore	




Part	 two	 acknowledges	 important	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 BWIs’	 discourse,	 which	
evolves	 significantly	 in	 the	 PRSPs,	 characterised	 by	 an	 emphasis	 on	 poverty	
reduction	and	the	promotion	of	social	inclusion	as	well	as	a	renewed	focus	on	the	
role	of	the	state	via	the	concept	of	good	governance.	This	is	without	breaking	with	
the	 macroeconomic	 prescriptions	 that	 characterised	 the	 SAPs;	 the	 renewed	
attention	to	social	policy	issues	by	the	donors	and	the	re-institutionalisation	of	the	
state	 remain	 firmly	 embedded	 within	 a	 neoliberal	 policy	 framework.	 The	
neoliberal	 policies	 of	 (uneven)	 global	 economic	 integration,	 privatisation,	
deregulation	and	austerity	continue	to	be	privileged	in	the	PRSPs.		I	argue	that	the	
PRSP	approach	therefore	represents	an	attempt	to	maintain	neoliberal	hegemony	
(understood	 in	 a	 neo-Gramscian	 sense),	 by	 co-opting	 counter-hegemonic	
narratives	 of	 social	 inclusion,	 poverty	 reduction,	 country	 ownership	 and	
participation,	whilst	maintaining	business	as	usual.	
	
In	contextualising	 these	 three	case	studies	within	 the	broader	picture	of	global	
governance	 structures	 and	 institutions,	 this	 thesis	 moves	 beyond	 the	 more	
traditional	framework	for	understanding	the	development	of	francophone	Africa:	
Françafrique. 8 	The	 approach	 sheds	 light	 upon	 the	 interactive	 relationship	
between	policy,	power	and	discourse,	demonstrating	how	the	dynamics	of	power	
in	these	three	countries	are	both	coercive	and	consensual	(in	the	neo-Gramscian	
sense).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 conceptual	 premise	 and	 operational	 framework	 of	
international	 development	 reflects	 continuity	 with	 the	 imperial	 legacy	 of	
	
8 	Françafrique	 refers	 to	 the	 neo-colonial	 relationship	 that	 France	 cultivated	 with	 its	








in	 the	 literature	 as	 ‘failed	 states’	 –	 states	 that	 have	 not	 succeeded,	 despite	 the	
generosity	of	rich	countries’	aid	and	much	foreign	investment.	At	its	worst,	this	
narrative	postulates	 these	 countries	 as	 innately	 inferior	parasites	 of	 the	 global	
economy,	 incapable	of	 self-government	and	 civilisation.	Poverty,	debt,	war	and	
devastating	 natural	 disasters	 are	 treated	 as	 a	 series	 of	 isolated	 events,	
decontextualised	from	the	structures	of	global	power.	These	false	representations,	
imbued	 as	 they	 are	 with	 paternalistic	 ideas	 of	 the	 White	 Man’s	 Burden,	
promulgate	 the	 neo-colonial	 developmental	 project,	 which	 has	 terrible	 human	
and	environmental	consequences.	This	study,	in	recontextualising	these	problems	
within	 structural	 change	 that	 has	 been	 imposed	 through	decades	 of	 neoliberal	
reform,	 seeks	 to	 challenge	 these	 problematic	 representations.	 Situating	 the	
postcolonial	 experience	 within	 the	 wider	 neoliberal	 literature	 and	 discursive	





































The	 subsequent	 discussion	 examines	 the	 mainstream	 approach	 that	 has	 been	
dominant	in	the	field	of	development	studies:	modernisation	theory.	The	realist	
and	 liberal	 traditions	 of	 IR	 are	 outlined	 and	 commonalities	 in	 these	 three	
approaches	are	delineated	and	critiqued.	I	then	advance	an	investigation	into	the	
origins	of	the	concept	of	Westphalian	sovereignty,	a	key	conceptual	marker	of	the	
present	 study.	 What	 follows	 is	 a	 critical	 discussion	 of	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	
process	of	neoliberal	globalisation.	I	highlight	the	inadequacies	of	all	of	the	above	
approaches	 for	 understanding	 and	 explaining	 poverty	 in	 the	 global	 periphery.	
This	leads	into	the	exploration	of	the	more	critical	approaches	to	development	and	
poverty,	through	a	critical	discussion	of	dependency	theory	and	the	neo-colonial	
literature.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 neo-colonial	 approach	 represents	 an	 alternate	
paradigm	 through	 which	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 development	 of	
postcolonial	 nations	 can	 be	 achieved.	 Lastly,	 I	 consider	 the	 critical	 political	
economy	 approach,	 grounded	 in	 Gramscian	 theory,	 as	 a	way	 of	 understanding	
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how	 dominant	 development	 strategies	 sustain	 themselves	 through	 discourse,	





Discussions	of	 global	processes	often	make	use	of	 geographical	 terminology	 to	




primarily	 postcolonial	 nations.	 However,	 many	 journalists	 and	 scholars	 have	




A	 common	 contemporary	 substitute,	 employed	 by	 scholars,	 journalists,	
international	 organisations	 and	 NGOs	 alike,	 is	 the	 developing/developed	
paradigm,	 which	 separates	 countries	 by	 their	 relative	 levels	 of	 industrial	
development	 and	 wealth.	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 convenient	 label	 to	 use,	 but	 is	
equally	problematic	in	that	there	is	no	clear	consensus	on	what	it	means	to	be	a	
developed	country.	 	Furthermore,	 it	 rests	on	 the	 teleological,	deterministic	and	
fundamentally	 Eurocentric	 assumptions	 of	modernisation	 theory;	 it	 assumes	 a	
desire	to	develop	along	the	traditional	Western	model	of	economic	development.	
Similarly	to	the	‘Third	World’	label,	it	also	implies	a	hierarchy	between	countries,	
perpetuating	 stereotypes	 about	 citizens	 of	 the	 ‘developing’	 world	 as	 being	
backwards,	lazy	and	irresponsible,	according	to	Shose	Kessi	(cited	in	Silver,	2015).	
	
In	 more	 recent	 decades,	 scholars,	 activists	 and	 development	 workers	 have	
engaged	 instead	 with	 geographic	 labelling.	 Based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	
majority	 of	 ‘developing’	 or	 ‘Third	 World’	 countries	 are	 in	 the	 Southern	
Hemisphere,	whilst	the	wealthiest	countries	are	in	more	northerly	latitudes,	the	
Global	 North/Global	 South	 terminology	 has	 become	 popular	 for	 distinguishing	
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differences	 within	 these	 broad	 latitudinal	 divides	 and	 is	 therefore	 overly	
reductionist	 (Sabzalieva,	 Martinez	 &	 Sá,	 2020).	 For	 example,	 the	 Global	 South	




by	 their	 inability	 to	 account	 for	 differences	within	 borders.	 For	 example,	 large	
populations	of	Brazil	and	India	live	under	the	global	poverty	line,	yet	both	these	
countries	 also	 host	 a	 wealthy	middle	 class	 that	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 global	




that	 these	 categories	 have	 emerged	 randomly,	 rather	 that	 they	 are	 a	 result	 of	
unequal	 relationships	 between	wealthy	 and	 poor	 nations.	 The	 core/peripheral	







explain	 the	widespread	poverty	of	 formerly	colonised	nations.	 Importantly,	 the	
core	 assumptions	 of	 modernisation	 theory	 have	 influenced	 the	 work	 of	
economists,	 sociologists,	 political	 scientists	 and	 IR	 theorists	 (Gruffydd	 Jones,	











and	 ‘underdeveloped’)	and	the	modern	(or	 ‘urban’,	 ‘developed’	and	 ‘industrial’)	
(Larrain,	1989,	p.	87).	Modernisation	theorists	argued	that	all	societies	follow	an	
evolutionary	 path	 to	 development	 from	 ‘traditional’	 to	 ‘modern’	 and	 that	 the	
problems	 of	 developing	 societies	were	 a	 result	 of	 their	 traditional	 nature.	 The	
state	 of	 tradition	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure;	 development	 is	
conceptualised	 as	 a	 linear	 process.	 Leading	modernisation	 thinker	 Bill	 Rostow	
theorised	 five	economic	development	 stages	 that	undeveloped	societies	 should	
progress	 through	 to	 become	 modern	 (Rostow,	 1954).	 This	 paradigm	 sees	
undeveloped,	 traditional	 societies	 move	 from	 a	 low-productivity,	 agricultural	
economy	to	a	mature	economy	with	a	focus	on	consumer	durables	and	services	








takes	 the	approach	 to	 task	 for	 its	 failure	 to	historicise	and	explain	 the	barriers	
preventing	 countries	 from	 developing.	 Rather	 than	 understanding	 poverty,	
corruption	and	authoritarianism	as	outcomes	of	distinct	historical	processes	of	
social	change,	modernisation	theory	naturalises	these	conditions.	In	so	doing,	it	
fails	 to	 explain	 the	 external	 nature	 of	 these	 obstacles	 as	 rooted	 in	 the	 social	
relations	 and	 practices	 of	 colonial	 rule	 (Gruffydd	 Jones,	 2005).	 Classical	
modernisation	theory	was	largely	discredited	in	the	1960s	through	the	emergence	




the	 underlying	 assumptions	 of	 modernisation	 theory	 continue	 to	 inform	
mainstream	development	economics.	
	




(Gruffydd	 Jones,	 2005).	 This	 can	 be	 in	 part	 explained	 by	 the	 dominant	 state-
centric	 approach	 that	 has	 pervaded	 the	 discipline	 since	 its	 inception.	 Both	 the	
realist	 and	 liberal	 traditions	 of	 IR	 are	 concerned	 primarily	 with	 the	 relations	





Realism	 has	 been	 the	 dominant	 theory	 of	 IR	 since	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 field.	






constantly	 prepared	 for	 an	 attack:	 ‘states	 are	 sovereign	 because	 there	 is	 no	






In	 contrast,	 liberalism	–	 finding	 its	 origins	 in	Adam	Smith’s	magnum	opus,	The	
Wealth	of	Nations	(1776)	–	identifies	such	protectionism	as	a	key	problem	in	the	
international	system	of	states.	Central	 to	the	 liberal	 thesis	 is	 the	notion	that	an	
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economy	 functions	 optimally	 when	 it	 operates	 free	 from	 state	 or	 political	
intervention.	 The	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 are	 rational	 and	 self-interested	




dinner,	 but	 from	 their	 regard	 to	 their	 own	 interest’	 (Smith,	 1904,	 V1,	 p.	 2).	
Classical	liberalism	insists	that	national	economies	should	specialise	in	their	area	






wealth.	 This	 way,	 all	 countries	 gain	 optimally.	 The	 theory	 of	 comparative	
advantage,	although	developed	during	the	18th	century	based	on	a	trading	system	





sovereignty	 is	 threefold:	 juridical	 equality	 between	 states,	 the	 respect	 of	 the	
territorial	 integrity	 of	 states;	 and	 a	 general	 agreement	 not	 to	 interfere	 in	 the	
domestic	affairs	of	others.	The	doctrine	is	named	after	the	Peace	of	Westphalia,	
signed	in	1684,	which	ended	the	Thirty	Years’	War,	in	which	the	major	continental	




on	 as	 a	 central	 point	 of	 reference	 in	 debates	 on	 international	 politics.	 George	
Lawson	 and	 Robbie	 Shilliam	 write	 that	 ‘sovereignty	 is	 a	 conceptual	 marker,	
normative	 frame	 and	 political	 tool	without	 rival’	 (Lawson	&	 Shilliam,	 2009,	 p.	
657).	The	 classical	perspective,	 anchored	 in	 realist	 and	neorealist	 assumptions	
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about	 international	politics,	 assumes	 that	 sovereignty	 is	a	 fixed	and	exogenous	
attribute	of	states	(Lake,	2003).	
	
The	 evident	 contradiction	 within	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 imperial	





(Berger,	 2003;	 Dossa,	 2007).	 Indeed,	 the	 modern-traditional	 binary	 of	
modernisation	 theory	 means	 that	 postcolonial	 states	 must	 undergo	 economic	





























freedom	 from	 outside	 interference’	 even	when	 gross	 human	 rights	 abuses	 are	
being	committed	(Jackson,	1990,	p.	74).	
	
This	 notion	 that	 the	 explanation	 of	 development	 challenges	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	
inherent	weaknesses	of	some	states	continues	to	pervade	both	the	discipline	of	IR	




threats	 that	 such	 countries	 tend	 to	breed	will	 not	 remain	within	 their	 borders	
forever’	 (Krasner,	2005,	p.	69).	When	serving	as	 a	policy	advisor	 to	George	W.	
Bush,	 Krasner	 wrote	 ‘left	 to	 their	 own	 devices,	 collapsed	 and	 badly	 governed	
states	 will	 not	 fix	 themselves’	 (Krasner,	 2004,	 p.	 86).	 In	 an	 article	 entitled	 In	
Defence	 of	 Empire,	 Robert	 Kaplan	 suggested	 that	 even	military	 intervention	 is	
sometimes	 defensible	 when	 ‘overwhelming	 national	 interest	 is	 threatened’	
(Kaplan,	 2014).	 Otherwise,	 interference	 in	 foreign	 affairs	 should	 be	 limited	 to	
economic	 inducements	 and	 diplomacy	 (Kaplan,	 2014).	 For	 Jackson,	 military	
intervention	 in	 ‘failed	 states’	 has	 been	wholly	 insufficient;	 ‘there	 is	 evidently	 a	




countries	 are	 the	 result	 of	 their	 inability	 to	 develop	 strong,	 capable	 domestic	
institutions.	Importantly,	classical	IR	has	failed	to	acknowledge	the	relationship	
between	imperialism	and	the	development	of	capitalism	on	a	global	scale.	Indeed,	
Darby	 and	 Paolini	 argue	 that	 ‘imperialism	 receives	 cursory	 treatment	 in	 the	
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standard	 texts	 as	 a	 historical	 category,	 reaching	 back	 almost	 unchanging	 to	





A	 further	 important	 inadequacy	 of	 both	 realist	 and	 liberal	 approaches	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 present	 study	 is	 the	 way	 that	 power	 is	 conceptualised	 in	 the	
international	economy.	Both	understand	power	in	a	largely	one-dimensional	way	
as	a	‘preponderance	of	material	resources’	of	individual	states	(Keohane,	1984,	p.	
32).	 Both	 largely	 neglect	 the	 increasing	 role	 and	 influence	 of	 international	
institutions	 in	 the	 global	 system,	 including	 NGOs,	 banks	 and	 transnational	
corporations	(TNCs).	Where	such	institutions	are	taken	into	consideration,	power	
is	 understood	 as	 the	 power	 of	 particular	 states	 to	 influence	 decision-making	
within	 those	 institutions.	 This	 limits	 the	 ability	 to	 conceptualise	 power	
relationships	at	the	structural	level	(Ruckert,	2008).	Whilst	global	disparities	in	
material	 power	 are	 real	 and	 important,	 both	 liberalism	 and	 realism	 fail	 to	
understand	power	as	ideational	as	well	as	material.	In	neglecting	the	significance	
of	 ideas	 and	 discourse,	 these	 theories	 are	 limited	 in	 their	 contribution	 to	
increasing	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 structural	 power	 balances	 between	 social	
forces	that	prevail	at	any	given	time	(Reinalda	&	Verbeek,	2004).	The	exploration	






always	 been	 an	 elusive	 concept	 for	 statesmen	 and	 analysts	 of	 international	
politics;	now	 it	 is	even	more	slippery’	 (Keohane	&	Nye,	1998,	p.	125).	Scholars	
have	proposed	a	number	of	definitions	and	theoretical	models	for	understanding	
















challenge.	 Indeed,	 as	 Kim	 England	 and	 Kevin	 Ward	 articulate,	 ‘there	 almost	
appears	 to	 be	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 between	 the	 volume	 of	 scholarship	




Levy,	 2011;	 Harvey,	 2005)	 and	 a	 process	 of	 the	 Foucauldian	 concept	 of	
governmentality	(Barry,	Osborne	&	Rose,	1996).		
	
In	 spite	 of	 the	 contention	 over	 what	 neoliberalism	means	 and	 how	 its	 power	
functions,	 most	 agree	 on	 a	 common	 story	 about	 its	 origins	 and	 the	 general	
principles	 that	 underpin	 it	 (Springer,	 2012).	 Founded	 on	 Smith	 and	 Ricardo’s	
liberal	 assumptions,	 neoliberalism	 emerged	 as	 a	 politico-economic	 ideology	
during	 the	 mid-20th	 century.	 Synthesised	 by	 Nobel	 Prize	 winning	 economists,	
including	 Friedrich	 Hayek,	 James	 Buchanan,	 Ludwig	 Von	 Mises	 and	 Milton	
Friedman,	 neoliberalism	 redefines	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	
economy,	applying	Smith’s	classical	liberal	notion	of	the	rational	economic	subject	
to	 all	 areas	 of	 social	 life.	 	 Neoliberal	 thinkers	 place	 the	 utmost	 importance	 on	
economic	 freedom	as	 the	 foundation	of	 freedom	more	broadly;	 in	Hayek’s	own	
words,	it	is	the	‘prerequisite	of	any	freedom’	(Hayek,	1944,	p.	489).	Contrary	to	
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previous	 liberal	 ideas	about	 government,	neoliberalism’s	 central	 assumption	 is	
that	the	market	is	more	efficient	than	the	state	and	should	therefore	be	privileged	
above	 it	 in	 the	 necessary	 functions	 of	 fostering	 economic	 growth.	 Rather	 than	
supervising	 the	 market,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 is	 therefore	 to	 favour	 individual	
property	rights,	the	rule	of	law	and	the	institutions	of	freely	functioning	markets	
and	 free	 trade	(Harvey,	2005).	According	 to	 this	 logic,	economic	problems	 that	
would	 previously	 have	 come	 under	 the	 remit	 of	 the	 government,	 such	 as	
employment	creation	and	industrial	growth,	are	better	addressed	by	the	market.	
Competition,	as	the	defining	characteristic	of	human	relations,	redefines	citizens	



















In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Keynesian	 approach,	 neo-classical	 economics	 proposes	 two	
theses,	which	serve	as	the	theoretical	justification	for	the	neoliberal	notion	of	the	







valuable	 factors	 of	 production	 (including	 labour)	 go	 to	 waste	 (Palley,	 2005).	
Proponents	of	these	theories	argue	that	economies	will,	therefore,	inevitably	self-
adjust	 to	 full	 employment	 and	 the	 use	 of	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 to	 raise	








paid	 what	 they	 are	 worth,	 institutions	 of	 social	 protection	 and	 trade	 unions	
become	 redundant.	 Some	 social	 and	 economic	 inequality	 is	 understood	 as	 a	
necessary	vehicle	for	progress	-	known	as	the	trickle	down	effect,	neoliberalism	







is	 fuelled	 by	 the	 limitless	 nature	 of	 capitalism.	 Proponents	 identify	 neoliberal	
globalisation	as	a	key	solution	to	the	global	poverty	challenge.	Peter	Martin	is	one	
such	 advocate,	 stating	 that	 the	 process	 of	 globalisation	 is	 the	 ‘accelerated	
integration	of	previously	marginalised	societies’	and	a	‘true	collaboration	across	
borders,	 across	 societies,	 across	 cultures’	 (Martin	 P.	 ,	 1997).	 Martin	Wolf	 also	
understands	 globalisation	 as	 a	means	 of	 raising	 living	 standards	 in	 the	 global	








process	 of	 ‘neoliberal	 globalisation.’	 However,	 globalisation	 is	 not	 a	 new	
phenomenon.	The	internationalisation	of	the	world	economy,	identified	by	Marx	
as	an	inner	tendency	of	capitalism,	has	seen	the	growth	of	international	trade,	the	
flow	 of	 capital	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 global	 economy	 (Marx,	 1867/1976)	
These	are	not	developments	unique	to	neoliberalism.	However,	the	contemporary	
stage	 of	 globalisation	 is	 characterised	 by	 growing	 financial	 transactions,	 the	
international	mobility	of	capital,	the	concentration	of	world	capital	among	TNCs	










Friedman’s	Chicago	School	 for	Economics	were	 installed	 to	 radically	 transform	
the	 economy,	 privatising	 government	 enterprises,	 removing	 restrictions	 to	
foreign	 investment,	 and	 re-orienting	 the	 economy	along	more	 export-led	 lines.	
Violence	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 ensuring	 this	 transition,	 though	 this	 is	 not	 a	




10 	The	 neoliberal	 transition	 arrived	 later	 in	 France	 through	 a	 series	 of	 colocations	
between	 President	 and	 Prime	 Minister	 of	 opposing	 political	 affiliations,	 but	 was	 less	




Soon	 thereafter,	 neoliberalism	 found	 further	 policy	 applications	 all	 across	 the	
global	periphery,	following	the	debt	crisis	that	broke	out	in	the	1970s.	A	dispute	
between	the	Organisation	of	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries	(OPEC)	and	the	US	
saw	 the	 OPEC	 raise	 the	 price	 of	 oil	 (Hobson,	 2013).	 Oil-producing	 states	
accumulated	large	budgetary	surpluses	and	commercial	and	investment	banks	in	
these	countries	 increased	the	scale	of	 their	 lending	to	nations	 in	the	periphery,	
recycling	 the	 petro-dollars	 that	 had	 been	 deposited	 in	 New	 York	 and	 London.	
Eventually,	realising	that	many	of	the	debtors	were	not	able	to	repay	their	loans,	
the	banks	 stopped	 lending,	 triggering	what	became	known	as	 the	Third	World	
Debt	 Crisis	 (Peet,	 2009).	 As	 countries	 defaulted	 on	 their	 debts,	 international	
finance	responded	by	offering	debt	relief,	tied	to	‘stabilisation	packages’	and	later	
SAPs.	 These	 programmes	 prescribed	 export-oriented	 strategies,	 a	 focus	 on	
comparative	advantage,	austerity,	liberalisation	and	the	deregulation	of	markets	
and	privatisation.	Although	at	first	the	SAPs	were	seen	as	a	cure	to	the	debt	crisis	
only,	 they	 soon	 became	 the	 standard	 policy	 package	 for	 peripheral	 countries	
during	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s.	 This	 was	 formally	 outlined	 as	 policy	 in	 the	
Washington	Consensus,	unveiled	by	English	economist	John	Williamson	in	1989	
(Williamson,	1990).	By	the	mid-1980s,	three-quarters	of	Latin	American	countries	
and	 two-thirds	 of	 African	 countries	 were	 under	 some	 form	 of	 IMF-WB	














ideological	 hegemonic	 project,	 rooted	 in	 neo-Gramscian	 theory,	 which	 is	
unpacked	later	in	this	chapter.	For	the	former,	I	refer	to	Williamson’s	Washington	
Consensus	as	the	neoliberal	blueprint	for	developing	countries,	in	line	with	other	
studies	 on	 neoliberal	 development	 in	 the	 periphery	 (Fine	 &	 Saad-Filho,	 2014;	







remains	 intuitively	 attractive,	 is	 that	 the	 processes	 of	 globalisation	 are	
undermining	the	foundations	of	state	sovereignty,	eroding	and	constraining	state	
agency	 and	 opportunities	 whilst	 simultaneously	 homogenising	 domestic	
institutions	(Appadurai,	1993).	This	presents	a	challenge	to	both	sovereignty	in	
practice	 and	 its	 theoretical	 underpinnings.	 This	 premise	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	





which	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 is	 deployed	 across	 and	 within	 national	
boundaries.	They	argue	that	the	neoliberal	era	has	witnessed	the	development	of	









as	 nations	 have	 had	 to	 delegate	 financial	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 international	
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financial	organisations	such	as	 the	 IMF,	or	 to	TNCs,	whose	monopolistic	power	
allows	them	to	exert	impacts	on	global	markets	(Li	&	Zhou,	2015).	The	power	of	
these	TNCs	has	grown	enormously	in	the	neoliberal	era;	products	and	services	of	





now	 moving	 towards	 ‘a	 global	 order	 in	 which	 the	 nation-state	 has	 become	
obsolete	 and	 other	 formations	 for	 allegiance	 and	 identity	 have	 taken	 its	 place’	
(Appadurai,	 1993,	 p.	 421).	 For	 advocates	 of	 neoliberal	 globalisation,	 this	 is	 a	
positive	development;	sacrificing	some	degree	of	sovereignty	to	fully	integrate	in	
the	 global	 economy	 is	 essential	 for	 development.	 Thomas	 Friedman	 calls	 this	






poorest	 is	 not	 that	 they	 are	 exploited,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 almost	 entirely	




guide	 countries	 towards	 cooperation	 and	 resolve	 ‘collective	 action	 problems’	
(Miller-Adams,	 1999,	 p.	 10).	 This	 is	 therefore	 conceptualised	 as	 specifically	
apolitical.	
	
Neoliberals	 therefore	 share	 the	neorealist	 view	 that	development	 in	 the	 global	
periphery	–	or	 in	 the	 ‘failed	states’	–	 is	often	not	possible	without	 the	cultural,	
economic	 and	 sometimes	 military	 intervention	 of	 a	 Western-led	 international	
community.	One	 such	 liberal	 scholar	 is	Harvard	professor	Niall	 Ferguson,	who	
makes	 a	 radical	 case	 for	 ‘liberal	 empire’	 over	 independent	 nations	 states.	 For	
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the	 basis	 that	 it	 is	 self-determination	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	 poverty	 and	
corruption	in	the	formerly	colonised	parts	of	the	world:	
	
‘Anti-colonialism	 ravaged	 countries	 as	 nationalist	 elites	 mobilised	 illiterate	












development	 facing	 former	 colonies	 and	 examine	 their	 progress	 since	
independence.	 This	 leads	 the	 more	 radical	 scholars	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	
decolonisation	has	been	a	failed	experiment.	In	placing	the	responsibility	for	state	
failure	 squarely	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 the	 state	 itself,	 these	 approaches	wilfully	
ignore	 the	 historical	 processes	 that	 have	 contributed	 to	 their	 political	 and	





increasingly	 enmeshed	 in	 transnational	 structures,	 they	 cannot	 be	 treated	 as	
isolated	 entities,	 solely	 accountable	 for	domestic	 strife.	Both	 realist	 and	 liberal	
approaches	to	IR	therefore	ignore	the	‘history	of	structuring	of	the	world	order	
through	imperialism	and	colonialism,	the	historicity,	structure	and	development	
of	 capitalism,	 and	 the	processes	of	 dispossession	which	 these	have	necessarily	
entailed	and	which	continue	relentlessly’	(Gruffydd	Jones,	2006,	p.	29).	Without	
understanding	the	legacy	and	character	of	colonialism	and	the	effects	of	ongoing	




to	 define,	 theorise	 and	 critique	 neoliberalism	 from	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	
perspectives.	 	 Scholars	 have	 challenged	 the	 notion	 that	 unfettered	 globalised	
markets	are	the	solution	to	the	challenges	of	global	poverty,	pointing	to	theoretical	
flaws	and	the	abysmal	track	record	of	neoliberal	policies	in	the	global	periphery.	
Importantly,	 John	 Brohman	 highlights	 the	 similarities	 between	 modernisation	
theory	and	neoliberalism,	arguing	that	both	are	‘rooted	in	the	historical	and	social	
experiences	of	a	 few	Western	industrialised	societies’	(Brohman,	1995,	p.	121).	
Modernisation	 theory	 universalised	 Western	 values	 and	 linked	 them	 with	
progress	 whilst	 simultaneously	 denigrating	 those	 of	 peripheral	 countries	 and	
tying	them	to	stagnation	and	underdevelopment.	This	tendency	reappears	in	the	
neoliberal	 development	 framework,	 which	 employs	 universalistic	 theoretical	




This	 is	 evidenced	by	neoliberalism’s	 ‘miserable	 economic	 record’,	 according	 to	
economist	Ha-Joon	Chang.	Chang	observes	that	where	economic	growth	has	been	
achieved	 through	 structural	 adjustment,	 this	 has	 come	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 growing	
inequality,	 intensified	 social	 tension,	 emasculation	 of	 democratic	 institutions,	
environmental	degradation	and	other	social	problems	(Chang,	2003,	p.	5).	Chang	
observes	 that	 wealthy	 core	 nations	 achieved	 their	 economic	 success	 through	
protectionist	policies	–	 the	antithesis	of	 the	 free-market	policies	 that	 they	now	
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espouse.	For	example,	it	was	through	tariff	protections	on	its	own	wool	industry	
that	 Britain	 crossed	 the	 threshold	 of	 the	 industrial	 revolution	 (Chang,	 2011).	
David	 Harvey	 advances	 another	 compelling	 critique,	 stating	 that	 the	 ‘main	
substantive	achievement	of	neoliberalisation	[…]	has	been	to	redistribute,	rather	
than	 to	 generate,	 wealth	 and	 income’	 (Harvey,	 2005,	 p.	 159).	 After	 the	
implementation	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	 in	 the	 late	 1980s,	 the	 share	 of	 national	
income	of	the	top	1%	of	income	earners	in	the	US	soared,	to	reach	15%	by	the	end	
of	 the	 century	 (Harvey,	2005,	p.	16).	A	 similar	 situation	 is	observed	 in	Britain,	
where	 the	 top	 1%	 doubled	 their	 share	 of	 national	 income	 from	 6.5%	 to	 13%	
between	1982	and	2005	(Harvey,	2005,	p.	17).	These	statistics	challenge	the	idea	
of	trickle	down	economics,	suggesting	that	whilst	some	of	the	wealth	generated	
by	 the	 private	 sector	 does	 inevitably	 trickle	 down,	 this	 tends	 to	 be	 minimal,	
unpredictable	 and	 inequitable.	 Chang	argues	 that	 the	 combination	of	 trimming	








(Artadi	 &	 Sala-i-Martin,	 2003,	 pp.	 3-4).	 Per	 capita	 income	 in	 Latin	 America	
dropped	by	7%	between	1980	and	2000	(Hopenhayn	&	Neumeyer,	2004,	p.	5).	
Critics	 insist	 that	 the	 neoliberal	 reforms	 attached	 to	 structural	 adjustment	
packages	 are	 largely	 responsible	 for	 plunging	 peripheral	 countries	 into	 ever-
greater	poverty;	 it	 is	not	 ‘despite	aid	and	 loans’,	 that	poverty	has	 increased	(as	




grand	political	 and	 economic	project,	 having	 achieved	 common	 sense	 status	 in	
much	of	the	world.	A	growing	body	of	literature	asserts	that	the	reasons	for	this	










explain	 development	 and	 poverty	 in	 the	 global	 periphery.	 Neoliberalism	
succumbs	to	the	same	problem	by	universalising	Western	values	and	assumptions	


















Frank,	 as	 an	 alternative	way	 of	 understanding	 historically	 embedded,	 politico-
economic	relations	of	capitalist	countries	within	the	context	of	the	global	economy	




economy,	which	 emerged	 in	 Europe	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 16th	 century,	 generates	
patterns	 of	 exploitation	 between	 three	 fundamental	 types	 of	 states:	 core,	
peripheral	and	semi-peripheral.	Core	states	focus	on	high	skilled,	capital-intensive	
production,	 whilst	 peripheral	 nations	 tend	 to	 monopolise	 relatively	 backward	
productive	 processes,	 representing	 low-wage	 areas.	 Semi-peripheral	 states	 lie	
midway	between	 the	 core	 and	 the	 periphery,	 coming	 into	 existence	 from	both	
developing	peripheries	and	declining	cores.	The	semi-peripheral	country	serves	
as	 a	 buffering	middle	 sector,	maintaining	 a	 hierarchic	 chain	 of	 exploitation	 by	
inspiring	both	aspiration	to	ascend	to	a	higher	stratum	and	fear	of	falling	into	the	
lower	 one	 (Fatton,	 2014).	 World-systems	 theorists	 understand	 that	 the	 three	
zones	of	 the	world	economy	are	tied	together	 in	an	exploitative	relationship	 in	
which	 wealth	 is	 drained	 from	 the	 periphery	 to	 the	 core.	 Furthermore,	
international	aid,	when	considered	via	the	world-systems	framework,	is	a	means	
of	 shaping	 the	 structures	 of	 peripheral	 nations	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 core	 nations,	
ensuring	that	they	conform	to	this	global	system.			According	to	this	logic,	nations	
like	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti	 are	 not	 failed	 or	 failing	 as	 a	 result	 of	 ill	
governance,	but	it	is	their	incorporation	into	an	unequal	world	system	that	keeps	
them	in	abject	poverty;	this	is	hugely	significant	for	the	conceptualisation	of	the	
state	 and	 the	 ‘blame’	 that	 can	 be	 apportioned	 for	 their	 economic	 malaise.	 All	






outer	 limits	 of	 this	 system	–	 the	outer	periphery	 (Fatton,	 2014).	 Economically,	
states	 in	the	outer	periphery	have	been	forced	to	the	very	bottom	of	the	global	
production	 process,	 where	 workers	 are	 paid	 extremely	 low	 wages	 and	 the	
majority	 live	 in	 abject	 poverty.	 Politically,	 their	 governments	 have	 extremely	
limited	independence,	despite	their	nominal	sovereignty.	According	to	Fatton,	the	




Although	 it	 presents	 the	 most	 radical	 alternative	 to	 conventional	 IR	 theory,	
scholars	have	pointed	to	a	number	of	problematic	tendencies	of	world-systems	
analysis.	 For	 Chamsy	 el	 Ojeili,	 in	 reducing	 the	many	 independent	 states	 of	 the	
world	to	just	three	positions,	world-systems	thinking	presents	a	challenge	to	‘the	
drive	 for	 specificity	 and	 nuance’	 and	 is	 therefore	 overly	 reductionist	 (el-Ojeili,	
2015,	p.	14).	He	finds	the	neat	categorisations	to	be	linear,	generic	and	woefully	
inadequate	 to	 account	 for	 the	 significant	 variability	 in	 history,	 culture,	




(Sanderson,	 2005).	 As	 a	 landlocked	 country,	 Chad	 faces	 unique	 structural	
challenges	 to	 accessing	 world	 markets	 that	 coastal	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 does	 not.	
Similarly,	other	critics	argue	that	by	placing	such	heavy	emphasis	on	the	economic	
dimension,	world-systems	analysis	succumbs	to	myopic	economism	and	therefore	
overlooks	 the	 centrality	 of	 culture	 (Palumbo-Liu,	 Robbins,	 &	 Tanoukhi,	 2011).	
Wallerstein	has	been	accused	of	economic	determinism	by	a	number	of	scholars	
who	 see	 world-systems	 analysis	 as	 based	 only	 on	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
dynamics	of	global	economic	forces	and	therefore	as	falling	short	of	an	adequate	
















Out	 of	 dependency	 theory,	 came	 the	 term	 neo-colonialism,	 which	 gained	
international	attention	in	1965	through	the	publication	of	Kwame	Nkrumah’s	Neo-
colonialism:	 The	 Last	 Stage	 of	 Imperialism,	which	 theorised	 the	 concept	 in	 the	
context	of	newly	independent	Africa.	Ghana’s	first	president,	Nkrumah,	developed	
the	idea	that	control	and	power	of	the	states	and	economies	of	the	ex-colonies	has	
been	 retained	 by	 the	 former	 colonial	 powers.	 Although	 Africa	 is	 nominally	
sovereign,	‘in	reality	its	economic	system	and	thus	its	political	policy	is	directed	
from	 outside’	 (Nkrumah,	 1965,	 p.	 ix).	 As	 with	 formal	 colonialism,	 the	 neo-







of	 a	 neo-colonial	 system.	 By	 controlling	 the	 world	 market	 and	 the	 prices	 of	
commodities	bought	and	sold	 there,	 core	 countries	are	able	 to	extract	primary	
resources	cheaply,	and	sell	the	manufactured	products	back	to	the	periphery	at	a	
fixed,	 high	price	 (Nkrumah,	 1965).	 This	 leads	Nagesh	Rao	 to	 suggest	 that	 neo-
colonialism	 and	 dependency	 theory	 have	 become	 inseparable;	 both	 hold	 that	
capital	accumulation	in	the	countries	of	the	imperialist	core	can	never	spread	to	
the	 former	colonies,	because	 their	peripheral	 status	 in	 the	world-system	keeps	
them	trapped	in	a	dependent	relationship	with	the	former	colonisers	(Rao,	2000).	
However,	 neo-colonial	 literature	 is	 explicitly	 political,	 avoiding	 the	 trap	 of	




the	 term	 Françafrique	 to	 denote	 the	 neo-colonial	 relationship	 that	 France	
cultivated	with	its	former	African	colonies	post-independence	(Verschave,	2004).	












scenes	 operator	 in	 doing	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 of	 what	 he	 claimed	 publicly,	
namely	 to	maintain	a	 structure	of	dependence’	 (Verschave,	2004,	p.	9).	 French	
policymaking	was	 developed	within	 a	 clandestine	 network	 of	 politicians,	 state	
officials,	military	officers,	CEOs	of	oil	and	military	companies	and	members	of	the	
African	 elite	 (Touati,	 2007).	 This	 has	 allowed	 France	 to	 maintain	 a	 dominant	






an	 increasing	 European	 presence	 in	 Africa	 and	 France’s	 move	 away	 from	 its	
traditional	 dirigiste	 paradigm	 to	 one	 that	 embraces	 a	 Washington-espoused	
neoliberal	economic	approach	are	all	factors	that	have	contributed	to	a	different	
type	 of	 French	 interventionism.	 French	 companies	 once	 dominated	 African	




On	 this	 basis,	 Tony	Chafer	has	 commented	 that	 the	Françafrique	 framework	 is	
‘inadequate	 for	 understanding	 French	 Africa	 policy	 more	 than	 50	 years	 after	
African	independence’	(Chafer,	2014,	p.	515).	However,	Bruno	Charbonneau	has	
cautioned	 that	 this	 shift	 ‘does	not	 inexorably	mark	 an	 end	 to	practices	 of	 neo-
colonialism’	 (Charbonneau,	 2008,	 p.	 280).	 Rather,	 France’s	 African	 policy	 has	
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vicissitudes	 in	 contemporary	 Françafrique	 behaviour,	 the	 centrality	 of	 this	
relationship	 revealingly	 situates	 postcolonial	 nations	 in	 a	 problematic,	





postcolonial	 nations.	 Rao	 comments	 that	 ‘neo-colonial	 dependency	 is	 not	 a	
permanent,	inevitable	or	typical	feature	of	third	world	development	at	all’	(Rao,	
2000,	 p.	 171).	 Examples	 that	 are	 regularly	 cited	 are	 the	 Asian	 ‘tigers’	 –	 South	
Korea,	 Taiwan,	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 Singapore,	 who	 achieved	 impressive	 levels	 of	
economic	 growth	 during	 the	 decades	 that	 followed	 independence	 (Rao,	 2000).	
The	 success	 of	 the	 Tigers	 is	 largely	 discussed	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 impressive	
economic	growth	only.	However,	a	number	of	scholars	have	criticised	the	heavy	
reliance	 on	 GDP	 as	 the	 sole	 measure	 of	 development,	 as	 it	 neglects	 and	 even	
encourages	environmental	plundering	as	well	as	masking	inequality	(Constanza,	
Hart,	 Posner,	&	 Talberth,	 2009;	 Kuznets,	 1934;	 Seers,	 1969).	 Indeed,	 since	 the	
Tigers	 shifted	 their	 policies	 to	 more	 neoliberal	 market	 reforms,	 they	 have	


























Furthermore,	 Jean-François	 Bayart	 has	 emphasised	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 neo-
colonised	 through	 his	 concept	 of	 extraversion.	 In	 the	 African	 context,	 Bayart	
argues	 that	 governance	 personnel	 are	 not	 passive	 victims	 of	 asymmetrical	
relations,	rather	they	actively	align	themselves	to	the	narratives	of	the	donors,	in	
order	to	access	greater	resources	into	their	state	(Bayart,	2000).	Extraversion	is	a	
policy	employed	by	African	officials	 in	order	 to	serve	 their	own	 interests	as	an	





colonial	 thesis.	 Rather	 than	 denying	 the	 wrongdoing	 of	 some	 African	 elites,	 it	
acknowledges	and	contextualises	instances	of	poor	governance	in	terms	of	how	




The	 neo-colonial	 literature	 is	 not	 acknowledged	 within	 mainstream	 IR.12 	This	
constitutes	a	conspicuous	hiatus	given	the	centrality	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty	
to	IR	as	a	field	of	scholarship	and	the	significant	implications	for	sovereignty	that	
neo-colonialism	poses.	This	 is	 likely	due	 to	 the	reality	 that	 the	concept	 is	often	
regarded	 as	 an	 outmoded	 concept	 in	 IR	 and	 indeed	 in	 development	 studies	
(Chafer,	 2014;	 Rao,	 2000).	 However,	 scholars	 working	 within	 other	 academic	





the	 sovereign	 state	 system	 has	 been	 transformed	 by	 a	 growing	 network	 of	
international	institutions	whose	purpose	is	to	realise	the	interests	of	core	states	
and	 transnational	 capital	 in	 the	 international	 system	 to	 the	 disadvantage	 of	
peripheral	nations	and	their	citizens.	Chimni	dubs	this	a	‘nascent	global	state’	with	
an	‘imperial	character’	(Chimni,	2004,	p.	2).	The	group	with	the	most	influence	in	
this	 global	 state,	 according	 to	 Chimni,	 is	 the	 transnational	 capitalist	 class,	







argues	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions	 that	 is	
contextualised	historically	and	politically.	Rejecting	both	the	neo-realist	view	that	
international	 institutions	 are	 simply	 an	 extension	 of	 state	 interests,	 and	 the	
neoliberal	view	that	they	play	an	independent	role	in	resolving	collective	issues,	






Anthropologist	 Yarimar	 Bonilla	 echoes	 this	 view,	 asserting	 that	 claims	 to	 a	
‘waning’	sovereignty	through	the	‘natural’	process	of	globalisation	are	dangerous	
as	 they	 permit	 core	 states	 to	 carry	 out	 interventions	 in	 the	 name	 of	 freedom,	
democracy	 and	 human	 rights.	 She	 writes:	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 “failed”	 or	 “occupied”	




non-independent	 territories	 of	 the	 Caribbean,	 as	 evidence	 for	 the	 fictions	 of	





	‘They	are	embedded	 in	a	sea	of	nominally	sovereign	nations	 that	are	mired	 in	
postcolonial	crises	of	structural	adjustment,	NGO	shadow	states,	interventionist	
humanitarianism,	and	the	heavy	hand	of	supranational	institutions,	and	foreign	







A	 key	 contribution	 to	 the	 neo-colonial	 literature	 is	 Mark	 Langan’s	 book	 Neo-
colonialism	and	the	poverty	of	‘Development’	in	Africa,	which	sets	out	the	case	for	
recovering	 the	 concept.	 Langan	 argues	 that	 engaging	 with	 the	 concept	 of	
sovereignty	does	not	necessitate	‘an	ontological	fetish	with	physical	borders’,	but	











TNCs,	 financial	 institutions	 and	 donors,	 like	 the	 BWIs.	 This	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	
present	study,	as	it	is	concerned	with	the	role	of	these	organisations	in	the	context	
of	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti.	 The	 role	 of	 transnational	 actors	 can	 also	 be	




sovereignty	 of	 nation-states	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 globalisation	 happens	 in	 a	
powerless	vacuum.	Rather,	 there	 is	 a	dramatic	divergence	 in	 the	experience	of	
core	 and	 peripheral	 states	 under	 neoliberal	 globalisation;	 it	 is	 a	 dialectical	
phenomenon	that	involves	processes	that	are	complex,	uneven	and	contradictory.	
Core	 states	 continue	 to	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 world	 economy,	
evidenced	by	 the	power	of	 the	G20	 in	designing	and	establishing	 international	





by	 ‘variability’	 of	 current	 receipts	 and	 net	 capital	 flows	 (15%);	 and	 financial	
strength	and	ability	to	contribute	to	the	IMF’s	finances	(5%)	(Vestergaard	&	Wade,	
2014,	 p.	 14).	 The	method	of	 allocation	of	 vote	 share	 at	 the	World	Bank	 is	 less	
transparent;	 the	 organisation	 does	 not	 share	 details	 of	 its	 calculations	
(Vestergaard,	 2011).	 The	 voting	 share	 varies	 across	 the	 different	 lending	










Despite	 the	 reality	 that	 it	 is	 these	 asymmetrical	 power	 relationships	 that	 have	
allowed	the	propagation	of	neoliberal	policies	in	the	global	periphery	via	IMF	and	
World	Bank-sponsored	programmes,	very	few	studies	have	sought	to	understand	
the	 relationship	 between	 neoliberalism	 and	 neo-colonialism.	 Giles	 Mohan	 and	
Tunde	Zack-Williams	contribute	a	notable	exception;	they	argue	that	imperialism	
seeks	a	model	neo-colony	that	will	open	its	markets	to	its	manufactured	goods,	
provide	 a	 safe	 haven	 for	 its	 investments	 and	 unrestrained	 avenue	 for	 profit	
repatriation	(Mohan	&	Zack-Williams,	2005).	Hugo	Radice	is	another	anomaly;	he	






reproduce	 global	 inequalities	 of	 wealth	 and	 power’	 (Radice,	 2005,	 p.	 96).	 He	
concludes	that	the	role	of	neoliberalism	is	to	provide	an	ideological	justification	
for	this	new	form	of	imperialism	that	amounts	to	‘nothing	less	than	the	extensive	
“re-embedding”	of	capitalism	across	 the	world,	as	a	social	order	 that	 is	at	once	
global	and	national’	(Radice,	2005,	pp.	97-98).	This	thesis	situates	itself	broadly	
within	 this	more	 critical	 literature	 that	understands	neoliberal	 globalisation	as	
furthering	 the	 process	 of	 capitalist	 accumulation	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 world.	 It	
examines	 the	 experiences	of	 Chad,	 Côte	d’Ivoire	 and	Haiti	 both	 as	postcolonial	
nations	and	as	a	neoliberal	states,	thereby	filling	an	important	gap	in	the	literature.	
	
Postcolonial	 scholars	 have	 also	 engaged	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 neo-colonialism.	
Postcolonial	 theory	 seeks	 to	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 literature,	 sexuality,	
politics,	political	science,	science	and	many	other	disciplines	have	been	decisively	





employed	by	postcolonial	 scholars	 as	 a	 critique	 of	 cultural	 imperialism,	where	
they	perceive	core	nations	 to	be	controlling	peripheral	nations’	values	 through	
media,	 language,	 education	 and	 religion.	 Whilst	 it	 is	 often	 referenced	 in	
postcolonial	 literature,	 it	 is	seldom	defined.	Postcolonialism	has	therefore	been	
criticised	for	being	‘too	caught	up	in	a	linguistic	and	cultural	turn	to	be	of	much	
relevance	to	real	history’	(Krishna,	2009,	p.	111).	In	other	words,	by	neglecting	















exploitation	 as	well	 changing	 the	 order	 of	 discourse;	 the	 problem	 is	 seen	 as	 a	











to	 emphasise	 the	material	 aspects	of	development	 at	 the	expense	of	 ideational	
aspects	(Langan,	2018).	By	failing	to	contend	with	the	role	of	ideas,	this	overlooks	
the	 importance	 of	 language	 and	 thereby	 evades	 cultural,	 social	 and	 ideological	
explanations	for	material	phenomena.	Critical	constructivists	argue	that	if	we	are	




Understanding	 how	 the	 discourse	 behind	 rules	 and	 norms	 that	 govern	 the	 aid	
relationship	and	the	way	that	interventions	in	economic	and	financial	affairs	are	
legitimised	by	donors,	is	crucial	to	any	modern	understanding	of	postcolonial	or	
neo-colonial	 relations.	 Antonio	 Gramsci’s	 conceptions	 of	 power	 and	 hegemony	
can	help	contribute	to	this	enquiry,	and	are	useful	in	understanding	current	trends	
of	neoliberal	globalisation	within	this	evolving	global	system.	Gramsci’s	ideas	have	
become	 particularly	 influential	 in	 the	 field	 of	 IPE	 and	 are	 compatible	 on	 an	
epistemological	 level	 with	 Critical	 Discourse	 Analysis	 (CDA),	 the	 methodology	
adopted	by	 this	 study.	Gramsci	was	 intensely	 interested	 in	 the	 issue	of	power,	
seeking	to	understand	who	holds	power	and	how	they	wield	it.	Conceptualising	
power	 as	Machiavelli’s	 centaur,	 half-man	 half-beast,	 a	mixture	 of	 coercion	 and	
consent,	Gramsci	introduced	the	concept	of	a	hegemonic	order,	characterised	by	





by	 the	 exploited	majority,	 through	 the	 institutions	 of	 civil	 society,	 such	 as	 the	














freedom	 of	 self-expression	 is	 allowed	 to	 the	 subordinated	 groups,	 thereby	
maintaining	the	continued	consent.	This	is	achieved	through	cultural	production;	
ideas	 and	 discourse	 are	 therefore	 central	 to	 this	 process.	 Gramscian	 thought	







Robert	 Cox	 has	 developed	 a	 neo-Gramscian	 approach	 that	 critiques	 prevailing	



















penetrates	 into	 all	 countries	 and	 links	 into	 other	 subordinate	 modes	 of	
production.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 complex	 of	 international	 social	 relationships,	 which	





across	 national	 boundaries,	 rules	 which	 support	 the	 dominant	 mode	 of	
production’	(Cox,	1996,	p.	137)	
	
	Cox	 lists	 five	 elements	 that	 are	key	 to	understanding	how	hegemony	operates	
through	 international	 institutions.	 These	 are:	 1)	 they	 embody	 the	 rules	which	












that	 the	 spread	 of	 neoliberalism	 has	 occurred	 by	means	 of	 both	 coercion	 and	
consent,	with	the	equilibrium	of	these	methods	depending	on	the	socio-political	
context	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Graham	Harrison	 is	 another	 example,	 arguing	 that	 ‘in	
itself,	neoliberalism	does	nothing;	its	“presence”	emerges	through	its	embodiment	
in	discourse	and	practice,	and	only	then	through	the	effort	of	interpretation	and	
critical	 reconstruction’	 (Harrison,	 2010,	 p.	 29).	 As	 an	 economic	 doctrine,	
neoliberalism	works	within	the	economy	to	forge	global,	deregulated	markets.	As	
a	 discourse,	 it	 aims	 to	 change	 the	 way	 that	 we	 think	 about	 development	 by	
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providing	 a	 different	 ‘grammar’	 concerning	 social	 change	 and	 economic	
management	 (Harrison,	 2010,	 p.	 32).	 Building	 on	 this	 tradition,	 this	 study	
contributes	 to	 a	 growing	 scholarship	 that	 understands	 neoliberalism	 as	 an	
ideological	hegemonic	project.			
	 	
Essential	 to	 such	 an	 enquiry,	 is	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 language	 in	
perpetuating	neoliberal	norms.	Indeed,	Gramsci	understood	language	as	both	an	
element	in	the	exercise	of	power,	and	a	metaphor	for	how	power	operates.	The	




and	 political	 worlds	 (Donoghue,	 2017).	 A	 central	 mechanism	 in	 a	 Gramscian	
hegemonic	 system	 is	 common	 sense,	 defined	 by	 Matthew	 Donoghue	 as	 ‘the	
internalisation	 and	 normalisation	 of	 a	 particular	 worldview,	 which	 takes	
subjective	 positions	 and	 makes	 them	 innocuous	 and	 therefore	 unquestioned’	
(Donoghue,	2017,	p.	4).	Ideologies	conveyed	through	discourse	are	not	imposed	
but	are	accepted	and	 it	 is	 illustrative	to	examine	the	role	of	donor	discourse	 in	
solidifying	 common	 sense	 understandings	 of	 development	 economics.	
Understood	through	a	Gramscian	lens,	discourse	has	a	hegemonic	function	in	the	
building	 of	 consent	 in	 international	 institutions	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 present	








historical	 and	 political	 contexts,	 helps	 problematize	 dominant	 paradigms	 and	
	
13	Whilst	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 squarely	on	 the	 institutional	discourse	of	 the	BWIs,	 other	




perspective	 is	 inevitably	 bound	 to	 discourse	 analysis	 to	 be	 able	 to	 assess	 how	








of	 the	 development	 of	 postcolonial	 states,	 from	 the	 fields	 of	 IR,	 development	
studies,	 postcolonial	 theory	 and	 IPE.	 Although	 Eurocentric	 in	 its	 origins,	
sovereignty	in	its	Westphalian	conception	remains	relevant	to	the	study	of	aid	and	
development.	The	present	study	rejects	the	liberal	and	realist	attempts	to	dismiss	
or	 reconceptualise	 sovereignty.	 In	 line	 with	 Langan’s	 position,	 I	 argue	 that	
sovereignty	 is	 a	useful	 category	 for	understanding	whether	nations	are	able	 to	






The	 academic	 field	 of	 IR	 seeks	 to	 describe	 the	 international	 system	 and	 its	
relations	 and	 is	 therefore	 well	 placed	 to	 answer	 questions	 about	 postcolonial	
sovereignty.	 However,	 there	 exists	 a	 significant	 lacuna	 in	 this	 space,	 where	
debates	about	state	sovereignty	are	often	reduced	the	 ‘national	to	global’	story,	
ignoring	 the	 asymmetries	 of	 power	 embedded	 within	 the	 global	 capitalist	
framework,	particularly	with	respect	to	postcolonial	countries.	The	linear	vision	
of	 progress	 of	 the	 liberal	 tradition	 transforms	 neoliberal	 globalisation	 into	 a	
natural	necessity,	denying	the	possibility	of	historical	choices.	This	study	follows	





postcolonial	 history	 in	 forging	 a	 negative	 development	 trajectory.	 This	 study	
broadly	 situates	 itself	 within	 this	 tradition,	 understanding	 the	 experience	 of	
postcolonial	 nations	 under	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 asymmetrical	 power	
relations	within	the	global	system	that	are	the	result	of	the	colonial	legacy.		
	
However,	 in	 placing	 such	 importance	 on	 the	 economic	 dimension,	 these	





bring	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	 development	 trajectory	 of	 these	
countries,	 avoiding	 the	 economism	 inherent	 in	 the	 reductionist	 nature	 of	
neoliberalism.	Only	with	this	theoretical	synthesis,	can	we	more	fully	understand	
the	postcolonial	development	experience	and	its	intersection	with	the	neoliberal	
hegemonic	 order.	 The	 present	 study	 seeks	 to	 re-engage	 neo-colonialism	 as	 a	
































and	 1980s	 primarily	 through	 the	 work	 of	 Bhaskar	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	
positivist/constructivist	dichotomy.	Bhaskar	accuses	both	approaches	of	reducing	
ontology	(what	is	real,	the	nature	of	reality)	to	epistemology	(our	knowledge	of	
reality)	 (Fletcher,	 2017).	 Whilst	 positivism	 limits	 reality	 to	 what	 can	 be	





In	 contrast,	 critical	 realists	posit	 that	 there	exists	both	a	world	 independent	of	
human	 consciousness,	 and	 a	 dimension	 that	 includes	 our	 socially	 determined	
knowledge	 about	 reality.	 It	 is	 therefore	possible	 to	 attempt	 to	 understand	 and	


















Critical	 realism	 therefore	 ‘reclaims’	 causal	 analysis	 for	 the	 critical	 traditions	








therefore	 allows	 us	 to	 explain	 the	 causal	 influence	 of	 social	 structures,	 via	 the	
dominant	ideologies	that	sustain	and	reproduce	them.	This	corresponds	closely	to	
the	objectives	of	this	thesis	as	it	allows	the	development	of	a	more	nuanced	causal,	
discursive	 narrative	 about	 how	 neoliberalism	 shapes	 development	 policy,	
including	greater	ontological	depth.		
	
In	 line	 with	 this	 approach,	 knowledge	 is	 acquired	 through	 a	 process	 of	




empirically	 observable	 social	 phenomena	 in	 order	 to	 postulate	 a	 real	 causal	










has	 a	 long	 history	 in	 the	 social	 sciences,	 employed	 by	 the	 founding	 fathers	 of	
modern	 social	 sciences	 Adam	 Smith	 and	 Karl	 Marx	 to	 find	 new	 ways	 of	
understanding	new	large-scale	phenomena.	Whilst	one-country	studies	detail	the	
individual	path	of	a	nation-state	and	offer	in-depth	analysis	on	a	particular	case,	
they	may	 fail	 to	 capture	 epoch-shaping	developments	 (Lichbach	&	Zuckerman,	
1997).	Neoliberal	 globalisation	has	meant	 that	 the	 international	political	 arena	
has	 become	 increasingly	 complex	 and	 active,	 augmenting	 the	 demand	 for	
comparative	 studies.	 Case-oriented	 comparative	methods	provide	 the	basis	 for	
examining	how	conditions	combine	in	different	ways	and	in	different	contexts	to	
produce	different	outcomes.	In	doing	so,	comparative	work	helps	to	build	theory	
by	 identifying	 single-case	 anomalies	 and	 revealing	 larger	 trends;	 as	 Wiarda	
argues,	 ‘comparative	 politics	 is	 particularly	 interested	 in	 exploring	 patterns,	
processes,	 and	 regularities	 among	 political	 systems.	 It	 looks	 for	 trends,	 for	
changes	of	patterns;	and	tries	to	develop	general	propositions	or	hypotheses	that	




In	 focussing	 on	 just	 three	 case	 studies,	 this	 study	 adopts	 a	 small-N	 approach.	
Whilst	 large-N	 studies	 of	 development	 benefit	 from	 greater	 breadth	 and	 can	
therefore	test	hypotheses	with	greater	confidence,	they	tend	to	abstract	particular	
phenomena	 from	 their	 context.	 They	 are	 able	 to	 explain	 the	 occurrence/non-
occurrence	 of	 phenomena,	 but	 not	 explain	 their	 specific	 features,	 i.e.:	 why	
something	 occurred	 and	 the	 way	 it	 occurred.	 Working	 with	 many	 countries	
therefore	 increases	 the	risk	of	building	on	 insufficiently	deep	knowledge	about	









intermediate	 factors	 lying	 between	 a	 structural	 cause	 and	 its	 purported	 effect	
(Gerring,	2011,	p.	1146).	The	present	study	benefits	from	the	detailed	analysis	of	
studying	 just	 three	 countries.	 Whereas	 large-N	 comparative	 studies	 tend	 to	
decontextualize	 phenomena,	 this	 approach	 is	 intended	 to	 provide	 a	 more	
sophisticated	 understanding	 of	 the	 case	 studies.	 The	 research	 is	 holistic	 and	
concerns	 itself	with	a	 thick	description	of	events,	 spanning	a	 time	period	of	30	
years	and	covering	a	number	of	policy	 themes.	At	 the	same	 time,	 the	choice	of	
three	countries	with	unique	political	and	economic	conditions,	allows	the	study	to	
capture	trends	that	are	not	regionalised	to	the	Caribbean,	to	Sub-Saharan	Africa,	














Haiti	 came	under	French	colonial	 rule	around	 the	year	1700	having	previously	




Haiti	 exported	 enormous	 amounts	 of	 cocoa,	 coffee,	 tobacco,	 cotton	 and	 other	
exotic	 products	 to	 the	 metropole,	 but	 sugar	 was	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 slave	





applied	 was	 inconsistent.	 Indeed,	 unfree	 labour	 persisted	 during	 the	 second	






economies.	 In	 Chad,	 the	 colonial	 administration	 established	 cotton	 plantations	
throughout	the	more	fertile	Southern	regions	of	the	country	and	cotton	quickly	
became	 a	 major	 export.	 In	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 the	 French	 colonialists	 began	 the	
commercial	production	of	cocoa	during	the	early	20th	century;	by	the	1930s	it	had	
become	an	important	commodity	(World	Bank,	1977b).	Like	18th	century	Haiti,	
Côte	 d’Ivoire	 was	 quickly	 established	 as	 the	 most	 economically	 successful	











the	 last	 to	 dissolve	 in	 1960;	 the	 African	 case	 studies	 have	 been	 nominally	
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independent	 for	 just	 60	 years,	 compared	 with	 Haiti’s	 three	 centuries	 of	
independent	history.	
	












beyond	 their	 French	 colonial	 history.	 However,	 in	 crucial	 respects,	 they	 share	
certain	 important	 features	 that	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 insightful	 comparison	



















in	 the	 top	 thirteen	 most	 ‘fragile’	 countries	 in	 the	 world. 16 	The	 UN’s	 Human	
Development	 Index	 (HDI)	 is	 another	 popular	 tool,	 which	 ranks	 countries	







‘The	 Troubled	 Ten’,	 which	 sought	 provide	 some	 context	 and	 to	 begin	 to	
understand	why	they	continue	to	score	so	poorly	(Messner	&	Lawrence,	2013).	
The	FFP	highlighted	poor	 climate,	 radicalisation	 and	unemployment	 to	 explain	
Chad’s	 poor	 performance,	 and	 wide	 scale	 corruption	 and	 limited	 government	
capacity	 in	 Haiti.	 As	 chapter	 one	 outlined,	 corruption	 is	 a	 common	 trope	 in	
mainstream	IR	literature.	The	World	Bank	‘considers	corruption	a	major	challenge	
to	 its	 institutional	 goals	 of	 ending	 extreme	 poverty	 […]	 and	 boosting	 shared	
prosperity	 for	 the	 poorest	 40	 percent	 in	 development	 countries’	 (World	Bank,	
2018).	Billions	of	heavily	tagged	anti-corruption	dollars	regularly	flow	from	the	
BWIs	 and	donor	 countries	 to	 the	periphery	 every	 year.	The	Berlin-based	NGO,	
Transparency	 International,	 releases	 an	 annual	 Corruption	 Perceptions	 Index	
(CPI)	which	is	‘based	on	expert	opinion	from	around	the	world’	and	‘measures	the	









critics	 pointed	 out	 that	 its	 name	 created	 a	 false	 binary	 between	 failed	 and	 non-failed	
states	(Leigh,	2012).	
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Rankings	 play	 an	 increasingly	 important	 role	 in	 the	 domains	 of	 IR	 and	 public	
policy.	 As	 tools	 of	 organisational	 power,	 they	 are	 designed	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	
states	to	improve	their	domestic	institutions	or	policymaking.	There	is	debate	as	
to	their	utility,	with	more	critical	scholars	taking	these	indices	to	task	for	focussing	
on	 internal	 government	 policies	 and	 ignoring	 the	 broader	 socioeconomic	 and	
global	causes	(Bukovansky,	2015;	Cooley	&	Snyder,	2015),	something	that	chapter	
one	 identified	 as	 a	 problematic	 tendency	 of	 traditional	 IR	 and	 development	
scholarship.	However	 flawed,	 the	FSI	 and	other	 rankings	 inadvertently	 show	a	
clear	correlation	between	colonial	history	and	underdevelopment;	in	2015,	every	













is	 recognised	 as	 formally	 independent,	 their	 attainment	 and	 exercise	 of	























the	perpetrators	 of	 a	military	 coup,	which	 removed	 the	democratically	 elected	
President	 Jean-Bertrand	 Aristide	 (Engler	 &	 Fenton,	 2005).	 18 	Eventually	 the	
Clinton	 administration	 returned	 Aristide	 to	 Haiti	 in	 1994,	 under	 a	 US-led	
multinational	force.	He	was	re-elected	in	2000	only	to	be	once	again	removed	in	
2004	by	foreign	powers	–	this	time	the	Haitian	political	elite	colluded	with	the	US,	
Canadian	 and	 French	 governments	 to	 forcibly	 remove	 the	 President	 from	









French	 military	 intervened	 in	 1968	 and	 again	 in	 1971	 to	 suppress	 a	 Libyan-
	









toppled	 in	 1975	 and	 the	 subsequent	 decade	 saw	 France	 and	 Libya	 fighting	
opposite	 sides	 in	 the	 ongoing	 civil	 war	 in	 Chad.	 France	 sent	 their	 largest	
expeditionary	force	ever	assembled	in	Africa	(excluding	Algeria’s	liberation	war)	
Opération	Manta	in	1983,	to	prevent	Libya	from	annexing	Northern	Chad.	The	US	
also	 joined	 in	 the	conflict,	 sending	economic	and	military	 resources	 to	 support	
rebel	groups,	undermining	the	French	government	(Schmidt	E.	,	2013).	Cold	War	
politics	 influenced	 this	 decision;	 the	 Reagan	 administration	 reasoned	 that	 the	
rebel	groups	were	more	anti-Communist	than	the	incumbent	President	and	would	
be	more	ready	to	challenge	Libya,	whose	relations	with	the	USSR	at	the	time	were	
deemed	 to	 be	 too	 friendly	 (Norland,	 2003).	 This	 fundamentally	 altered	 the	
dynamic	 of	 the	 conflict	 from	 one	 between	 warring	 ethnicities	 supported	 by	 a	
postcolonial	power,	to	one	where	a	purportedly	sovereign	state	became	simply	a	
pawn	 in	 the	 political	 agendas	 of	 much	 larger,	 more	 affluent	 states.	 Becoming	
embroiled	in	Cold	War	political	machinations	is	another	commonality	shared	by	
Chad	and	Haiti.	In	1990,	Idriss	Déby	toppled	the	leadership,	with	the	support	of	
the	 French	 secret	 services	 (Norland,	 2003).	 Déby’s	 government	 has	 been	






were	 characterised	 by	 relative	 political	 stability,	 although	 French	military	 and	
political	 influence	was	of	equal	importance;	Ivorian	President	Félix	Houphouët-
Boigny	 personified	 neo-colonial	 Françafrique	 relations,	 agreeing	 a	 bilateral	
defence	treaty	in	1961	which	gave	France	the	right	to	station	French	forces	in	the	
country	 and	 the	 responsibility	 to	 intervene	 if	 an	 external	 threat	 is	 posed.	
Houphouët-Boigny’s	 death	 in	 1993	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 mutual	 interests	 of	 the	
Ivorian	and	French	governments.	Indeed,	when	called	upon	for	military	assistance	
by	then-President	Gbagbo	in	2002,	the	French	government	did	not	oblige.	A	civil	
war	 lasted	 from	2002	 to	2007,	with	 the	 leader	of	 the	attempted	coup	Alassane	
Ouattara	 taking	 control	 of	 northern	 parts	 of	 the	 country,	 with	 the	 support	 of	
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period	 of	 five	 years,	 but	 failed	 to	 resolve	 the	 conflict.	 The	 United	 Nations	
Operations	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	(UNOCI)	was	formed	in	2004	to	ensure	that	the	rebels	
disarm,	 but	 this	 was	 not	 achieved	 (Pigeaud,	 2011).	 In	 April	 2011,	 the	 French	
Licorne	forces	intervened	again,	to	remove	President	Gbagbo	and	allow	Ouattara	
to	 assume	 the	 role	 of	 president,	 following	 an	 electoral	 dispute	 in	 which	 both	
parties	claimed	victory	in	the	election	(Pigeaud,	2011).	
	
This	 discussion	 demonstrates	 that	 military	 intervention	 has	 been	 a	 common	
theme	 in	 the	postcolonial	histories	of	 these	countries.	 	The	extent	 to	which	the	
former	colonial	power	and	indeed	other	international	players	have	intervened	in	
all	 three	 cases,	 playing	 a	 key	 role	 in	 deciding	 who	 is	 fit	 or	 unfit	 to	 govern,	 is	
evidence	of	the	external	interests	at	play	in	the	governance	of	these	economies.	A	
myriad	 of	 different	 motivating	 political	 and	 social	 factors	 have	 driven	 these	
various	external	interventions,	the	exploration	of	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	
present	study.	However,	 the	pattern	of	military	 intervention	 is	 significant,	as	 it	
suggests	that	the	moment	of	independence	cannot	truly	be	understood	as	the	birth	
of	a	sovereign	nation.	Rather,	the	legacy	of	colonial	structures	has	endured	and	








the	 country’s	 total	 value	of	 exports	 (World	Bank,	2020b,	p.	74).	Côte	d’Ivoire’s	







Importantly,	 the	 origins	 of	 these	 high	 levels	 of	 external	 debts	 lie	 in	 their	
experiences	as	 colonies,	 something	 that	 the	 introduction	 to	 chapters	 three	and	
four	explores	 in	more	detail.	However,	 the	period	during	which	 the	debts	have	
grown	 at	 the	 quickest	 pace	 is	 during	 structural	 adjustment.	 As	 SAP	 and	 PRSP	
credits	 were	 disbursed	 to	 fund	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 development	
programmes,	all	three	countries	saw	their	total	external	debts	and	debt	service	
repayments	reaching	unsustainable	levels.	As	the	most	recent	indicators	suggest,	
the	 debt-to-exports	 ratios	 have	 not	 much	 improved,	 despite	 development	
strategies	and	debt	relief	granted	under	the	HIPC	initiative.		This	is	an	important	
commonality	of	 these	 three	countries,	which	begs	 the	question:	why	have	such	











































three	 case	 studies.	 This	 section	 has	 highlighted	 three	 important	 areas	 of	
commonality	between	Chad,	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti,	which	provide	a	sound	basis	
for	 comparative	 analysis.	 These	 former	 French	 colonies	 have	 ended	 up	 in	 the	
lower	echelons	of	global	rankings,	branded	as	‘failed’,	‘fragile’	and	‘corrupt’.	They	
have	also	each	been	subject	to	numerous	external	military	interventions	in	their	
postcolonial	 periods,	 suggesting	 that	 their	 journey	 to	 true	 sovereignty	 has	 not	
been	straightforward	and	that	power	asymmetries	continue	to	exist	in	the	global	
political	system,	giving	nations	in	the	global	core	the	capacity	and	legitimacy	to	
exert	 their	 military	 influence	 over	 these	 former	 colonies.	 Lastly,	 they	 have	
accumulated	unsustainable	levels	of	external	debts,	having	been	the	recipients	of	
large	 quantities	 of	 international	 finance,	 which	 appear	 to	 have	 had	 very	 little	
positive	impact	on	development	indicators.		
	
Yet,	as	 the	 table	and	preceding	discussion	show,	 these	countries	have	 followed	
quite	different	development	trajectories.	They	have	each	pursued	different	trade	



















































centuries	 in	 the	Haitian	 context,	 arguably	 ample	 time	 for	 them	 to	have	broken	
away	 from	 their	 colonial	 masters	 and	 forged	 more	 positive	 futures	 for	 their	
citizens.	The	reality	of	their	economic	predicaments	throws	out	some	important	




borrowed	 from	 multilateral	 institutions	 to	 develop	 successfully,	 with	 strong	
economies,	political	institutions	and	welfare	states?		
	 	




economy,	 an	 oil	 economy	 and	 an	 assembly	 economy,	 this	 study	 explores	 a	
spectrum	 of	 experiences	 and	 insights	 into	 the	 neoliberal	 turn	 in	 postcolonial	
states	 within	 a	 globalised	 capitalist	 economic	 system.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 a	 non-
African	country	in	the	comparison,	coupled	with	the	complexity	of	interests	across	
all	three	countries,	problematizes	the	traditional	Françafrique	framework,	which	
places	at	 the	 centre	of	 its	 analysis	 the	 collusion	of	French	government	officials	
with	business	interests	and	African	elites.	In	Chad,	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti,	a	mêlée	














their	 polices,	 specifically	 the	 way	 that	 neoliberal	 ideology	 has	 influenced	 this	
framing.	Supporting	the	discourse	analysis	with	empirical	evidence,	via	detailed	
discussion	 of	 the	 specific	 policies	 seeks	 to	 illuminate	 the	 specific	 interrelation	












and/or	 rhetoric.	 For	 each	 period,	 two	 chapters	 explore	 the	 practical	 and	






out	 the	 discourse	 analysis	 was	 an	 iterative	 one,	 moving	 between	 theory	 and	
method/practice.	I	explain	this	process	in	the	following	section.	Before	outlining	
the	specific	tools	of	DHA,	I	consider	several	basic	principles	that	broadly	underpin	
the	 field	 of	 CDA	 and	 inform	 this	 research.	 CDA	 aims	 to	 explore	 the	 often-
	
24	Policy	shifts	at	the	BWIs	did	not	happen	overnight	in	the	transition	from	SAP	to	PRSP.	






obfuscated	 relationship	 between	 language,	 power	 and	 ideology,	 regarding	
language	 as	 social	 practice.	 Rather	 than	 focussing	 on	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	
linguistic	 features,	 CDA	 is	 therefore	 more	 concerned	 with	 interpreting	 the	
relationship	 between	 discourses	 and	 social	 structures.	 CDA	 acknowledges	 that	
texts	 construct	 representations	 of	 the	 world,	 social	 relationships	 and	 social	










Applying	 this	 definitional	 frame	 to	 this	 study	 suggests	 that	 events	 and	 ideas	
shaped	 the	 language	 used	 by	 the	 policymakers	 at	 the	 BWIs	 and,	 in	 turn,	 the	
language	used	by	those	policymakers	reflected	back	on	those	events	and	 ideas.	
CDA	 therefore	 proceeds	 from	 recognition	 of	 the	 discursive	 (or	 semiotic	 or	
linguistic)	 character	 of	 policymaking,	 broadly	 aligning	 it	 with	 a	 critical	 realist	
position.	CDA	is	especially	appropriate	for	critical	policy	analysis	as	it	advances	a	
detailed	investigation	of	the	relationship	of	language	to	other	elements	of	social	




















through	 the	 analysis	 of	 discourse.	 In	 this	 study,	 the	 CDA	 approach	 seeks	 to	
understand	the	influence	of	neoliberal	ideology	on	the	discourse	of	development	
at	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF.	 Chapter	 one	 delineated	 the	 neoliberal	
development	 paradigm	 and	 argued	 for	 the	 usefulness	 of	 a	 neo-Gramscian	








are	 being	 privileged	 in	 the	 process?	 By	 revealing	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 social	
structures	and	ideologies	shape	and	reproduce	social	practices,	CDA	provides	an	




as	 a	 ‘falsehood’	 in	binary	opposition	with	 the	 ‘truth’.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	1997	
World	Development	Report,	authors	at	the	World	Bank	wrote	that	 ‘competitive	
pressures	from	globalisation	have	made	it	increasingly	urgent	for	government	to	
privatise	 or	 contract	 out	 activities	 in	 which	 it	 lacks	 comparative	 advantage’	
(World	Bank,	1997,	p.	165).	Casting	a	critical,	discursive	gaze	upon	this	claim,	we	
might	find	that	the	claim	is	ideological.	This	does	not	necessarily	make	the	claim	





reinforce	a	 certain	 (e.g.	neoliberal)	 social	order,	 and	 those	 that	 instead	seek	 to	
reveal	practices	of	dominance.	
	
This	 study	 borrows	 from	 the	 Discourse-Historical	 Approach	 (DHA)	 to	 CDA,	
developed	by	Ruth	Wodak	and	Martin	Reisigl.	The	DHA	concentrates	its	efforts	in	
the	field	of	politics,	where	it	tries	to	develop	conceptual	frameworks	for	political	
discourse,	and	 is	 therefore	 the	most	appropriate	method	 for	 the	present	study.	
Importantly,	the	DHA	focuses	its	analysis	on	the	language	of	those	in	power,	with	





socio-historical	 context.	 By	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 historical	 and	 political	






for	 this	 thesis,	 since	 it	 is	 designed	 to	 expose	 the	 ‘persuasive	 or	 “manipulative”	
character	of	discursive	practices’	(Reisigl	&	Wodak,	2009,	p.	88).25	In	making	the	
socio-diagnostic	critique,	the	researcher	makes	‘use	of	contextual	knowledge	and	
draw	 on	 social	 theories	 as	 well	 as	 other	 theoretical	 models	 to	 interpret	 the	




25	The	 other	 two	 approaches	 are:	 text	 or	 discourse-immanent	 critique,	which	 aims	 at	
discovering	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 text-internal	 or	 discourse-internal	 structures;	 and	
















Reisigl	and	Wodak	delineate	a	substantial	 list	of	devices	 that	are	used	order	 to	
enact	these	strategies,	including	topoi,	negative	and	positive	adjectives	and	nouns,	





justified	 by	 a	 warrant)	 that	 need	 not	 be	 stated	 explicitly,	 either	 because	 it	 is	
familiar	to	the	discourse	community	or	is	considered	self-evident,	at	least	within	
the	given	discourse	community’	(Paprota,	2018,	pp.	50-51).		

















and	argumentation	 strategies,	but	 it	pays	 scant	attention	 to	how	 the	metaphor	




Developed	 by	 George	 Lakoff	 and	 Mark	 Johnson,	 CMT	 understands	 metaphor	
beyond	its	semantic	or	pragmatic	expression,	but	as	a	cognitive	phenomenon,	as	
much	 part	 of	 ordinary	 thought	 as	 of	 language.	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 argue	 that	





the	metaphor.	This	will,	 in	 turn,	 reinforce	 the	power	of	 the	metaphor	 to	make	




one	 conceptual	 domain	 (the	 target	 domain)	 in	 terms	 of	 another	 conceptual	
domain	(the	source	domain).	Source	domains,	according	to	Chilton,	have	a	clear	
tendency	to	be	based	in	human	physiological	experience	whereas	target	domains	
are	 more	 abstract,	 problematic	 conceptual	 areas	 (Chilton,	 2004).	 The	
	
26	The	importance	of	metaphors	in	discourses	of	international	political	economy	has	been	
explored	 by	 Rorden	 Wilkinson	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 WTO.	 Wilkinson	 highlights	 the	
























Metaphor	 is	 understood	 therefore	 to	 have	 an	 evaluative	 function	 and	 power,	
making	 it	 of	 special	 interest	 in	 a	 CDA	 study.	 Semino	 (2008)	 warns	 that	
unconscious	 metaphorical	 associations	 are	 especially	 dangerous	 as	 they	 are	
difficult	for	audiences	to	perceive	and	therefore	challenge;	they	come	to	represent	
a	 ‘common	 sense’	 view	 of	 things	 (Semino,	 2008).	 When	 used	 enough,	 certain	
metaphors	can	become	political	tools	as	their	repeated	use	makes	them	invisible	
to	the	average	audience	as	both	metaphors	and	political	devices.	Critical	analysis	









A	 second	 weakness	 of	 the	 DHA,	 which	 was	 highlighted	 by	 the	 preliminary	




the	 economy	 (Bourdieu	 &	Wacquant,	 2001).	 They	 identify	 the	 ‘new	 planetary	
vulgate’	 of	 neoliberal	 globalisation,	 noting	 a	 series	 of	 oppositions	 and	
equivalences	 that	 are	 constructed	 in	 a	 neoliberal	 discourse	 of	 globalisation	 to	
represent	a	particular	comparative	image	of	the	state	versus	the	market.	Within	
this	 discourse,	 the	 market	 has	 positive	 connotations	 of	 freedom,	 openness,	
flexibility,	dynamism	and	above	all,	efficiency.	This	is	in	binary	opposition	with	the	





constraint	 	 	 	 	 freedom	
closed		 	 	 	 	 open	
rigid	 	 	 	 	 	 flexible	
immobile,	fossilised	 	 	 	 dynamic,	moving,	self-transforming	
past,	outdated	 	 	 	 future,	novelty	
stasis	 	 	 	 	 	 growth	
group,	lobby,	holism,	collectivism	 	 individual,	individualism	
uniformity,	artificiality	 	 	 diversity,	authenticity	




this	 thesis.	 The	 DHA	 allows	 for	 the	 association	 of	 some	 of	 the	 above	 binary	
oppositions	–	which	are	found	in	the	policy	documents	–	with	particular	topoi.	This	
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Fairclough’s	 techniques	 for	 textual	 analysis	 offer	 a	 more	 detailed,	 linguistic	
approach	to	CDA	(Fairclough,	2003).	This	enables	a	more	thorough	understanding	
of	how	a	discourse	is	sustained	at	the	linguistic	level.	Fairclough	examines	how	











competition’,	 indicated	 by	 the	 conjunction	 ‘and’.	 This	 affirms	 the	 relationship,	
since	the	coherence	of	the	sentence	depends	upon	it.	 	Fairclough’s	analysis	also	
helps	 to	 bring	 attention	 to	 where	 agency	 is	 obscured	 or	 emphasised,	 through	
passive	or	active	sentence	structures,	or	 through	use	of	nominalisation	 (where	
processes	are	presented	as	entities	by	their	nominal	form).	This	textual	analysis	





I	 have	 therefore	 drawn	 on	 Fairclough’s	 techniques	 for	 textual	 analysis	 where	
appropriate	 to	 strengthen	 the	 analysis	 and	 demonstrate	 the	 multiple	 ways	 in	
which	neoliberal	 ideology	works	 its	way	 into	the	development	discourse	of	 the	
BWIs.	 This	 multidisciplinary	 approach	 aligns	 with	 Fairclough’s	 assertion	 that	
textual	analysis	is	a	resource	for	social	research,	which	can	enhance,	provided	it	is	
used	in	conjunction	with	other	methods	of	analysis	(Fairclough,	2003).	It	is	also	in	
line	 with	 Wodak’s	 view	 that	 CDA	 practitioners	 should	 exercise	 ‘conceptual	


















as	 it	 enables	 easy	 and	meaningful	 international	 comparisons.	 However,	where	





enquiry	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	 postcolonial	 development	 experience	 with	
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neoliberalism,	 via	 a	 neo-Gramscian	 frame	 of	 analysis	 that	 understands	 power	




In	comparing	 three	 former	French	colonies,	 the	 four	analytical	 chapters	aim	 to	
advance	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 neoliberalism,	 as	 a	 development	 paradigm	
(articulated	 in	 the	 Washington	 Consensus)	 and	 as	 an	 ideological	 hegemonic	
project,	has	influenced	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF’s	lending	in	the	periphery.	In	
line	 with	 the	 neo-Gramscian	 emphasis	 on	 both	 the	 coercive	 and	 consensual	




2015).	 Borrowing	 insights	 from	 the	 DHA,	 CMT	 and	 Fairclough,	 the	 discourse	
analysis	 seeks	 to	 understand	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 donors	 legitimise	 their	
development	 programmes	 in	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti.	 The	 comparative	
approach,	 coupled	 with	 the	 unique	 synthesis	 of	 discourse	 approaches	 will	
augment	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 neoliberal	 ideology	 has	 shaped	 and	
reproduced	 development	 policy,	 reflecting	 and	 reinforcing	 the	 asymmetrical	
power	relationships	in	the	international	development	system.		
	
Part	 one	 –	 chapters	 three	 and	 four	 –	 applies	 this	 framework	 to	 the	 structural	
adjustment	era,	whilst	part	two	–	chapters	five	and	six	–	considers	the	PRS	era.	By	
comparing	across	two	supposedly	distinct	periods	of	policymaking,	the	approach	
seeks	 to	 understand	 the	 evolving	 nature	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 an	 ideological	
hegemonic	project,	in	line	with	the	neo-Gramscian	perspective.	Within	these	two	
parts,	 the	 chapters	 are	 split	 thematically,	 to	 examine	 two	 separate	 but	 related	
policymaking	areas:	 finance	and	 trade.	The	 following	section,	which	 introduces	






























finance	 (public	 spending	 and	 borrowing)	 and	 trade.	 The	 final	 part	 of	 this	
introductory	 section	 offers	 some	 historical	 context	 on	 pre-adjustment	





The	 structural	 adjustment	 era,	 beginning	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	 and	 concluding	 in	
1999	with	the	introduction	of	the	next	generation	of	aid	packages	–	the	PRSPs	-	
was	 an	 instrumental	 period	 for	 many	 postcolonial	 states.	 Through	 structural	
adjustment	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	intervened	extensively	in	the	economic,	









and	 IR,	have	 concerned	 themselves	with	analysing	 the	effects	of	 treaties,	 trade	
deals	and	policy	packages.	Studies	examining	the	impacts	of	structural	adjustment	
on	a	particular	industry	or	country	abound	(Dollar	&	Svensson,	2000;	Jamal,	1994;	
Kawewe	&	Dibie,	 2000;	Mosley,	Harrigan,	&	Toye,	 1991;	Watkins,	 1995).	 Such	
work	 has	 sought	 to	 understand	 whether	 and	 why	 liberalisation	 has	 failed	 to	
reverse	economic	decline	 in	 the	developing	world.	 Indeed,	a	number	of	studies	






structural	 adjustment	 is	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 neoliberal	 development	





ideological	 underpinnings	 of	 the	practices	 that	 are	 implicated	 in	 the	 structural	
adjustment	 framework	 and	 the	 power	 relations	 between	 the	 donors	 and	 the	
	 83	
governments.	Of	key	importance	is	the	way	that	global	power	is	exercised	through	
the	 discursive	 legitimisation	 of	 external	 financial	 and	 economic	 interventions,	
represented	by	the	neoliberal	development	agenda.	Through	critical	interrogation	
of	the	power	dynamics	manifested	in	the	structural	adjustment	framework,	this	
approach	 will	 attempt	 to	 gain	 insight	 into	 the	 implications	 for	 postcolonial	









facilities	and	different	 instruments	of	policy	reform.	Today,	 the	activities	of	 the	
World	Bank	and	the	IMF	have	become	so	interlinked	that	it	is	not	always	easy	to	
identify	 where	 the	 work	 of	 one	 ends	 and	 the	 other	 begins.	 Yet,	 upon	 their	
establishment	at	the	Bretton	Woods	conference	in	1944,	the	IMF	and	the	World	
Bank	had	specific	and	distinct	agendas.	The	IMF	was	set	up	to	regulate	the	new	
system	 of	 fixed	 exchanged	 rates,	 making	 loans	 in	 times	 of	 crisis	 to	 ensure	
international	 stability.	 The	 International	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	
Development	 (IBRD)	 (a	 lending	arm	of	 the	 institution	 that	would	 later	become	
known	as	the	World	Bank)	financed	the	reconstruction	of	those	countries	whose	
economies	had	been	ruined	by	World	War	II.	During	the	1950s,	both	institutions	
introduced	 conditionality	 into	 their	 lending	 (Peet,	 2009).	 The	 IMF	 lent	 via	 its	
Stand-By	Arrangement	(SBA)	whereby	the	borrower	could	make	purchases	from	








its	 Extended	 Fund	 Facility	 (established	 in	 1974)	 with	 funds	 attached	 to	
‘stabilisation’	 programmes	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	 announced	 its	 Structural	




of	 structural	 adjustment	 lending	 transformed	 the	 landscape	 of	 development	
financing	by	lending	for	policy	reform	(‘adjustment’)	rather	than	funding	specific	
development	 projects.	 Countries	 borrowing	 under	 the	 SAF	 were	 expected	 to	
develop	macroeconomic	and	structural	policy	reforms	for	the	economy	as	a	whole.	




adjustment	 lending	 (as	 opposed	 to	 earlier	 types	 of	 development	 finance)	 that	
drew	 critique	 from	 those	who	 viewed	 the	 SALs	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 economic	
coercion	(Braithwaite	&	Drahos,	2000).		
	
Policy	 reform	would	be	 incorporated	 in	a	Policy	Framework	Paper	 (PFP),	 to	be	
reviewed	 by	 Executive	 Directors	 of	 IMF	 and	 the	 World	 Bank.	 The	 Enhanced	
Structural	Adjustment	Facility	(ESAF)	replaced	the	SAF	in	1987.	The	World	Bank’s	
Country	Assistance	Strategy	(CAS)	was	introduced	in	1990	for	countries	borrowing	





There	 is	 variation	 in	 the	 specific	 aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 these	 different	 policy	
instruments,	but	broadly	these	programmes	set	out	to	promote	sustained	higher	















financial	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 public	 sector,	 looking	 at	 issues	 around	
government	borrowing	and	public	spending.	Financial	policymaking	extends	well	











illiteracy	and	poverty,	 and	between	 ill	health	and	poverty	 (World	Bank,	2005).	
Literature	 also	 links	 health	 and	 education	 –	 educational	 status	 can	 be	 a	major	
predictor	of	health	outcomes,	particularly	in	the	global	periphery,	and	vice	versa	
(Zimmerman,	 Woolf,	 &	 Haley,	 2014).	 A	 key	 consideration	 is	 the	 relationship	
between	 public	 spending	 and	 external	 debt.	 	 As	 fundamental	 factors	 of	
development,	 attention	 to	 spending	 in	 health	 and	 education,	 compared	 with	
















with	 the	 above	 objective	 of	 reducing	 the	 government’s	 public	 deficit	 (the	
difference	 between	 what	 is	 spent	 and	 the	 revenue	 earned	 in	 a	 given	 year).	









economic	 development	 model	 emphasises	 export-led	 growth	 and	 the	
















sectors.	 In	 line	with	 the	postcolonial	approach,	 the	extent	 to	which	commodity	




status	 of	 these	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 way	 that	 historical	






















to	 in	 its	 main	 market	 of	 France	 (Bulmer-Thomas,	 2012).	 French	 commercial	
interests	were	soon	eclipsed	by	those	of	the	US,	as	Haiti	part	of	the	United	Fruit	
Company’s	 impressive	 production	 and	 distribution	 network	 of	 bananas	 from	
Central	America	and	the	Caribbean	back	to	the	US.	During	the	occupation	of	Haiti,	
the	 Wilson	 administration	 changed	 the	 Haitian	 constitution	 in	 favour	 of	 US	












increasing	 per	 capita	 income	 (IBRD,	 1957).	 A	 trade	 union	movement	 emerged	
during	 1946,	 whose	 leaders	 worked	 to	 improve	 working	 conditions	 and	
established	minimum	wage	and	a	pension	system	(Gros,	2010).	Important	sectors	
of	 the	 economy	were	 reserved	 for	 state	 ownership,	 including	 sugar,	 flour	 and	





(Gros,	 2010).	 However,	 a	 shift	 was	 initiated	 during	 the	 1960s,	 when	 Duvalier	
began	 to	 remove	 protections	 in	 order	 to	 open	 up	 the	 economy	 to	 foreign	
investment,	 understood	 as	 a	 way	 of	 retaining	 the	 crucial	 backing	 of	 the	 US	





significantly;	 in	 between	 1975	 and	 1987	 the	 value	 of	 total	 external	 debt	 as	 a	
proportion	 of	 the	 value	 of	 exports	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 rose	 from	 34.4%	 to	
186.8%	(World	Bank,	1989b,	p.	177).	Importantly,	much	of	this	debt	was	accrued	







years	 	 (Macdonald,	 2010).	 These	 calls	 have	 been	 woefully	 ignored	 by	
policymakers	on	the	international	stage.		
	
Although	 Chad	 and	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 were	 not	 required	 to	 purchase	 their	
independence,	 in	 order	 to	 try	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	 promises	 made	 by	 the	 pro-
independence	 arguments	 of	 improved	 living	 conditions,	 newly	 independent	
governments	across	Africa	borrowed	from	external	creditors	in	order	to	launch	
development	programmes.	Côte	d’Ivoire’s	total	external	debt	to	exports	rose	from	
45.2%	in	1970	to	153.3%	on	the	eve	of	 the	country’s	 first	SAP	 in	1981	(World	
Bank,	 1989b,	 p.	 101).	 Similarly,	 Chad’s	 debt	 to	 exports	 ratio	 rose	 from	 a	
manageable	46.6%	in	1970	to	158.6%	in	1987	(World	Bank,	1989b,	p.	73).		
	
An	 important	 contributor	 to	Africa’s	 accumulating	 debts	 and	 a	 key	 obstacle	 to	
economic	 and	 financial	 independence,	 as	 been	 the	 Communauté	 Financière	












As	 French	 colonies,	 wealth	 created	 by	 labour	 and	 resources	 flowed	 from	
periphery	 to	 centre;	 colonialism	 created	 a	 structural	 dependence	whereby	 the	
colonies	 were	 reliant	 on	 exporting	 large	 quantities	 of	 a	 small	 selection	 of	
agricultural	crops.	The	newly	independent	economies	of	Chad	and	Côte	d’Ivoire	
therefore	 continued	 to	 focus	 on	 agriculture.	 Houphouët-Boigny	 fostered	 links	
between	 the	 bureaucratic	 Ivorian	 elite	 and	 French	 companies	 during	 his	
presidency,	ensuring	mutual	benefits	for	both	sides	Africa	(Blas,	2010).	In	1988,	
the	 President	 attempted	 to	 increase	 falling	 prices	 by	 stockpiling	 cocoa.	 French	
company	 Sucden	 bought	 up	 400,000	 tonnes	 of	 the	 surplus,	 with	 French	
government	assistance,	and	held	200,000	tonnes	off	the	market	to	try	to	prop	up	
the	 price.	 This	 strategy	 was	 unsuccessful	 and	 eventually	 Sucden	 dumped	 the	
cocoa,	depressing	the	price	further.	However,	in	the	short	term	it	enabled	the	cash-
strapped	Ivorian	government	to	service	its	debts	and	it	established	Sucden	as	a	
global	 player	 in	 the	 cocoa	 trade	 (Della	 Porta	 &	 Meny,	 1997).	 This	 episode	
demonstrates	the	entanglement	of	French	commercial	and	political	interests	with	
the	 Ivorian	 economy	 at	 the	 time.	 This	 was	 further	 strengthened	 by	 secret	





and	 climatic	 conditions.	 The	 country	 nevertheless	 became	 the	 leading	 cotton	
producer	in	West	Africa,	producing	40,000	tonnes	each	year	and	generating	large	








Importantly,	 the	 CFA	 franc	 zone	 has	 also	 played	 a	 role	 in	 perpetuating	 this	
commodity	dependence,	since	the	unlimited	convertibility	of	the	CFA	into	French	
francs	permitted	France	 effective	 exclusive	 rights	 of	 access	 to	 the	 zone	 and	 its	
commodity	markets	(Taylor,	2019).	This	perpetuated	a	dependence	on	the	export	





sustained	 themselves	 beyond	 the	 moment	 of	 independence.	 Many	 of	 Haiti’s	
development	challenges	at	the	advent	of	structural	adjustment	had	been	largely	
determined	by	the	colonial	debt,	foreign	invasions	and	dictatorships	propped	up	
by	 the	 international	community.	 In	 the	African	context,	 the	 influence	of	French	
commercial	interests	in	the	cocoa	and	cotton	sectors,	coupled	with	the	pervasive	











Côte	 d’Ivoire	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 African	 countries	 to	 sign	 onto	 the	 economic	
reform	package	under	the	ESAF	in	1981,	in	exchange	for	a	loan	of	$150	million	
equivalent	(World	Bank,	1981a).	In	1983,	two	years	after	the	implementation	of	
the	SAP,	a	second	 loan	agreement	was	signed	with	 the	 IBRD	for	$250.7	million	




for	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 therefore	 form	part	 of	 the	 corpus	 (World	Bank,	
1989a;	 World	 Bank,	 1995).	 An	 extended	 arrangement	 covering	 a	 three-year	
period	was	agreed	with	the	IMF	in	February	1981	(IMF,	1981).		A	series	of	Stand-
By	Arrangements	 (SBAs)	were	 agreed	over	 the	next	 seven	 years.	 In	 1994,	 Côte	
d’Ivoire	entered	into	a	three-year	arrangement	under	the	ESA.	In	1994,	the	World	
Bank	drew	up	a	CAS	 (World	Bank,	1994b)	whilst	 the	IMF	prepared	PFP	 for	 the	
period	1994-1996	 (IMF,	1994).	 In	1998,	 a	 second	 three-year	arrangement	was	










interrupted	 in	 1987	when	 government	 paramilitary	 death	 squads	 and	military	
forces	retaliated	against	the	Haitian	population.	External	assistance	was	curtailed	







Economic	 Recovery	 Programme	 (EERP)	 was	 designed	 in	 Washington	 by	 a	
multinational	 task	 force	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Development	 Bank	 (IDB),	 the	
World	Bank,	the	IMF	and	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	
(USAID),	whilst	 the	US	was	preparing	 to	 intervene	 and	 reinstate	 the	President	
(World	Bank,	1994a).	 It	was	a	12-18	month	blueprint	 for	Haiti’s	economic	and	
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Chapters/passages	 relating	 to	 public	 expenditure	 are	 closely	 analysed	 to:	 a)	
extract	 and	 compare	 the	 similarities	 and	 divergences	 in	 policy	 across	 the	 case	








for	 cutbacks	 in	 spending,	which	 had	 far-reaching	 adverse	 social	 consequences.	
Importantly,	this	chapter	argues	that	this	agenda	was	imposed	on	these	countries	
by	the	IFIs,	in	the	context	of	increasing	external	debts	and	financial	dependency,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 strategic	 placement	 of	 BWI	 officials	 in	 positions	 of	 financial	
authority	 within	 government.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 neo-Gramscian	 theoretical	
approach,	I	argue	that	the	austerity	agenda	undermined	sovereignty	by	means	of	
both	coercion	and	consent;	the	coercive	power	of	the	IMF	and	the	Word	Bank	is	
evident	 through	 their	 financial	 leverage,	 whilst	 consent	 is	 generated	 by	 the	
restriction	of	ideas.	The	discourse	analysis	reveals	a	common	austerity	discourse,	
which	persuasively	argues	 that	 there	 is	no	alternative	 to	spending	cutbacks.	 In	





austere	 financial	 policies	 in	 policy	 programmes	 across	 the	 world,	 arguing	





a	 significant	 period	 was,	 measured	 by	 levels	 of	 employment,	 trade	 balance,	
economic	growth,	fiscal	balance	and	price	stability.	This	is	not	a	radical	position;	
the	UN	Department	for	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	endorsed	this	in	a	2010	report	
(Saad-Filho,	 2010).	 During	 the	 Keynesian	 era,	 a	 strong	 economy	 was	
characterised	by	full	employment,	stable	economic	growth,	relatively	low	inflation	
and	sustainable	external	accounts.	These	priorities	explained	the	need	for	more	
interventionist	 policies,	 including	 counter-cyclical	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policies,	
whereby	 governments	 borrow	 during	 periods	 of	 recession	 in	 order	 to	 target	
employment	and	increase	output,	or	increase	taxes	during	boom	periods.	Budget	
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(low	 inflation),	 thus	 legitimising	 austerity	 measures	 (Ocampo,	 2003).	 This	 is	
partly	explained	by	the	belief	that	there	is	a	stable	relationship	between	the	rate	
of	 economic	growth	and	 the	pace	of	 inflation,	 although	 the	evidence	 for	 this	 is	
contentious. 29 	Within	 neoliberal	 reasoning,	 the	 counter-cyclical	 role	 of	
macroeconomic	policy	is	therefore	completely	suppressed	(Friedman,	M.,	1976).	
Instead,	 governments	 are	 expected	 to	 eliminate	 deficits;	 the	 Washington	
Consensus	asserts	this	as	a	key	priority.	Traditionally,	this	is	achieved	by	cutting	
expenditures	and/or	raising	revenues,	through	increasing	taxes.	In	the	context	of	




equality	 levels.	 Specific	 measures	 include	 decreasing	 subsidies,	 public	
employment,	public	sector	wages	and	both	current	and	investment	expenditures.	




















student	 welfare	 policies,	 such	 as	 allowances,	 housing	 and	 transport;	 and	
restrictions	 on	 scholarships	 for	 secondary	 and	 higher	 education	 (World	 Bank,	
1981a,	pp.	17-18;	1983c,	p.	12).		
	
In	housing,	 the	World	Bank	 insisted	on	 the	 reduction	of	 the	number	of	 people	






new	 scholarships	 (World	 Bank,	 1986b,	 p.	 19).	 The	 austerity	 policy	 was	 also	






(World	 Bank,	 1977a,	 p.	 xi;	 1994b,	 p.	 5).	 Primary	 schools	 were	 coming	 under	
increasing	 pressure	 from	 the	 cuts	 made	 to	 secondary	 education,	 with	 many	
children	 repeating	 their	 final	 year.	 The	World	 Bank	 also	 reported	 that	 health	
















small	 increases	were	 achieved	 through	 a	 reallocation	 of	 resources	 rather	 than	
through	an	overall	increase	in	public	spending	(IMF,	1994,	p.	5;	1998b,	p.	5).	
	
With	 austerity	 continuing	 to	 underpin	 the	 overarching	 financial	 strategy,	 the	
donors	began	to	focus	their	cuts	more	intensively	on	the	civil	service;	the	Ivorian	
government	 was	 required	 to	 continue	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 civil	 servants	
through	voluntary	redundancies	(IMF,	1994,	p.	9;	1998b,	p.	8).	The	World	Bank’s	




public	 services	 to	 counter	 the	 ‘adverse	 impact	 that	 certain	 initial	 adjustment	
measures	 were	 having	 on	 part	 of	 the	 population’	 by	 1996.	 (IMF,	 1994,	 p.	 6).	
Primary	government	expenditure	as	a	proportion	of	GDP	was	41%	in	1978	on	the	
eve	of	the	first	SAP	(World	Bank,	1981a,	p.	3).	Under	BWI	supervision,	this	figure	
















1983	 SAL	 II	 (World	
Bank,	1983c)	
	
15	 billlion	 CFAF	 reduction	 in	 annual	 education	 spending,	 new	
budgetary	 controls;	 sharp	 reduction	 in	 civil	 servants	 housing	































the	 donors’	 continued	 to	 reduce	 expenditures	 overall,	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 own	
reporting	of	the	adverse	social	consequences	of	austerity.	This	calls	into	the	true	
motivations	 of	 the	 BWIs,	 highlighting	 starkly	 the	 contradictory	 objectives	 of	




by	 limited	 government	 spending	 and	 routinely	 balanced	 budgets.	 This	 was	
achieved	through	high	taxation,	which	fell	most	heavily	on	the	poor,	and	a	sharp	
reduction	in	public	investment	in	health	and	education,	under	François	Duvalier	
(IBRD,	 1961).	 Jean-Claude	 Duvalier	 (in	 office	 1971-1986)	 was	 less	 frugal,	
siphoning	 off	 funds	 into	 his	 personal	 accounts	 and	 intensifying	 the	 country’s	
financial	problems,	but	maintaining	an	austere	policy	with	regards	 to	pro-poor	
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development	 (HRW,	 2011).	 In	 early	 agreements,	 the	 IMF	 sought	 to	 curb	 the	







divert	state	 funds	 into	his	own	pocket	and	government	expenditures	 increased	
from	an	average	of	19%	of	GDP	in	1976-79	to	22%	in	1984	(World	Bank,	1985,	p.	






new	primary	 intake	 increasing	at	 the	rate	of	3%	per	year,	well	below	the	10%	
average	that	was	achieved	between	1978	and	1982	(World	Bank,	1986a,	p.	97).	In	
lieu	of	 increasing	salaries,	 the	Bank	proposed	that	 the	government	employ	 less	
qualified	teachers	so	as	to	maintain	teachers	without	increasing	expenditure.	They	
suggested	 that	 the	 government	 divest	 from	 public	 vocational	 and	 technical	
training	 establishments	 and	higher	 education;	 user	 fees	were	 introduced	 in	 all	
faculties	of	the	state	university	as	well	as	in	training	establishments.	The	authors	
concluded	 that	 no	 new	 aid	 commitments	 in	 the	 area	 of	 education	 would	 be	
necessary	in	the	period	1986	to	1989	(World	Bank,	1986a,	v.	ii).	
	
On	 top	 of	 the	 education	 cuts,	 the	World	Bank	 also	 targeted	 the	 health	 budget,	
demanding	a	$4.5	million	reduction	in	investment	and	a	$1.75	million	in	current	
health	 spending	 (World	 Bank,	 1986a,	 p.	 109).	 They	 proposed	 cutbacks	 in	 a	
number	 of	 ways:	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 number	 of	 referrals;	 contracting	 out	 the	
delivery	of	 services	 to	 the	private	sector	and	 to	NGOs;	 freezing	 jobs	within	 the	
health	ministry	(the	MSPP);	halving	the	number	of	medical	students	in	training;	
introducing	 some	 forms	 of	 private	 or	 social	 insurance	 to	 finance	 health	 care;	
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expanding	 user	 charges;	 delaying	 plans	 for	 hospital	 and	 health	 centre	
reconstruction	 and	 re-equipment;	 and	 scrapping	 plans	 for	 a	 new	 maternity	
hospital	in	Port-au-Prince	(World	Bank,	1986a,	p.	vii).	The	World	Bank’s	proposals	
became	 policy	 through	 the	 1986	PFP	 and	 the	World	 Bank’s	ERC.	 In	 1989,	 the	
World	 Bank	 issued	 a	 loan	 for	 $28.2	million	 for	 a	 Health	 Project	 (World	 Bank,	
1989b).	However,	this	was	far	from	a	pro-poor	initiative;	the	main	objectives	of	
the	project	were	the	reduction	of	expenditures	of	the	MSPP,	and	the	improvement	
of	 patient	 contribution	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 services	 and	 drugs.	 Improving	 health	
outcomes	 by	 extending	 health	 service	 coverage	 were	 ‘additional	 objectives’	
(World	Bank,	2001b,	p.	2).	The	project	set	out	to	reduce	the	MSPP’s	budget	35%	
in	 real	 terms	over	5	 years	 by	 cutting	 salaries	 (World	Bank,	 1989b,	 p.	 13).	 The	
project	also	signified	a	further	shift	towards	the	privatisation	of	healthcare.	Half	
of	all	health	care	establishments	were	privately	operated	and	funded	at	the	time.	
The	project	 channelled	 financing	 through	a	number	of	NGOs	 to	 implement	and	
deliver	 specific	public	health	 interventions,	 rather	 than	 through	 the	MSPP.	The	
project	 supported	 the	 continuation	of	user	 fees	 for	medical	 services	and	drugs	
(World	Bank,	1989b,	p.	13).	The	need	for	such	measures	was	reinforced	by	SBAs	




Like	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 these	 austerity	 measures	 had	 deleterious	 effects	 on	
development	indicators.	Primary	school	enrolment	fell	from	96%	during	the	early	
1980s	 to	56%	by	1996,	giving	Haiti	 the	 lowest	 school	enrolment	 rates	and	 the	
highest	repetition	and	dropout	rates	in	the	hemisphere	(World	Bank,	1996d,	p.	2).	
The	number	of	physicians	per	person	fell	during	the	1980s	and	in	1996	the	World	
Bank	 estimated	 in	 1996	 that	 less	 than	 60%	 of	 the	 population	 were	 receiving	
primary	health	care	(Schneidman	&	Levine,	1998,	pp.	5-6;	World	Bank,	1996d,	p.	
2).	This	is	not	surprising;	the	introduction	of	user	fees	into	health	systems	in	low-
income	countries	excludes	 the	poor	 from	accessing	vital	 services	 (Bond	&	Dor,	





towards	 the	social	 sectors.	The	1994	EERP	 reallocated	 funding	 towards	health,	
education,	 nutrition	 and	 other	 social	 programmes.	 It	 announced	 increasing	
expenditures	on	medical	supplies	and	equipment,	school	textbooks	and	supplies	
and	targeted	nutrition	programmes	(World	Bank,	1994c,	p.	7).	However,	 like	in	
the	 Ivorian	 context,	 there	 remained	 significant	 pressure	 to	 comply	 with	 fiscal	
austerity.	 	The	1996	PFP	demanded	the	removal	of	price	controls	on	petrol	and	
increased	 electricity	 tariffs,	 both	 measures	 which	 impact	 the	 poor	
disproportionately	 (IMF,	 1996c,	 p.	 29).	 The	PFP	did	 not	 challenge	 user	 fees	 in	
heath	 or	 education.	 The	 programme	 announced	 the	 scaling	 back	 of	 the	 civil	
service,	via	early	retirement	and	voluntary	separation,	to	reduce	the	overall	wage	











$4.5	 million	 reduction	 in	 health	 investment	 and	 $1.75	 million	
reduction	 in	 current	 health	 spending	 through:	 jobs	 freeze;	
reduction	 of	 medical	 students;	 expanding	 user	 charges;	
postponing	construction	of	new	health	centres/hospitals	(p.	109)	














15	 billlion	 CFAF	 reduction	 in	 annual	 education	 spending,	 new	
budgetary	 controls;	 sharp	 reduction	 in	 civil	 servants	 housing	













living	 in	 poverty	 and	 that	 the	 poverty	 situation	 had	 worsened	 over	 the	 past	
decade,	with	per	capita	income	falling	at	an	annual	rate	of	5.2%	between	1985	and	
1995	 (World	Bank,	 1998b,	 p.	 v).	 Health	 indicators	worsened	 during	 structural	
adjustment;	rates	of	maternal	mortality	and	child	mortality	rose	between	1987	








a	 series	 of	 military	 dictatorships.	 In	 1987,	 salaries	 were	 a	 mere	 60%	 of	 the	
nominal	salary	scales	established	twenty	years	previously	 in	1967	and	the	IMF	
acknowledged	 that	 current	expenditures	were	 ‘already	at	 a	 critically	 low	 level’	
(IMF,	 1987a,	 p.	 33).	Nonetheless,	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	Bank	 oversaw	public	






government	 subsidy	 and	 charge	 service	 users	 for	 water	 and	 electricity	 (IMF,	














government	 responded	 to	 the	 strikes	and	removed	 the	wage	 freeze.	The	social	
sectors	 were	 not	 subject	 to	 direct	 cuts	 under	 these	 programmes,	 but	 they	
continued	to	be	neglected.	For	example,	a	public	investment	programme	was	in	
place	 from	 1991	 to	 1995,	 almost	 entirely	 externally	 financed,	 but	 was	






CAS	 announced	plans	 to	 increase	 total	enrolments,	 construct	1,700	classrooms,	
increase	 the	 number	 of	 teachers,	 and	 expand	 teacher	 training	 (World	 Bank,	
1996b,	p.	7).	In	health,	the	objective	was	to	improve	access	to	primary	health	care,	
decentralise	services	and	increase	appropriations	for	central	drugs.	This	was	to	
be	 financed	 by	 increasing	 the	 share	 in	 public	 expenditures	 accorded	 to	 these	
sectors,	from	16%	in	1994	to	20%	in	1997	in	education,	and	from	12%	to	18%	in	
health	(World	Bank,	1996b,	p.	8).		Like	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti,	this	was	achieved	
by	 reallocating	 resources	 rather	 than	 increasing	 public	 expenditure	 overall.	
Indeed,	the	CAS	planned	to	decrease	public	expenditure	as	a	ratio	to	GDP	over	the	
next	 three	years	by	7%	(World	Bank,	1996b,	p.	3).	 It	was	 therefore	a	policy	of	
restructuring,	 not	 investment.	 Like	 in	 Haiti,	 the	 World	 Bank	 funded	 a	 health	
project,	which	promoted	user	fees;	the	objective	was	to	have	patients	financing	up	
to	10.5%	of	total	health	expenditure	by	2000	(World	Bank,	1994g,	p.	8).	Again,	the	
promotion	of	user	 fees	 in	areas	 that	might	be	considered	basic	human	rights	–	






















































32	The	 ERCs	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Chad	 in	 1994	were	 implemented	 in	 response	 to	 the	
devaluation	of	the	CFA	franc.	
	 105	









per	 year	during	 the	1980s	 and	 further	 still	 to	0.15%	during	 the	1990s	 (World	
Bank,	 2020b).	This	 is	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 relative	political	 stability	 that	 the	 country	





cutbacks	 and	 wage	 freezes	 in	 the	 civil	 service	 over	 the	 structural	 adjustment	
period.	
	
This	 discussion	 has	 shown	 that	 consistent	 in	 all	 three	 countries	 during	 the	
structural	adjustment	period,	was	the	reduction	of	government	spending,	in	line	
with	 the	 Washington	 Consensus	 development	 paradigm,	 aligned	 with	 the	
neoliberal	emphasis	on	shrinking	the	state.	In	the	cases	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti,	
where	 cuts	were	more	 heavily	 targeted	 at	 the	 social	 sectors,	 the	 indicators	 of	
development	 are	 more	 revealing	 still.	 As	 programmes	 made	 moves	 towards	
privatisation	and	decreasing	public	resources	for	health	and	education,	access	to	
and	usage	of	these	services	decreased,	and	poverty	rose.	Consistently,	the	World	
Bank	 promoted	 user	 fees	 for	 cost	 recovery	 in	 the	 social	 sectors,	 without	
considering	the	ability	of	poor	people	to	pay	these	fees.	Today,	consensus	in	the	
global	 health	 sector	 is	 that	 user	 fees	 are	 the	most	 inequitable	means	 of	 health	
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system	 financing	 and	 a	 major	 barrier	 to	 access	 to	 care. 33 	Equally,	 education	
research	 (including	 research	conducted	by	 the	World	Bank)	 suggests	 that	user	
fees	perpetuate	 low	enrolment	rates,	since	the	 inability	 to	pay	 fees,	and	 fear	of	
public	embarrassment	due	to	the	inability	to	make	payments,	are	deciding	factors	
for	parents	in	keeping	children	out	of	school	(World	Bank,	2009a).	Although	the	
1990s	 witnessed	 a	 renewed	 focus	 and	 investment	 in	 these	 sectors,	 this	 was	





largely	 implemented	 by	 governments.	 A	 key	 question	 that	 arises	 from	 this	
discussion	 is	 to	 what	 extent	 were	 these	 policies	 imposed	 on	 the	 borrowing	









and	 thus	 the	 cycle	 continues.	 This	 is	 a	 well-documented	 trend	 in	 the	 global	
periphery	(Toussaint	&	Millet,	2010;	George,	1991).	An	examination	of	indicators	














health	 and	 education	 were	 so	 dramatically	 reduced	 during	 the	 structural	
adjustment	era.	This	is	most	acutely	highlighted	by	social	spending	figures,	when	










In	Haiti,	 the	 level	of	 spending	at	 the	start	of	 the	structural	adjustment	era	was	
much	lower	than	in	Côte	d’Ivoire.	Per	capita	social	spending	therefore	increased	
rather	 than	 decreased	 over	 the	 period.	 However,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 debt	
figures,	it	is	clear	where	the	bulk	of	treasury	resources	were	flowing.	Education	
per	capita	spending	rose	 from	just	under	$3	 in	1982	to	$5	by	1990,	and	health	























large	 sums	 of	 money	 to	 cash-strapped	 governments,	 of	 which	 very	 little	 is	
allocated	 for	 social	 spending,	whilst	 a	 significant	 proportion	 is	 returned	 to	 the	
donors	 in	 the	 form	 of	 debt	 service.	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 power	 imbalance	
between	 the	 governments	 and	 the	 multilateral	 donors,	 highlighting	 the	
circumscribed	 nature	 of	 the	 Chadian,	 Ivorian	 and	 Haiti	 governments’	 self-





funds	 necessary	 to	 prevent	 an	 economic	 collapse.	 This	 amounts	 to	 economic	
coercion	and	the	blatant	undermining	of	sovereignty,	creating	a	deeply	unequal	
relationship	between	lender	and	borrower.	Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	Haiti,	the	




Another	 factor	 pointing	 towards	 the	 power	 and	 influence	 of	 the	 donors	 over	
national	 governments	 is	 the	 revolving	 doors	 phenomenon.	 This	 has	 been	
observed	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 global	 periphery,	where	 staff	 turnover	 between	 the	







borrowing	 countries	 (Bretton	 Woods	 Project,	 2012).	 In	 1990,	 Daniel	 Kablan	
Duncan,	 a	 former	 special	 appointee	 at	 the	 IMF,	 was	 appointed	 Minister	 of	
Economy	and	Finance	 in	Côte	d’Ivoire.	He	became	Prime	Minister	 in	1993,	and	
publicly	announced	the	continuation	of	austerity	measures	that	his	predecessor,	
Alassane	 Ouattara,	 also	 an	 economist	 at	 the	 IMF	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years,	 had	
overseen	under	IMF	and	World	Bank	supervision	(Bavier,	2017).	In	Haiti,	World	
Bank	technocrat	Marc	Bazin	was	appointed	as	Finance	Minister	 in	1982,	at	 the	
behest	 of	 an	 international	 committee	 of	 foreign	 aid	 donors	 and	 following	 the	
suspension	 of	 Canada’s	 biggest	 aid	 project	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 Haiti	 (Dewind	 &	









employees,	 points	 to	 a	 deeply	 unequal	 power	 relationship.	 Austerity	 has	 had	








next	section	of	 this	chapter	seeks	 to	 lay	bare	 the	 ideological	basis	 for	austerity	
measures.	Given	the	donors’	commitment	to	an	austerity	policy,	in	line	with	the	
neoliberal	development	paradigm,	 this	analysis	will	 shed	 light	on	 the	nature	of	
neoliberal	discourse,	adding	to	a	growing	literature	that	seeks	to	understand	how	
austerity	 policies	 have	 reproduced	 themselves	 across	 the	 world,	 despite	 little	
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evidence	 of	 success	 (Boriello,	 2017;	 Fonseca	 &	 Ferreira,	 2015).	 The	 failure	 of	
austerity	 measures	 to	 improve	 living	 conditions	 throws	 out	 two	 important	















The	 second	 is	 the	 framing	 of	 austerity	 as	 a	 pragmatic,	 logical	 and	 most	
importantly,	inevitable	response	to	all	economic	and	financial	problems.	The	crux	
of	this	argument	is	that	there	is	no	alternative	to	austerity.	The	analysis	revealed	




















The	 first	 claim	 is	 that	 the	 fiscal	 crisis	 is	 a	 result	 of	 irresponsible	 spending.	
When	viewed	this	way,	unsustainable	debt	levels	and	large	budget	deficits	are	the	
result	 of	 years	 of	 poor	 financial	 and	 economic	 policies.	 This	 claim	 therefore	
contributes	 to	 the	 first	 overarching	 argument,	 which	 is	 the	 blame	 and	






















































































‘stabilisation’	 programmes	or	 ‘stabilising’	measures,	 often	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
overarching	objective	and	need	for	‘macroeconomic	stability’.	In	these	excerpts,	
the	donors	draw	on	the	topos	of	stability,	which	presents	‘stability’	as	the	condition	







and	 fiscal	 balance,	 a	well-functioning	 economy	would	 require	 sustainable	 debt	




In	 deploying	 the	 topos	 of	 stability	 the	 donors	 are	 able	 to	 draw	 a	 link	 between	
macroeconomic	stability,	as	 they	understand	 it,	and	stability	more	broadly	-	an	
inherently	 appealing	 concept.	 This	 is	 particularly	 misleading,	 as	 it	 excludes	
notions	 of	 stability	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 economy	 and	 indeed	 in	 society.	 Stability	





pensions	 within	 the	 civil	 service	 was	 also	 disturbed.	 The	 topos	 of	 stability	 is	
convincing	 in	 reaffirming	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 crisis-facing	 economy,	 and	 is	 a	more	
appealing	 way	 to	 frame	 austerity	 (‘stabilisation	 programmes’,	 or	 ‘stabilising	
measures’).	 Indeed,	 the	words	 ‘austere’	and	 ‘austerity’	are	notably	absent	 from	
many	 of	 the	 programmes	 over	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 era.	 This	 discursive	
redefinition	of	stability	is	key	in	the	positive	depiction	of	austerity	measures.	
	
The	 portrayal	 of	 the	 economy	 as	 facing	 crisis	 is	 aided	 by	 two	 conceptual	
metaphors.	The	 first	 is	 the	 ‘economy	 is	a	human	body’	metaphor,	or	 the	health	
metaphor.	 Within	 this	 metaphor,	 the	 economy	 (the	 target	 domain)	 is	
conceptualised	as	a	living	organism	(the	source	domain)	that	can	become	ill,	can	
be	 diagnosed,	 and	 can	 be	 prescribed	 with	 medical	 treatment.	 Its	 presence	 is	
noticeable	 through	 specific	 vocabulary	 that	 refers	 to	 the	 human	 body	 and	 its	
organs.	The	table	demonstrates	two	examples	where	the	donors	use	vocabulary	
related	to	ill	health	(weakness,	suffering	and	bloated)	to	describe	the	public	sector.	
The	 ‘economy	is	a	machine’	plays	a	similar	role	 in	 the	crisis	narrative.	Like	the	
human	 body,	 the	 source	 domain	 of	 the	 machine	 implies	 the	 existence	 of	 an	
objective	 ‘normal	 functioning’	 that	 can	 be	 restored	 by	 political	 actors	 through	
policy	 in	 the	 event	 that	 something	 within	 the	 machine	 ‘breaks	 down’.	 The	
mechanical	 analogy	 presents	 the	 economy	 an	 autonomous	 system	 and	 policy	
reform	as	a	technical	activity	of	maintenance,	or	‘adjustment’.	The	depiction	of	the	
financial	crisis	as	a	 technical	 issue	requiring	repairs	 is	reinforced	by	use	of	 the	
terms	‘deficiencies’,	‘distortions’	and	‘dysfunctions’	to	describe	the	public	sector	
deficit.	This	metaphor	provides	a	depoliticising	function	of	depicting	the	economy	
as	 an	 autonomous	 system,	 and	 reforms	 and	 donor	 intervention	 as	 technical,	
apolitical	measures.	This	is	misleading	in	light	of	the	inherently	political	nature	of	




financial	 environment	 constitutes	 a	 continued	 risk	 which	 endangers	 the	
adjustment	process.	The	discourse	frames	‘macroeconomic	stability’	as	essential	
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to	 the	stability	of	 the	whole	economy.	The	 implication	 is	 that	without	austerity	
policies,	 the	whole	system	(reinforced	through	the	conceptual	metaphor)	could	







Within	 this	 discourse	 of	 crisis,	 the	 donors	 are	 also	 clear	 in	 their	 attribution	 of	
responsibility	 –	 to	 irresponsible	 governments	 and	 their	 overspending.	 A	 key	







policies	 negatively,	 using	 adjectives	 such	 as	 ‘inappropriate’,	 ‘inefficient’	
‘overambitious’	and	‘ill-conceived’,	depicting	the	public	sector	as	incompetent	and	
irresponsible.	In	so	doing,	they	operationalize	the	topos	of	burden	to	establish	that	





By	 the	 1990s,	 the	 donors	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 abandonment	 of	 crucial	
investments	had	contributed	to	Haiti’s	economic	difficulties:	
	








government	 to	 neglect	 its	 infrastructure	 development’,	 acknowledging	 the	
consequences	 of	 imposing	 budgetary	 ceilings	 and	 saddling	 a	 government	with	







Bank,	1994e,	p.	12).	Here,	 they	deploy	the	topos	of	burden	 in	a	positive	way,	 to	
praise	the	small	Chadian	public	sector.	The	donors	do	not	blame	the	fiscal	crisis	in	
Chad	on	overspending,	since	governments	of	Chad	had	not	invested	‘excessively’	
or	 indeed	at	 all	 in	 a	welfare	 state	during	 the	 early	 independence	years.	As	 the	
figures	have	shown,	the	Chadian	government	had	not	invested	in	developing	its	
social	 sectors	 during	 its	 first	 two	 decades	 of	 independence	 before	 structural	
adjustment.	Government	social	spending	figures	were	low	in	comparison	to	Côte	
d’Ivoire,	since	much	of	the	period	was	spent	in	civil	war	with	many	civilians	caught	
in	 the	crossfire.	Despite	 this,	 the	donors	praise	 the	Chadian	government	whilst	
they	lambast	the	Ivorian	government,	writing:	
	






agenda	 above	 the	 development	 agenda.	 The	 donors’	 discursive	 treatment	 of	 a	
country	 with	 a	 relatively	 well-established	 welfare	 state	 and	 improving	











as	 value-neutral	 is	 also	 assisted	 by	 the	 use	 of	 passive	 sentence	 structures,	 for	
example:		
	






the	 austerity	 discourse	 as	 it	 denies	 the	 donors	 any	 accountability	 for	 the	
detrimental	 consequences	 of	 the	 measures	 that	 they	 demanded	 of	 these	
governments.	 Rather	 than	 understanding	 structural	 adjustment	 as	 a	 political	
project	and	an	 ideological	 response	 to	 the	neoliberal	problem	of	a	 large	public	





































‘The	 government	 will	 promote	 community	 participation	 in	 the	
delivery	 of	 social	 services	 in	 order	 to	minimise	 the	 use	 of	 public	
resources	 and	 encourage	 a	 sense	 of	 collective	 responsibility	 for	



















from	 the	 user	 who	 must	 pay	 for	 the	 service,	 thus	 concealing	 the	 human	
consequences	 of	 the	 measure.	 These	 examples	 evoke	 the	 topos	 of	 burden	 by	
depicting	public	spending	on	health,	education,	housing	and	the	civil	service,	as	





















became	 less	 accessible	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	Haiti	 during	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s,	
poverty	was	increasing.	The	evidence	from	elsewhere	in	the	global	periphery	as	
well	as	in	the	case	studies,	suggests	that	a	broader	approach	to	health	is	needed	to	
strengthen	 health	 systems	 through	 investment	 -	 rather	 than	 their	 systematic	
weakening	through	cuts,	user	fees	and	privatisation	(Bond	&	Dor,	2003).	
	



















Here,	 the	World	 Bank	 obscure	 the	 agency	 of	 those	 affected	 by	 the	 systematic	
weakening	 of	 the	 development	 sectors,	 thus	 evading	 responsibility	 and	
reinforcing	their	own	authority	as	policymakers.	On	the	other	hand,	the	finances	
of	 these	 economies	 are	 placed	 in	 subject	 position,	 accorded	 agency	 by	 the	
grammatical	structure	of	the	language.	For	example:	
	
‘The	 expansion	 of	 the	 education	 system	 […]	 was	 accompanied	 by	 growing	








in	 the	 donors’	 discourse	 on	 Chad	 too,	 despite	 the	 tiny	 proportion	 of	 public	
resources	that	flowed	to	these	sectors	during	the	1980s	and	the	1990s.	In	Chad,	
the	 analysis	 also	 reveals	 the	 topos	 of	 self-reliance	 in	 the	 legitimisation	 of	 the	
austerity	 strategy,	 through	 emphasis	 on	 ‘collective	 responsibility’	 and	 ‘burden-
sharing’	 in	 announcing	 the	 shift	 in	 provision	 from	 the	 state	 to	 communities	
themselves.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	 a	 conservative	 critique	of	 the	welfare	 state	
whereby	 the	 support	 provided	 by	 the	welfare	 state	 prevents	 individuals	 from	
growth	because	it	does	not	allow	them	to	develop	self-reliance.		The	reference	to	













I	 identify	 this	 first	 overarching	 argument	 as	 the	 blame	 discourse.	 The	 crisis	
narrative	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 as	 it	 constructs	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	 blame	
allocation	 and	 the	 ‘there	 is	 no	 alternative’	 argument	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	
following	section.	The	blame	allocation	attributes	the	blame	to	the	irresponsibility	





from	being	universal	 basic	 rights	 and	key	 areas	 to	 address	 in	 the	 fight	 against	
poverty,	but	instead	as	secondary	priorities.	This	blame	discourse	represents	the	





	By	 locating	 the	 causes	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 countries’	 problems	 in	 the	 domestic	
arena,	the	donors	pave	the	way	for	the	legitimisation	of	austerity	policies	not	only	



























































































For	 the	most	 part,	 the	 assumptions	 are	 implicit	within	 the	discourse,	 aided	by	
discursive	strategies	and	devices	in	order	to	legitimise	austerity.	For	example,	the	
positive	predication	of	 austerity	policies	and	government	 cooperation	with	 the	
donors	 as	 ‘prudent’,	 ‘rational’	 and	 ‘cautious’	 all	 serve	 to	 depict	 austerity	 as	
rational.	Cuts	are	nominated	as	‘rationalisation’	and	‘streamlining’.	Within	these	








ideologically	 motivated	 political	 measure.	 The	 use	 of	 vocabulary	 such	 as	
‘mechanisms’	and	‘instruments’	to	describe	policies	assists	in	this	metaphor.	The	
nomination	of	 reforms	as	 ‘corrective’	 features	 in	all	 three	cases	 fits	within	 this	
image	 of	 a	 faulty	 machine	 in	 need	 of	 a	 technical	 fix	 by	 an	 objective	 expert,	
depoliticising	 the	reforms.	Again,	 the	metaphor	also	plays	down	the	 impacts	of	
austerity;	in	announcing	the	removal	of	measures	that	had	been	introduced	by	the	
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Ivorian	 government	 to	 support	 the	 poor	 during	 economic	 recession,	 the	 IMF	
nominated	 the	 measures	 as	 ‘fine-tuning’.	 Likening	 the	 process	 of	 stripping	
vulnerable	 groups	of	price	 caps	on	essential	 foods,	 school	books	and	 tariffs	on	
water	and	electricity,	to	a	minor	adjustment	of	a	machine,	downplays	entirely	both	
the	 human	 consequences	 and	 the	 political	 consequences,	 as	 discontent	 was	
brewing	among	the	Ivorian	citizenry.		
	
The	 health	 metaphor	 is	 operationalised	 too,	 which	 again	 helps	 to	 present	
overspending	and	budget	deficits	as	the	sickness,	and	austerity	as	its	treatment.	
In	nominating	the	downsizing	of	the	civil	service	(in	order	to	be	able	to	pay	its	
wages	on	 time)	 as	 its	 ‘rehabilitation’,	 the	World	Bank	 frame	 redundancies	 in	 a	
positive	 way,	 when	 in	 reality	 these	 cuts	 pushed	 civil	 service	 workers	 into	
unemployment	and	poverty.	The	reality	of	those	who	were	negatively	impacted	
by	 the	 austerity	 measures	 is	 consistently	 glossed	 over	 or	 ignored	 within	 this	
discourse.	
	
Closely	 linked	 to	 this	 last	 claim,	 is	 the	 fourth	and	 final	 claim:	 that	austerity	 is	
necessary.	In	addition	to	the	emphasis	on	the	rational	nature	of	the	reforms,	the	



















































This	 argument	 builds	 on	 the	 earlier	 claim,	 which	 depicts	 a	 fragile	 economic	
situation	requiring	immediate	and	drastic	action.	For	example,	in	Côte	d’Ivoire,	the	







Here,	 the	 IMF	 suggests	 that	without	 ‘forceful’	 fiscal	 austerity,	 social	 as	well	 as	
economic	 development	 could	 be	 jeopardised,	 drawing	 on	 the	 topos	 of	
danger/threat.	This	 is	a	 clear	 fallacy,	 since	 it	was	under	consistent	 consecutive	
austerity	programmes	that	Côte	d’Ivoire’s	social	development	was	reversed.	This	
is	 indicative	of	the	manipulative	nature	of	the	discourse,	as	 it	 transforms	harsh	













‘and’	 associates	 the	 fiscal	 objective	 with	 the	 growth	 and	 poverty	 alleviation	
objectives.	 It	 creates	 a	 logical	 connection	 between	 these	 objectives,	 since	 the	
coherence	of	the	phrase	depends	on	a	near-equivalent	relationship.	This	allows	
the	reader	to	associate	austerity	with	GDP	growth	and	poverty	reduction,	without	
the	need	 for	explanation	on	 the	nature	of	 the	relationship.	Again,	 this	 is	highly	
misleading	in	light	of	the	reality	that	austerity	policies	had	an	adverse	impact	on	
human	 development	 objectives.	 In	 constructing	 a	 false	 equivalence	 between	
austerity,	 growth	and	poverty	 reduction,	 the	donors	are	able	 to	 inoculate	 their	
programmes	and	themselves	from	critique.		
	
Furthermore,	building	on	previous	 claims	of	 a	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	need	 for	
‘stability’	 in	 the	narrowest	 sense	 of	 its	macroeconomic	meaning,	 the	 discourse	
reinforces	 the	 need	 for	 spending	 cuts	 by	 emphasising	 need	 to	 reassure	
international	markets,	investors	and	observers	about	the	ability	to	guarantee	the	
solvency	 of	 the	 country.	 The	market	 again	 emerges	 as	 the	 external	 constraint	
rendering	austerity	an	unavoidable	response	to	outside	pressures.	The	topos	of	
reality	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 supporting	 this	 claim,	 as	 the	 donors	 argued	 that	
spending	policy	and	investment	budgets	must	be	‘realistic’,	ensuring	the	financial	
‘credibility’	and	‘viability’	of	the	country.	They	refer	to	credibility	specifically	in	
the	 context	 of	 ‘financial	 markets’	 and	 ‘private	 investors’,	 highlighting	 the	
importance	 of	 retaining	 the	 trust	 of	 international	markets	 in	 order	 to	 borrow	
more	funds:	
	
‘The	 Government	 will	 strengthen	 its	 efforts	 to	 improve	 public	 finances	 and	






















The	 depoliticised	 language	 allows	 the	 donors	 to	 present	 their	 own	 analysis	 of	











emphasising	the	 incompetency	of	the	state	 in	order	to	 legitimise	these	policies.	
The	policies	themselves	have	worked	to	limit	the	sovereignty	of	the	governments	








This	 chapter	has	demonstrated	 that	 austerity	was	 a	 key	priority	 of	 the	donors	
during	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 era.	 In	 all	 three	 case	 studies,	 the	 donors	
demanded	 that	 public	 spending	 be	 reduced	 or	 restrained.	 In	 Haiti	 and	 Côte	
d’Ivoire,	 they	 targeted	 the	 social	 sectors	 in	particular	 as	 areas	where	 spending	
could	be	 reined	 in,	 and	 in	all	 three	 countries	 the	 civil	 service	was	 subjected	 to	
consistent	cutbacks	over	the	period.	These	austerity	measures	undermined	basic	
development	 goals,	 reflected	 in	 deteriorating	 indicators	 in	 primary	 school	
enrolment,	access	to	primary	health	care,	and	overall	poverty	indicators.	During	
the	1990s	the	strategy	shifted	somewhat	as	resources	were	reallocated	back	to	





project.	 Critical	 to	 this	 process	 of	 circumscribing	 financial	 sovereignty	 of	 the	
borrowing	states,	was	the	growing	external	debt.	The	debt	became	both	a	tool	of	
coercion	 and	 a	 legitimising	 discursive	 strategy.	 Debt	 burdens	 rose	 over	 the	
structural	 adjustment	 period	 and	 the	 debt	 service,	 deepening	 the	 influence	 of	
financial	 capital	 and	 sustaining	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 countries	 on	 the	
international	 creditors,	 thus	 undermining	 their	 self-governing	 capacity.	 The	













the	 other	 two	 case	 studies,	 the	 depiction	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 civil	 service	
employment	 as	 a	 burden	 on	 a	 struggling	 state	 is	 common	 across	 all	 three	
countries.	 In	 all	 three	 cases,	 the	 donors	 constructed	 an	 anti-welfare	 state	






and	 technical	 in	 nature	 (as	 opposed	 to	 ideologically	 driven	 alternatives),	 the	
donors	make	a	compelling	case	that	austerity	is	an	urgent	and	necessary	project	
for	development.	Even	into	the	1990s,	as	the	deleterious	impacts	of	the	austerity	
policies	 became	 clear,	 the	 discourse	maintains	 this	 stance,	 excluding	 from	 the	
narrative	 any	 responsibility	 for	 worsening	 social	 indicators	 to	 the	 austerity	
agenda	 imposed	by	 the	donors.	 	All	of	 the	examined	passages	and	texts	 largely	
reproduce	 and	 confirm	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 discourse,	 using	 strategies	 of	
argumentation	 that	 lead	 to	 the	 same	 conclusion:	 there	 is	 no	 alternative	 to	
austerity	policies.	This	conclusion	makes	it	an	inherently	depoliticising	discourse;	
it	 denies	 the	 political	 nature	 of	 spending	 cuts	 by	 claiming	 that	 they	 are	 the	
inevitable	result	of	an	objective	financial	situation.		Yet,	the	austerity	discourse	is	
clearly	 political	 for	 two	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 its	 claims	 can	 be	 identified	 with	 the	
discursive	 practices	 of	 a	 specific	 political	 project:	 neoliberalism.	 Secondly,	 the	
discourse	has	important	performative	effects,	as	it	reinforces	the	imagined	reality	
that	 it	 perceives	 to	 be	 objective.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 legitimising	 austerity,	 it	
reinforces	the	neoliberal	logic	of	the	market’s	supremacy	over	the	state.	Through	




















essential	 and	 inevitable,	 in	 line	 with	 the	Washington	 Consensus.	 This	 chapter	
focuses	on	the	development	strategy	of	the	donors	during	this	same	period	in	the	









also	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 population,	 as	 government	 revenues	 are	 partially	
determined	by	the	success	of	these	exports.	This	is	particularly	pertinent	in	the	
context	of	the	discussion	in	the	previous	chapter,	as	the	SAPs	heavily	emphasised	















the	 way	 that	 neoliberalism	 reinforces	 itself	 discursively	 in	 regimes	 across	 the	
world.	Lastly,	a	discussion	brings	together	the	findings	from	chapters	three	and	
four	to	discuss	and	critique	the	structural	adjustment	paradigm	and	draw	some	
conclusions	 about	 the	 aid	 framework	 of	 this	 period	 and	 its	 implications	 for	
postcolonial	development	and	sovereignty.	
	
The	discussion	 shows	 a	 common	policy	 framework,	 in	 line	with	 the	neoliberal	
Washington	 Consensus	 emphasis	 on	 exporting	 to	 international	 markets	 and	
minimising	the	role	of	the	state.	Despite	the	different	export	focuses	of	these	three	
countries,	themes	in	both	policy	and	consequences	are	remarkably	similar.	When	




legitimise	 the	 trade	 strategy:	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 state-market	 binary,	 which	
vilifies	the	state	and	elevates	the	market;	and	the	privileging	of	GDP	growth	above	
other	 development	 indicators.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 donors	 portray	 these	 deeply	








on	 exporting	 and	 ‘free	 trade’.	 It	 rests	 on	 a	 fusion	 of	 different	 neoclassical	
arguments.	One	of	these	is	the	theory	of	comparative	advantage,	which	assumes	
that	 there	 are	 advantages	 of	 trade	 between	 economies	with	 different	 ‘natural’	
advantages,	based	on	capital	and	labour	ratios	(Ricardo,	1969).	Another	important	
argument	concerns	the	benefits	of	‘openness’	for	economic	growth,	claiming	that	
trade	 encourages	 the	 spread	 of	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 that	 contributes	 to	
faster	 growth	 (Love	 &	 Lattimore,	 2009).	 Both	 these	 theories	 have	 played	 an	




the	 entry	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investment’	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 tariffs	 or	 ‘trade	







From	 the	earliest	days	of	 its	 involvement	 in	Côte	d’Ivoire,	 the	World	Bank	had	






des	Productions	Agricoles	 (CAISTAB)	saw	 large	 reductions	 in	 its	 surpluses	 from	
coffee	 and	 cocoa	 (World	 Bank,	 1981a).	 Consequently,	 the	 first	 1981	 SAP	
demanded	 some	 initial	 structural	 reform	 to	 the	 cocoa	 sector.	 The	World	 Bank	
argued	 that	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 should	 seek	 to	 diversify	 and	 grow	 other	 crops,	 but	




The	main	measure	that	 the	donors	 insisted	on	to	boost	exports	 from	the	cocoa	
sector	during	the	structural	adjustment	period	was	the	reduction	of	export	taxes.	
The	unitary	export	tax	(Droit	Unique	de	Sortie	[DUS])	is	paid	by	exporters	when	
the	 cocoa	 cargo	 is	 loaded	 onto	 the	 vessel.	 In	 1986,	 taxes	 on	 export	 crops	
represented	just	under	one	third	of	the	government’s	total	revenues,	the	majority	






The	 export	 tax	 decreased	 gradually	 over	 the	 period,	 costing	 the	 government	
important	tax	revenues.	Cocoa	production	increased;	after	1995	cocoa	output	was	
between	1	and	1.2	million	tonnes,	against	levels	generally	between	700,000	and	
800,000	 tonnes	 during	 the	 1980s	 (IMF,	 2000a,	 p.	 35).	 The	 economy	 remained	
highly	specialised	and	therefore	dependent	on	cocoa,	making	it	more	vulnerable	
to	falling	prices.	An	important	consequence	of	the	reduction	of	the	DUS	export	tax	
was	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 cocoa	 sector	more	 broadly.	 Large	 TNCs	 became	
incentivised	 to	 participate	 in	 more	 extensive	 operations	 within	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	
investing	 in	 the	 processing	 of	 cocoa	 and	 increasingly	 handling	 exports	 too,	
increasing	 the	number	of	 transnational	players	 in	 the	 cocoa	 industry.	Between	
1980	and	 the	early	2000s,	 for	example,	 the	number	of	 cocoa	 trading	houses	 in	




arrived	 on	 the	 scene,	 pre-structural	 adjustment	 Haiti	 was	 not	 a	 big	 exporter.	




documents	 produced	 during	 the	 1980s.	 The	 World	 Bank	 argued	 that	 Haiti’s	











Key	 changes	 implemented	 during	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 1980s	 included:	 the	
revision	of	the	labour	code	to	allow	foreigners	to	work	in	the	country;	the	revision	




assembly	export	 industry	and	encouraged	 foreign	 investment	 into	 the	country;	




There	 were	 very	 few	 backward	 linkages	 to	 the	 Haitian	 economy	 from	 this	
strategy;	US	tariff	legislation	discouraged	the	use	of	local	inputs	in	the	production	
process.	 In	 1990,	 84%	 of	 the	 assembly	 sector’s	 exports	 were	 composed	 of	
imported	inputs	(Weisbrot,	1997).	Tax-free	profits	made	from	the	assembly	sector	




























signed	 the	 Convention	 de	 recherches,	 d’exploitaiton	 et	 de	 transport	 des	



















In	 the	present	chapter,	analysis	of	 the	oil	project	 is	 therefore	based	on	the	 few	
references	made	 in	 the	 policy	 documents,	 and	 the	 aforementioned	Convention,	
since	it	established	the	legal	framework	upon	which	the	project	was	erected.		
	
Whilst	 the	 export-side	 of	 the	 project	was	 the	 clear	 focus	 at	 this	 time,	with	 the	
Sédigui	element	projected	to	receive	‘a	small	catalytic	contribution’	relative	to	the	
Doba	 project,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 significant	 that	 the	 donors	were	 supportive	 of	
plans	to	develop	domestic	infrastructure	and	markets	(World	Bank,	1996b,	p.	15).	
The	dual	approach	that	was	described	in	the	documents,	of	developing	the	country	
for	 both	 export	 and	 domestic	 supply,	 represents	 a	 slight	 divergence	 from	 the	
strategies	 pursued	 in	 the	 other	 two	 case	 studies	 –	which	 focussed	 entirely	 on	
export	markets,	neglecting	domestic	markets	altogether.	The	domestic,	demand-
led	 side	 of	 the	 oil	 project	 presented	 the	 opportunity	 to	 increase	 public	






















the	 neoclassical	 economic	 theories	 of	 income	 distribution	 and	 employment	
determination,	 introduced	 in	 chapter	 one,	 which	 propose	 that	 the	 price	









rise	 or	 fall	 in	 line	 with	 the	 market,	 and	 creating	 a	 labour	 market	 climate	 of	
employment	 insecurity	 by	 eroding	 labour	 protections	 (Montreal	 Economic	




In	Côte	d’Ivoire,	 the	donors	sought	 to	 integrate	 this	 logic	 into	 the	cocoa	sector.	
Before	adjustment,	CAISTAB	set	a	cost	and	price	structure	(barème)	at	the	start	of	
each	 agricultural	 season,	 determining	 the	 minimum	 producer	 price	 after	
deducting	all	 costs	 in	 the	 supply	 chain	 from	 the	 reference	export	price	 (World	
Bank,	1977b).	They	were	able	to	do	this	by	selling	a	significant	proportion	of	the	
crop	 forward	 ahead	 of	 the	 time	 of	 harvest.	When	 a	 cocoa	 sale	 was	made,	 the	
exporter	would	compensate	CAISTAB	for	any	difference	between	the	actual	sale	
price	and	the	reference	price.	 If	 the	actual	sale	price	was	 lower	than	CAISTAB’s	
reference	 price,	 CAISTAB	 would	 compensate	 exporters	 by	 granting	 them	 a	
payment.	 CAISTAB	 was	 also	 responsible	 for	 domestic	 and	 external	 marketing	
(World	 Bank,	 1977b).	 This	 system	 ensured	 consistency	 in	 price	 for	 the	 cocoa	
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farmers.	When	the	world	cocoa	price	was	high,	farmers	would	receive	a	smaller	
share,	 but	 when	 prices	 were	 low	 their	 incomes	 were	 protected.	 This	 system	
represents	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 the	 state	 involvement	 in	 the	 economy	 that	 is	
reproved	within	neoliberal	reasoning.	The	reform	of	the	sector	through	structural	
adjustment	therefore	offers	a	useful	case	study	for	how	these	institutions	respond	
to	 economic	 systems	 and	 practises	 that	 they	 consider	 as	 obtrusive	 state	
involvement.		
	
Following	 the	 plummeting	 of	 cocoa	 prices,	 the	 donors	 persuaded	 the	 Ivorian	
government	to	reduce	the	producer	price	by	half	in	1989	(World	Bank,	1989a,	p.	
29).	 Not	 content	 with	 this,	 in	 the	 mid-1990s	 the	 donors	 then	 demanded	 a	
reduction	of	the	role	of	CAISTAB	in	domestic	and	external	marketing,	in	favour	of	
a	new,	private,	auction	system	for	export	rights	in	the	cocoa	sector	(IMF,	1994,	p.	





















	The	 consequences	 of	 this	 move	 for	 the	 farmers	 were	 devastating;	 under	 the	








incomes	 diminished	 by	 half,	 and	 with	 so	 many	 of	 the	 population	 engaged	 in	
agricultural	activity,	rural	poverty	increased	rapidly	(World	Bank,	2002c,	p.	5).	A	















Ivorian	 government	 tried	 to	 increase	 custom	duties	 as	 a	means	of	 boosting	 its	
income	 from	 the	 cocoa	 trade,	 and	 the	 large	 exporters	 responded	 by	 stopping	
exports	 until	 the	 new	 custom	 duties	 were	 reduced	 (Essoh,	 2014).	 This	
demonstrates	 the	 enormous	 power	 that	 a	 small	 handful	 of	 international	
companies	were	 able	 to	wield	 over	 the	 small	 Ivorian	 producers,	 following	 the	




yet	 by	 1999	 it	 had	 been	 completely	 transformed,	 shows	 the	 ideological	
	









over	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 in	 Haiti	 the	 development	 agencies	
sought	 to	minimise	 the	role	of	 the	state	 in	 the	assembly	 industry,	 incentivising	




one	 public	 industrial	 park	 (SONAPI)	 as	 well	 as	 some	 private	 ones.	 The	 public	
industrial	park	received	some	incentives,	which	gave	it	a	competitive	edge	over	
the	 private	 ones,	 which	 drew	 criticism	 from	 the	 World	 Bank.	 The	 donors’	
investment	in	the	sector	was	therefore	channelled	to	private	industrial	firms	and	









































































































subsidies	 and	 establishing	 a	 basic	 regulatory	 framework.	 The	 case	 of	 Chad	
presents	 a	 completely	 different	 context,	 in	 which	 the	 export	 industry	 of	 focus	
(petroleum)	had	not	yet	been	established.	Chad	represented	an	opportunity	for	











year	 concession	 to	 develop	 the	 oilfields	 in	 southwestern	 Chad.	 It	 granted	 the	
consortium	 the	 rights	 to	produce,	 transport,	 and	market	 the	oil	 from	 the	Doba	
fields,	and	was	signed	by	President	Habré	before	he	was	deposed	in	1990.40	For	
the	export	portion	of	the	project,	the	framework	agreements	became	effective	in	














translations	and	draws	on	 their	analysis.	An	understanding	of	 the	 terms	of	 the	
agreements	 that	 the	 World	 Bank	 accepted	 and	 that	 underpin	 the	 project,	 is	
necessary	for	a	thorough	comprehension	of	their	intentions	for	the	oil	strategy	in	





the	 government	 from	 intervening	with	 the	project.	 Both	 agreements	 provide	 a	
minimum	standard	for	oil	exploration,	which	the	consortium	is	under	contractual	
duty	 to	 conform	 to.	 However,	 they	 also	 contain	 an	 enforceable	 ceiling	 on	





the	 authors	 of	 the	 Amnesty	 report	 argue,	 this	 vague	 reference	 to	 ‘petroleum	
industry	 standards’	 could	 be	 interpreted	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways,	 not	 necessarily	









act	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 Consortium,	 without	 prior	 agreement	 between	 the	
Parties,	which	has	the	duly	established	effect	of	increasing,	directly,	or	by	virtue	








The	 language	 of	 this	 article	 is	 broad,	 and	 could	 apply	 to	 any	 laws	 that	 the	
Consortium	deems	 to	affect	 its	 ‘rights	 and	economic	benefits’,	 including	 labour	
laws,	such	as	allowing	unionisation	or	the	raising	of	taxes	on	Doba	oil	production.	
An	equilibrium	clause	is	incorporated	too,	which	stipulates	that	if	the	government	






conditions,	 obligations	 and	 responsibilities,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 same	 rights	 and	






















a	 financier	 and	 a	 key	 stakeholder	 of	 the	 project,	 the	World	 Bank	 conducted	 a	
comprehensive	 appraisal	 of	 the	Conventions	and	 accepted	 the	 legal	 framework	
that	they	established.	The	privileging	of	TNC	interests	and	a	limited	government	
role	were	therefore	key	to	the	World	Bank’s	development	strategy	for	Chad	and	is	
further	 evidence	 of	 the	 insincerity	 of	 any	 BWI	 claims	 to	 genuine	 domestic	
development.	
	
Again,	 the	 impacts	 of	 this	 PRS	 will	 be	 considered	 in	 chapter	 six,	 following	 a	
discussion	 of	 the	 poverty	 reduction	 strategy	 trade	 policy	 and	 the	 birth	 and	
evolution	of	the	Chadian	oil	industry	during	the	2000s.	For	the	time	being,	suffice	
it	to	say	that	the	World	Bank	oversaw	and	approved	the	legislative	framework	that	










led	 to	development	with	shallow	roots	–	exemplified	by	 the	 industrial	zones	 in	
Haiti,	which	create	a	race	to	the	bottom	to	gain	competitive	advantage,	resulting	
in	 wage	 suppression,	 disregard	 for	 labour	 standards	 and	 poor	 workplace	
conditions.	 In	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 too,	 the	 country	 did	 not	 own	 the	 industrialisation	





of	 the	 three	 cases	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 rolling	 back	 of	 the	 state,	 because	 TNCs	 (the	
consortium)	were	key	agents	in	the	process,	and	were	partly	responsible	for	the	
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legal	 framework	which	pushed	 out	 the	 government	 entirely.	 The	Chadian	 case	














taxes	 paid	 by	 foreign	 investors	 and	 handing	 over	 economic	 operations	 to	 the	
private	sector,	these	policies	are	more	likely	to	have	had	the	opposite	effect.	Yet,	
the	act	of	reducing	the	role	of	the	state	within	the	economy	in	itself	is	not	evidence	




from	the	policy	documents	and	 from	secondary	sources	 that	point	 towards	 the	
imposed	nature	of	the	discussed	trade	policies	in	Haiti	and	Côte	d’Ivoire,	which	
this	 section	will	 now	discuss.	Chapter	 three	 advanced	 an	understanding	of	 the	
SAPs	 as	 an	 infringement	 upon	 sovereignty,	 demonstrating	 considerable	
asymmetry	in	the	power	relationship	between	borrowing	governments	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 the	 donors	 on	 the	 other.	 It	 showed	 how	 the	 donors	 were	 able	 to	
influence	 the	 governments	 of	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti	 to	 comply	 with	
	
41	The	Chadian	 example	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 reality	 that	 the	Déby	 government	 is	 an	












government’s	 own	 development	 plan,	 requesting	 $1	 billion	 in	 development	
assistance	for	a	project	that	would	prioritise	an	increase	of	national	production,	
particularly	of	agricultural	and	manufactured	goods	 for	 local	consumption.	The	
international	development	agencies	argued	 that	 the	government	 lacked	a	 clear	
strategy	 for	 national	 development	 and	 questioned	 how	 realistic	 the	 plan	 was.	










‘Under	 strong	 pressure	 from	 the	 international	 financial	 community	 and	 from	
governments	of	traditional	donor	agencies,	the	President	of	Haiti	and	the	group	
surrounding	 him	were	made	 to	 understand	 that	 continued	 aid	 to	 Haiti	 would	
require	major	policy	corrections’	(World	Bank,	1983a,	p.	4).		
	
It	 is	 therefore	 clear	 that	 a	 level	of	 coercion	was	employed	by	 the	 international	














Clearly,	 the	 World	 Bank	 understood	 the	 difficult	 choice	 facing	 the	 President,	
between	pursuing	campaign	promises	and	 implementing	 the	donors’	 agenda,	a	
key	condition	for	his	return	to	the	country.		
	
In	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 President	 Houphouët-Boigny	 and	 his	 administration	 put	 up	
resistance	to	the	strategy	too.	In	the	Project	Completion	Report	for	the	1989	SAL,	
experts	at	the	World	Bank	wrote	that	‘the	perception	that	some	things	were	“too	
important	 to	 be	 left	 to	 the	 market”	 remained	 widespread	 at	 all	 levels	 of	
government’	 (World	 Bank,	 1994d,	 p.	 4).	 Houphouët-Boigny	 in	 particular,	 they	
wrote,	was	 a	 ‘firm	believer	 in	 fixed	prices	 for	 consumers	 and	producers	 and	 a	
strong	opponent	to	reliance	on	world	markets	as	a	means	to	assure	Côte	d’Ivoire	
the	 stable	 level	 of	 resources	 it	 needs	 to	 develop	 economically’	 (World	 Bank,	
1994d,	 p.	 4).	 Later,	 during	 the	 1990s,	 the	 release	 of	 funds	 in	 tranches	 was	
conditioned	 on	 the	 government’s	 commitment	 to	 reducing	 the	 powers	 and	
responsibilities	of	CAISTAB	(World	Bank,	1995).	The	World	Bank	acknowledged	






The	 legal	 foundation	 of	 the	 pipeline	 project	 and	 the	 trade	 reforms	 that	 were	













case	 studies,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Washington	 Consensus	 paradigm	 of	 export-led	
growth	 and	 a	 reduced	 role	 for	 the	 state,	 through	 deregulated	 and	 liberalised	
markets.	 Importantly,	 it	 has	 highlighted	 the	 lack	 of	 domestic	 ownership	 of	 the	
trade	strategy.	What	the	analysis	has	also	revealed	is	the	failure	of	this	strategy	to	
improve	incomes	or	to	address	poverty;	rather,	the	opposite	has	occurred.	As	in	
the	 previous	 chapter,	 this	 begs	 the	 question:	 how	 were	 the	 donors	 able	 to	
legitimise	 these	 policies,	 given	 their	 status	 as	 organisations	 operating	 in	 the	
service	of	development?	This	section	therefore	explores	the	way	that	the	donors	
use	 discursive	 strategies	 to	 legitimise	 the	 neoliberal	 policy	 paradigm,	 thus	
shedding	light	on	the	nature	of	neoliberal	ideology	in	the	context	of	the	SAPs.	The	
methodology	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 borrowing	 different	




that	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 CDA	were:	 the	 executive	 summaries,	 sections	
pertaining	 to	 the	 industry	 in	 question	 and	 the	 broader	 sector	 in	 which	 that	
industry	sits	(cocoa	and	agriculture,	in	Côte	d’Ivoire,	for	example),	as	well	as	the	
broader	 policy	 matrices.	 As	 already	 discussed,	 the	 oil	 industry	 was	 not	 yet	
established	 nor	 do	 the	 SAPs	 dedicate	 much	 time	 to	 discussing	 the	 oil	 project,	
beyond	describing	the	two	aspects	(Doba	and	Sédigui)	and	the	benefits	that	they	
might	bring	to	the	country.	However,	as	we	have	seen,	Chad	was	in	the	process	of	
preparing	 for	 an	oil	 project	 and	 laying	 the	 foundations	 for	 an	oil-led	economy,	
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under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 World	 Bank	 as	 well	 as	 with	 the	 oil	 consortium.	
Documents	 from	 the	 Chadian	 context	 are	 therefore	 incorporated	 into	 the	




their	 justification	 for	 an	 export-oriented	 trade	 strategy	 with	 minimal	 state	
regulation.	As	in	the	previous	chapter,	there	is	significant	commonality	across	the	
case	studies	in	key	arguments,	claims	and	discursive	strategies.	The	first	argument	













Claims	 1	 and	 2	 are	 associated	with	 the	 first	 argument	 identified	 above,	whilst	





Chapter	 two	 introduced	 Bourdieu	 and	 Wacquant’s	 ‘new	 planetary	 vulgate’	 of	
neoliberal	globalisation,	which	delineates	a	series	of	oppositions	and	equivalences	
that	 are	 constructed	 in	 a	neoliberal	 discourse	 to	privilege	 the	market	 over	 the	
state	 (Bourdieu	 &	Wacquant,	 2001).	 This	 framework	 demonstrates	 the	 binary	
opposition	between	the	open,	flexible,	dynamic,	efficient,	modern	market	and	the	
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rigid,	 closed,	 static,	 weak,	 inefficient,	 out-dated	 state,	 a	 key	 assumption	 of	
neoliberalism.	I	refer	to	these	oppositions	in	the	analysis,	examining	the	ways	in	
which	 the	 donors	 represent	 this	 binary	 opposition	 as	 objective	 truth,	 thus	
legitimising	the	policies	explored	in	the	first	half	of	this	chapter.	The	first	claim	


















































































three	 cases,	 government	 intervention	 in	 the	 economy	 (through	 price-setting	
mechanisms,	 regulations,	 tariffs	 and	 restrictions)	 is	 presented	 as	 normatively	
undesirable	 and	 specific	 trade	 policies	 are	 designated	 as	 both	 economically	
incompetent	and	unethical.	The	donors	describe	the	trade	policies	of	the	state	in	
the	 economy	 mostly	 by	 means	 of	 negative	 predications,	 such	 as	 ‘excessive’	





an	 urgent	 priority,	 the	 language	 takes	 on	 a	 metaphorical	 character.	 As	 was	
















unhelpful	 trade	 policies	 of	 government,	 the	 market	 would	 establish	 its	 own	
natural	equilibrium;	 this	 is	complemented	by	the	nomination	of	 the	removal	of	
certain	 trade	policies	as	 ‘corrections’.	The	use	of	 the	 lexicon	 ‘correct’	 simplifies	
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economic	policymaking	into	a	‘right	way’,	which	leads	to	the	proper	functioning	of	
the	 economy,	 and	 a	 wrong	 way,	 which	 causes	 the	 economic	 machine	 to	
breakdown.	Use	of	these	metaphors	aids	in	supporting	the	claim	that	the	problems	
of	 the	 economy	 are	 a	 result	 of	 incompetent	 governments	 and	 can	 be	 resolved	
through	a	technical	fix	or	a	medical	antidote	of	structural	adjustment.	In	this	case,	
that	fix	is	the	removal	of	the	state	from	the	private	domain,	in	accordance	with	the	
neoliberal	 notion	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 an	 autonomous,	 self-regulating	 body	 or	






as	 ‘distortions’	 and	 ‘rigidities’,	 and	 as	 ‘impediments’,	 and	 ‘obstacles’	 to	 private	
sector	development.	Within	the	argumentation,	the	topos	of	burden	again	plays	an	
important	 role	 in	 portraying	 the	 state	 as	 incompetent.	 This	 negative	
representation	of	the	state	forms	the	basis	upon	which	neoliberal	arguments	in	
favour	of	deregulated	markets	are	grounded.	The	use	of	nouns	such	as	‘obstacles’	
and	 ‘impediments’	 to	 describe	 particular	 trade	 policies	 is	 also	 a	 strategy	 of	










since	 those	 affected	by	CAISTAB	 and	 therefore	 by	 the	 reforms	 (cocoa	 growers,	
public	 sector	workers,	 traders,	 etc.)	 are	 not	 represented	 in	 the	 discourse.	 The	







this	excerpt	also	serves	a	depoliticising	purpose.	 In	announcing	 that	 ‘enough	 is	
known’,	policymakers	at	the	World	Bank	are	vague	about	who	is	calling	for	new	











laden	 claims	 about	 the	 problems	 of	 government	 policy	 as	 factual	 and	 value-
neutral.		
	
Furthermore,	 the	 discourse	 suggests	 that	 government	 trade	 policies	 were	
‘imposed’	on	the	private	sector,	evoking	the	topos	of	freedom,	suggesting	that	the	
state’s	activities	in	the	private	sector	are	not	only	economically	incompetent,	but	






chapters	 have	 argued,	 these	 programmes	 impeded	 the	 freedom	 of	 borrowing	
governments	to	decide	on	their	own	financial	and	economic	policies.	This	freedom	
to	act	is	closely	linked	to	the	notion	of	state	sovereignty,	but	is	entirely	excluded	














as	 responsible	 for	 economic	 underdevelopment,	 ignoring	 the	 role	 played	 by	
external	agents	in	cementing	Haiti	in	the	outer	periphery	of	the	global	economic	
system.	This	same	document	fails	to	mention	the	impact	of	the	colonial	legacy	or	





Chad's	 turbulent	 history	 has	 also	 left	 positive	 elements:	 […];	 the	 economy	 is	
relatively	unregulated’	(World	Bank,	1994e,	p.	12)	
	
Although	describing	 two	different	 situations,	 the	message	 is	 the	 same:	policies	
that	 work	 to	 create	 an	 unregulated	 economy	 in	 which	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 is	
minimal,	are	desirable.		
	
Within	 this	 discourse,	 which	 vilifies	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 donors	 position	
themselves	as	the	voice	of	reason	and	expertise,	against	the	irrationality	of	politics	







‘First,	 several	 sound	 but	 forceful	 actions	 […]	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 met	 with	 some	
opposition	from	vested	interests’	(World	Bank,	1983c,	p.	42)														
	













the	 market;	 the	 second	 claim	 is	 that	 the	 market	 is	 the	 most	 efficient	 and	
valuable	 method	 of	 organisation.	 Where	 the	 first	 claim	 designates	 the	
interventionist	 practices	 of	 the	 government	 as	 normatively	 bad	 –	 both	
economically	incompetent	and	immoral,	this	claim	designates	the	practices	of	the	
market	 as	 normatively	 good	 –	 economically	 competent	 and	 moral.	 In	 this	







































policies.	 Successful	 reforms	 could	 send	 a	 strong	 signal	 to	
























In	 passages	 pertaining	 to	 the	 overall	 development	 strategy	 and	 to	 the	
development	of	 the	export	 industry	 in	question,	 the	donors	qualify	 the	market	
with	positive	predications,	praising	markets	as	‘dynamic’	and	business	managers	





force’	 of	 the	 economy	and	 the	 ‘engine	of	 growth’,	 reinforcing	 the	notion	of	 the	
private	 sector	 as	 moving	 and	 dynamic.	 In	 conceptualising	 the	 economy	 as	 a	
machine,	the	assumption	is	that	markets	and	the	private	sector	are	run	according	
to	economic	laws	(e.g.:	laws	of	supply	and	demand,	laws	of	competition,	etc.).	The	
emphasis	 on	 the	 mechanical	 order	 of	 the	 market	 aids	 in	 the	 construction	 of	
markets	 as	 efficient,	 law-governed	 mechanisms	 that	 gravitate	 towards	
equilibrium.	This	gives	way	to	the	discursive	separation	of	the	market	from	the	
state,	suggesting	an	opposition	between	the	natural	course	of	the	market	and	the	
unnaturalness	of	state	 interference.	Within	 this	metaphor,	 interventions	on	 the	
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part	of	 the	 state	 create	 faults	 and	distortions	 in	an	otherwise	well-functioning,	












not	 challenge	 the	 regulations	underpinning	 them.	For	 example,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
disagree	with	legislation	against	the	exploitation	of	children.	Choosing	to	discuss	
markets	in	terms	of	‘freedom’	serves	a	political	purpose;	the	superfluous	adding	
of	 the	 adjective	 ‘free’	 promotes	 the	 idea	 of	markets	 representing	 freedom	 and	
liberty.	Being	a	proponent	of	 the	 liberation	of	markets	 is	 less	provocative	 than	
being	an	opponent	of	government.	The	term	‘free	market’	associates	the	market	
with	 free	 individuals,	 rational	 choice	 and	 freedom	 of	 contract	 or	 voluntary	
exchange.	This	is	binary	opposition	to	the	doctrine	of	negative	liberty	associated	
with	government	 intervention	that	 is	established	 in	the	 first	claim,	setting	up	a	
dichotomous	 either-or	 opposition	 between	 state	 and	 market.	 Within	 this	
discourse,	freedom	is	reduced	to	market	behaviour.		
	



















observed,	 describing	 prices	 as	 flexible	 is	 a	 misnomer	 (Jackson	 W.	 A.,	 2015).	
Flexibility	 is	 usually	 used	 to	 describe	 objects	 that	 can	bend	 and	 change	 shape,	
which	prices	are	not	able	to	do.	Whilst	they	can	be	variable,	they	cannot	be	flexible.	
However,	as	William	Jackson	observes,	the	term	‘variable	prices’	does	not	evoke	
the	 same	 positive	 connotations	 as	 ‘flexible	 prices’	 and	 even	 suggests	 a	 certain	




sector,	market	 prices,	market	 conditions,	 etc.)	 is	 often	 in	 subject	 position.	 For	
example,	from	the	Ivorian	SAL	I:	
	
‘The	 reforms	 are	 designed	 to	 [..]	 assure	 the	 rational	 prices	 and	world	market	
conditions	would	 guide	decisions	 to	 invest	 and	 produce’	 (World	 Bank,	 1981a,	
Loan	Summary)	
	




















the	 former	more	 negatively.	 This	 supports	 the	 third	 claim,	 that	 international	




















accelerating	 output	 growth	 and	 employment,	 rather	 than	




















































International	 markets	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 positive	 notions	 of	 ‘growth’	
‘competition’,	‘success’	and	‘dynamism’,	whereas	domestic	markets	are	predicated	





‘Industrial	 firms	 tended	 to	 rely	 on	 rents	 from	 the	 narrow,	protected	 domestic	
market	 rather	 than	 investing	 to	 correct	 inefficiencies	 and	 compete	 in	 the	
international	marketplace.’	(World	Bank,	1987a,	pp.	16-17)	
	
The	 transition	 to	 a	 more	 export-oriented	 economy	 is	 framed	 as	 fulfilling	 the	
country’s	 potential,	 predicated	 as	 a	 ‘future-oriented’	 approach	 that	 is	 ‘outward	
looking’,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 ‘stagnant’	 domestic	 approach.	 The	 topos	 of	
modernisation	appeals	to	modernisation	theory’s	Eurocentric	assumptions	about	
postcolonial	 nations	 and	 the	 necessity	 of	 developing	 their	 economies	 along	 a	
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Western,	 linear	 path	 of	 development.	 This	 is	 further	 evidence	 of	 the	 assertion	
made	 in	 chapter	 one	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 neoliberal	 development	
theories	and	earlier	modernisation	theory.	This	discourse	ignores	the	reality	that	
highly	 protectionist	 trade	 strategies	 played	 in	 important	 part	 in	 the	 economic	
success	of	‘modern’,	‘developed’	core	economies	(Chang,	2010).	
	
In	 announcing	measures	 of	 a	 deregulatory	 nature,	 the	 donors	 create	 a	 binary	
opposition	between	protectionist	trade	policies	(tariffs,	subsidies	and	taxes)	and	






The	 paratactic	 relationship	 between	 ‘reducing	 protection’,	 and	 ‘encouraging	
competition’	 is	 indicated	 by	 the	 conjunction	 ‘and’,	 indicating	 equivalence.	
Competition	 is	 contrasted	with	 ‘rent-seeking	 activities’;	 the	 topos	 of	 corruption	
aids	in	portraying	protected,	domestic	markets	as	mired	with	vested	interests,	and	
aligning	deregulated,	 international	markets	with	 freedom	and	 fair	 competition.	








amongst	 large	 firms.	 	 The	 Ivorian	 case	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 this,	 where	
competition	 in	 the	 cocoa	 global	 value	 chain	 decreased	 significantly	 after	 the	
industry	 was	 privatised.	 The	 reality	 that	 the	 neoliberal	 discourse	 promises	 a	
model	of	competition	between	firms,	but	in	reality	led	to	an	industry	characterised	
by	 non-competitive	 behaviour	 where	 an	 increasingly	 small	 number	 of	 firms	




Within	 this	 pro-globalisation,	 pro-deregulation	 discourse,	 the	 use	 of	 passive	
structures	 contributes	 to	 the	 elision	 of	 human	 agency	 and	 responsibility	 for	
processes	in	the	export-oriented	economy.	For	example:	
	




















Haitian	 economy.	Through	excluding	different	 interest	 groups,	 the	discourse	 is	
depoliticised.	Elsewhere,	these	implicit	assumptions	about	the	impartiality	of	the	
donors	 and	 their	 reforms	 are	 stated	 explicitly.	 For	 example,	 the	 World	 Bank	

















In	 this	 excerpt,	 the	 authors	 draw	 on	 the	 topos	 of	 reality	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	
priority	 with	 the	 oil	 project	 is	 the	 export	 project	 since	 it	 represents	 the	
opportunity	for	private	money-making,	whilst	the	domestic	oil	project	does	not.	





state,	 and	 international	 over	 domestic	 trade	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 a	 series	 of	
programmes	 that	 reconfigured	 the	 economy	 to	 become	 (or	 remain)	 export-
oriented	 with	 a	 minimalist	 state.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 these	 policies	 failed	
catastrophically	to	improve	living	conditions	or	incomes	in	these	countries.	It	is	






earliest	 days	 of	 its	 structural	 adjustment	 lending;	 improving	 living	 standards,	
reducing	poverty	and	 increasing	 incomes	were	key	objectives	of	 theirs	 in	 their	
















result	 and	 relying	 on	 the	 redistribution	 of	 some	portion	 of	 the	 growth	 to	 help	
counter	act	the	inequality	that	has	resulted.	Thus,	increasing	growth	will	lead	to	






























‘Growing	 real	 appreciation	 thwarted	 efforts	 to	 restore	
growth	 and,	 thereby,	 reduce	 the	 growing	 poverty	 in	 rural	
areas’	(World	Bank,	1995,	p.	9)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	














rate	 of	 real	 GDP	 growth	 is	 provisionally	 estimated	 at	 6	
percent’	(IMF,	1998b,	p.	4)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)																																							
‘Haitian	industry	is	still	characterised	by	stagnant	protected	
import	 substitution	 industries	 and	 a	 growing	 export	

























In	 particular,	 the	 donors	 indicate	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 growth	 and	










real	wage	growth	and	 increases	 in	standards	of	 living	amongst	 the	poor,	many	
economists	suggest	that	GDP	growth	or	indeed	increases	in	employment	will	not	
suffice	 (Seers,	 1969).	 Whilst	 increase	 in	 per	 capita	 income	 can	 contribute	 to	
improved	living	standards,	there	is	no	guarantee,	as	the	examples	of	oil	exporting	







through	 grammatical	 relations	 between	 words	 and	 clauses.	 The	 table	 shows	
examples	where	 the	 donors	 express	 the	 dual	 objectives	 of	 the	 programmes	 as	
‘growth	and	development’.	The	paratactic	structure	–	indicated	by	the	conjunctive	














42 	An	 example	 that	was	 relevant	 and	 accessible	 during	 structural	 is	 Trinidad	with	 an	












of	development.	Nominalising	one	 specific	 economic	measure	 (GDP	growth)	as	
‘recovery’	 conceals	 the	 importance	 (and	 absence)	 of	 other	 development	
indicators,	like	per	capita	income,	inequality	or	poverty	levels.	This	metaphor	also	








‘Political	 ideology	 played	 a	 secondary	 role	 to	 practical	 considerations	 in	
promoting	growth	and	development.’		(World	Bank,	1981a,	p.	1)		
	
In	 this	 excerpt,	 promoting	 growth	 (and	 development,	 implied	 through	 the	
paratactic	conjunction)	 is	 framed	as	a	practical	exercise,	 in	direct	opposition	to	
alternative	 economic	 strategies,	 portrayed	 as	 ideologically	 motivated.	 This	






Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 incomes	 did	 not,	 and	 poverty	 increased	 during	 the	 1980s	 and	
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1990s. 43 	In	 Haiti	 too,	 periods	 of	 growth	 were	 not	 accompanied	 by	 poverty	
reduction	or	improved	incomes.	This	claim	is	therefore	crucial	in	legitimising	the	
SAPs.	 By	 constructing	 a	 discursive	 equivalence	 between	 GDP	 growth	 and	
development,	 the	 donors	 were	 able	 to	 frame	 what	 results	 they	 did	 achieve	




course	 of	 twenty-year	 period	 and	 across	 the	 three	 examples	 is	 not	 completely	
homogenous.	 During	 the	 1990s,	 the	 donors	 begin	 to	 incorporate	 more	 social	
objectives	 into	 their	 programmes,	 placing	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 poverty	











and	 the	 PRSPs	 that	 would	 become	 the	 next	 lending	 paradigm	 for	 peripheral	
countries.		
	
Not	 only	 do	 they	 increasingly	 include	 discussions	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 poverty,	 the	
donors	 also	 begin	 to	 explicitly	 state	 poverty	 alleviation	 as	 a	 key	 objective	 of	
structural	 reform.	For	example,	 in	Haiti’s	1994	EERP,	 the	donors	highlight	as	a	








shift	 from	 the	 conflation	 of	 economic	 growth	 with	 development,	 towards	 the	
assumption	that	poverty	alleviation	will	occur	as	a	result	of	economic	growth.	In	
other	words,	GDP	growth	was	no	longer	the	development	objective	in	and	of	itself,	









by	 the	 donors	 to	 ensure	 that	 poverty	 alleviation	 would	 occur.	 The	 neoliberal	
development	strategy	in	all	three	countries	was	based	on	1)	an	austerity	policy	
that	pulled	resources	away	from	the	social	sectors;	and	2)	an	export-led	growth	
strategy	 that	 removed	protections	 for	 local	 industries	 and	workers	 in	order	 to	
incentivise	foreign	investment.	The	consequences	of	these	reforms,	in	the	form	of	


















able	 to	 legitimise	 their	 policy	 of	 undermining	 and	 rolling	 back	 the	 state.	 The	
machine	 becomes	 a	 rich	 source	 domain	 for	 the	 economy	 and	 is	 particularly	
influential	 in	this	discursive	construction	of	 the	market	as	a	self-regulating	and	
balanced	 system.	By	portraying	 the	 state,	 conversely,	 as	 corrupt,	 influenced	by	
vested	 interests	and	 ideology,	 the	neoliberal	strategy	 is	 legitimised.	Taking	this	
state-market	 binary	 as	 an	 objective	 truth,	 as	 the	 discourse	 falsely	 depicts	 it,	
retracting	the	powers	of	the	state	in	favour	of	the	market	appears	common	sense.	
On	its	own,	this	argument	is	powerful	but	limited	when	faced	with	the	reality	that	








policies,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 policy	 matrix	 of	 deregulated	 export-led	
economies	 with	 minimal	 state	 intervention.	 The	 similarities	 across	 the	 case	
studies	are	even	more	significant	in	this	than	in	chapter	three,	since	these	were	
three	very	different	 industries.	Deregulation	has	been	a	key	commonality	 in	all	




In	 all	 three	 cases,	 this	 has	 led	 to	 downwards	 pressure	 on	 labour	 rights	 and	
protections,	the	long-term	consequences	of	which	are	explored	further	in	chapter	
six.	In	all	three	cases,	resource	and	authority	has	been	transferred	from	the	state	




TNCs	were	quick	 to	 take	advantage	of	 the	 ‘favourable’	environments	 that	were	





1998	 (Nestle,	 1998,	 pp.	 88-89).	 Forbes	 estimated	 that	 CEO	 Peter	 Brabeck	
Letmathe	 earned	 $5,000,0000	 in	 2003	 (Forbes,	 2003).	 In	 contrast,	 per	 capita	
income	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	declined	by	one	sixth	between	1999	and	2007,	fuelled	by	
the	 fall	 in	 rural	 incomes	 after	 CAISTAB	 was	 dismantled.	 In	 1996,	 clothing	
contractors	 in	Haiti	 producing	 garments	 for	North	American	 companies	 under	
license	with	Disney	were	in	some	cases	paying	as	little	as	12	cents	an	hour,	well	
below	the	minimum	wage.	Contrast	this	to	the	$97,600	per	hour	that	CEO	Michael	












in	 these	 countries.	 The	 depoliticisation	 of	 the	 discourse	 –	 aided	 by	 conceptual	
metaphors	-	is	essential	as	it	allows	the	donors	to	present	themselves	as	technical,	










desperate	need	 for	 credit	allowed	 the	World	Bank	and	 the	 IMF	 to	extend	 their	
economic	and	political	influence	via	the	SAPs,	prescribing	a	series	of	one-size-fits-
all	policy	reforms:	austerity;	deregulation;	 the	removal	of	protective	 tariffs	and	
taxes;	 and	 privatisation.	 Importantly,	 these	 chapters	 have	 shown	 that	 these	
policies	were	not	owned	by	the	governments,	but	designed	and	imposed	by	the	
BWIs	 and	 therefore	 represent	 the	 undermining	 of	 sovereignty.	 The	 ability	 to	
withhold	finance	and	condition	these	reforms	to	much-needed	credit	is	evidence	
of	 the	coercive	power	of	 these	 institutions	relative	 to	borrowing	countries.	Far	
from	facilitating	an	improvement	in	living	standards,	 in	many	ways	the	policies	




how	 the	donors	 generated	 consent	 for	 these	 reforms,	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 abysmal	
record.	 The	 comparative	 approach	 has	 allowed	 me	 to	 identify	 a	 common	
neoliberal	 discourse,	 which	 presents	 a	 number	 of	 arguments	 as	 infallible,	
scientific,	 objective	 economic	 realities.	 Contested	 subjective	 claims	 about	 the	
necessity	 of	 austerity	 and	 the	 virtues	 of	 the	market	 are	 presented	 as	 common	
sense,	 thus	 limiting	 the	 possibility	 for	 alternatives.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 discourse	
produces	the	policies	and	the	policies	produce	the	discourse,	in	line	CDA		(Wodak	
&	Meyer,	 2009).	Together,	 this	has	 enabled	an	understanding	of	how	power	 is	
wielded	in	the	international	development	system,	via	coercion	and	consent,	in	the	
neo-Gramscian	 sense.	 The	 discourse,	 in	 internalising	 the	 problems	 of	 these	
countries	and	shifting	the	responsibility	 for	underdevelopment	onto	 inefficient,	
corrupt	 and	 overbearing	 governments,	 presents	 another	 dimension	 to	 this	
erosion	of	sovereignty.	The	deligitimisation	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	discourse	
enables	the	donors	to	pursue	the	deligitimisation	of	the	state	in	their	programmes,	
via	 austerity	measures	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 government	 in	 the	




Importantly,	 the	discourse	analysis	has	 revealed	 the	myriad	ways	 in	which	 the	
donors	 depoliticise	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda.	 The	BWIs	 operate	 ostensibly	 on	 the	





The	 SAPs	 were	 indeed	 deeply	 political,	 as	 they	 undermined	 the	 institutional	
capacities	of	the	state	on	a	practical	level,	by:	1)	increasing	the	debt	burden	and	
therefore	 dependency	 of	 these	 countries	 on	 international	 donors	 and	 financial	
institutions;	 2)	 underfunding	 public	 services;	 and	 3)	 reinforcing	 an	 unpopular	
export-led	 paradigm	 that	 cedes	 control	 of	 key	 industries	 to	 foreign	 TNCs.	
Sovereignty	 has	 been	 further	 undermined	 through	 the	 discourse,	 as	 the	
arguments	unveiled	by	 the	CDA	prepare	a	suitable	base	upon	which	neoliberal	
policymaking	can	be	implemented	by	establishing	legitimacy	and	illegitimacy	for	





















Chapters	 three	 and	 four	 argued	 that	 structural	 adjustment	 failed	drastically	 to	
facilitate	development	in	the	case	study	countries.	Indeed,	as	we	have	seen,	many	
SAPs	resulted	in	profoundly	damaging	economic	and	social	consequences.	Key	to	
the	arguments	put	 forward	 in	 these	 two	chapters	 is	 the	analysis	of	 the	donors’	
language.	 This	 revealed	 a	 discourse	 that	 legitimised	 neoliberal	 policies	
throughout	the	period	of	structural	adjustment,	despite	their	evident	failures.	The	
purpose	of	the	second	part	of	this	thesis	is	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	the	
lending	 policy	 framework	 that	 replaced	 the	 SAPs	 –	 the	 PRSPs	 –	 represents	






legitimise	 the	 continuation	 of	 neoliberal	 policies,	 given	 the	 latter’s	 poor	 track	




This	 introduction	 to	part	 two	begins	by	 contextualising	 the	BWIs’	move	 to	 the	
PRSPs	 within	 a	 historical	 perspective,	 considering	 the	 factors	 that	 drove	 the	
donors	to	re-evaluate	their	approach.	What	 follows	 is	a	brief	description	of	 the	
PRSP	process	and	the	HIPC	initiative	as	it	relates	to	development	policy	under	the	









been	 discredited	 by	 scholars	 and	 civil	 society	 movements	 the	 world	 over	
(Kawewe	&	Dibie,	2000;	Watkins,	1995;	Jamal,	1994).	Both	internal	and	external	
evaluations	 conducted	 during	 the	 1990s	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 problems	 that	
hindered	the	effectiveness	of	programmes	supported	by	the	ESAF	(IMF,	1998e).	
Social	 movements	 gained	 traction	 as	 they	 raised	 legitimate	 concerns	 about	
development	 financing,	 failure	 to	 address	 issues	 of	 social	 justice	 and	
unsustainable	debt	levels	(Woodroffe	&	Ellis-Jones,	2000).	Eventually,	the	donors	
were	compelled	to	accept	that	a	new	policy	paradigm	was	needed.	It	is	significant	






It	was	 in	 this	 political	 climate	 that	 the	 Poverty	 Reduction	 and	 Growth	 Facility	
(PGRF)	became	the	new	lending	facility	in	1999,	and	PRSPs	became	the	new	policy	







not	 call	 into	 question	 the	 content	 of	 the	 SAPs;	 rather,	 it	 was	 the	 process	 of	
formulating	strategies	that	needed	to	be	challenged.		
Poverty	Reduction	Strategies:	aligning	with	global	development	goals	
The	 advent	 of	 the	 PRSPs	 coincided	 with	 a	 new	 global	 commitment	 to	 reduce	
poverty	 in	 its	 many	 forms;	 in	 2000,	 the	 189	 UN	 member	 states	 signed	 the	
Millennium	Declaration	committing	them	to	the	achievement	of	the	Millennium	
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Development	 Goals	 (MDGs)	 by	 2015. 44 	The	 MDGs	 set	 out	 to	 address	 several	
dimensions	 of	well	 being,	 including	 eradicating	 poverty	 and	 hunger,	 achieving	










prerequisite	 for	 receiving	 aid	 from	 most	 bilateral	 donors	 too	 (Tan,	 2011).	
According	 to	 the	 IFIs,	 each	 PRSP	 is	 required	 to	 be	 ‘nationally	 owned’,	 i.e.:	 the	






this	more	 country-tailored	 approach,	 the	 IFIs	 declared	 that	 there	would	 be	 no	
blueprint	 or	 rigid	 framework	 for	 the	PRSP	 (World	 Bank,	 2002a).	 However,	 all	














Poor	Countries	 (HIPC)	 initiative,	which	 emerged	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 criticism	
leveled	at	the	donors	for	creating	unsustainable	debt	levels	through	the	SAPs.	
	





of	 the	 fundamental	 objective	 of	 poverty	 reduction.	 And	 accompanying	 these	
efforts	will	be	a	bigger,	better	debt-relief	package’	(Boorman,	1999)	
	
Initially	 launched	 in	1996,	but	broadened	 into	 the	Enhanced	HIPC	 in	1999,	 the	
scheme	aimed	to	significantly	reduce	the	net	debt	stock	of	41	HIPCs,	bringing	their	
debt-to-export	ratios	below	the	critical	threshold	of	150%	and	reducing	their	debt	
service	 payments.	 The	 enhanced	 HIPC	 moved	 beyond	 these	 objectives	 and	
focussed	 on	 freeing	 up	 resources	 for	 poverty	 reducing	 programmes	 and	

























conditionality	 to	 country-owned,	 participatory,	 poverty-centred	 development	

















foregrounding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 poverty	 reduction.	 The	 second	 essential	
difference	is	the	participatory	process	of	creating	the	PRSP,	involving	all	levels	of	
community	 to	 represent	 a	 bottom-up	 rather	 than	 a	 top-down	 governance	
approach.	 However,	 the	 necessity	 of	 World	 Bank	 and	 IMF	 endorsement,	
communicated	 through	 the	 JSAN,	 before	 the	 donors	 agree	 to	 release	 funds,	
highlights	a	clear	contradiction	 in	 the	objectives	(Weber,	2006).	 Some	scholars	
and	practitioners	have	 critiqued	 the	process	of	 formulating	 the	PRSPs,	 arguing	
that	they	are	not	as	participatory	in	nature	as	they	claim	to	be	as	the	participation	
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that	 they	 consider	 to	be	priority	 and	 list	 a	number	of	policy	 interventions	 and	
objectives	that	are	conditions	to	be	met	before	concessional	lending	for	a	PRSP	can	
be	approved.	The	priority	areas	are:	 ‘macroeconomic	and	structural	policies	 to	




available	 to	 countries	 to	 determine	 their	 own	 policy	 agendas	 remains	
circumscribed	by	conditionalities	related	to	both	spending	and	trade.			
	
The	 Sourcebook	 maintains	 the	 donors’	 narrow	 definition	 of	 macroeconomic	
stability	as	low	inflation	and	balanced	budgets,	achieved	by	keeping	government	











contribute	 to	 the	debate	about	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	PRSPs	differ	 from	SAPs,	







based	 on	 consultation	 with	 civil	 society.	 Analysis	 of	 the	 PRSP	 documents	 is	
therefore	complicated	by	the	challenge	of	locating	the	separate	or	united	voices	of	
the	government	and	the	donors.	Given	the	10-year	period	of	analysis,	identifying	





to	 PWC.	 For	 each	 PRSP,	 the	 IMF	 produces	 a	 Joint	 Staff	 Advisory	 Note	 (JSAN),	
commenting	 on	 and	 approving	 the	 government’s	 development	 plan.	 Similarly,	
national	development	strategies	continue	 to	be	 informed	by	Country	Assistance	
Strategy	 (CAS)	 documents,	 and	 then	 later,	 Country	 Partnership	 Strategy	 (CPS)	








discussion;	 practitioners	 and	 scholars	 elsewhere	 have	 investigated	 this	 by	
examining	 the	 different	 stakeholder	 groups	 included	 or	 excluded	 from	 the	
process,	the	method	of	engagement,	and	the	extent	to	which	competing	voices	are	
incorporated	into	the	final	PRSP.47	Instead,	the	focus	here	is	on	the	policies	and	the	
discourse.	 However,	 this	 study	 ought	 to	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
process,	 without	 investigating	 it	 directly.	 Given	 the	 proclaimed	 participatory	
nature	of	the	PRSPs,	it	is	logical	to	expect	much	less	homogeneity	across	the	three	






that	 has	 been	 designed	 through	 the	 genuine	 consultation	 and	 with	 the	
participation	of	 civil	 society	 (comprised	of	 local	 nongovernmental	 and	not-for-
profit	 organisations	with	 grassroots	 knowledge	 and	 experience)	 ought	 to	 vary	
considerably	 across	 the	 three	 countries,	 according	 to	 their	 unique	 needs	 and	
political	contexts.	
PRSPs	and	the	case	studies:	a	timeline	
For	 the	purposes	of	 the	next	 two	 chapters,	 it	 is	 the	 first	 ten	years	of	 the	PRSP	
framework	that	are	under	consideration.	This	allows	for	consideration	of	the	more	






IMF	 in	 2001;	 this	 was	 the	 donors’	 first	 re-engagement	with	 the	 country	 since	
financial	 assistance	was	 suspended	 in	1999	 (IMF,	2001e).	 In	2002,	 an	 interim-
PRSP	 (I-PRSP)	was	drawn	up	 to	 cover	 the	period	2002-2004	 (Republic	of	Côte	
d’Ivoire,	2002)	and	the	World	Bank	produced	an	accompanying	CAS	(World	Bank,	
2002c).	 Civil	 unrest	 disrupted	 aid	 relations	 for	 the	 next	 few	 years.	 Upon	 re-
engagement	in	2007,	Côte	d’Ivoire	implemented	a	policy	programme	supported	














Haitian	 authorities	 once	 again	 to	 facilitate	 a	 resumption	 of	 lending	 and	
disbursement.	The	reengagement	between	Haiti	and	the	World	Bank	was	further	
bolstered	by	the	approval	of	a	SMP	with	the	IMF	in	June	2003	(IMF,	2003b).	This	





Cooperation	Framework	 (ICF),	which	outlined	 a	plan	 for	 the	period	2004-2006	






Following	 four	 major	 hurricanes	 and	 tropical	 storms	 that	 killed	 hundreds	 of	
Haitians	in	August	and	September	2008,	the	donors	changed	direction	once	again.	












50	Although	 the	Government	of	Haiti	 officially	 launched	 it,	 the	programme	was	 largely	
dictated	at	an	informal	meeting	held	in	Washington.	USAID	described	the	programme	as	
‘the	donor	coordinated	assistance	programme	for	Haiti’s	recovery’,	and	contributed	the	






Chad	was	 the	 first	 country	of	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 to	 sign	up	 to	 a	PRSP.	This	
programme	 was	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 endorsement	 of	 the	 all-
important	oil	pipeline	project.	They	produced	three	documents	to	accompany	the	
loans	that	they	distributed	to	the	Government	of	Chad:	the	Petroleum	Development	
and	Pipeline	project	 (PDPP);	 the	Management	of	 the	Petroleum	Economy	Project	
(MPEP);	and	a	Capacity	Building	Project	(CBP).	The	PRSP	was	preceded	by	an	I-
PRSP	in	2000	(Republic	of	Chad,	2000);	the	full	programme	was	approved	in	2003,	






































was	 a	 key	 policy	 component	 of	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 era	 and	 identified	 a	
common	 austerity	 discourse	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 that	 framed	 cuts	 to	
public	 expenditure	 as	 necessary,	 technical	 solutions	 to	 an	 objective,	 apolitical,	
financial	situation.	With	the	development	of	the	HIPC	initiative	and	the	PRSPs,	the	
donors	 acknowledged	 that	 heavy	 debt	 burdens	 were	 a	 contributing	 factor	 to	









The	 structure	 follows	 previous	 chapters,	 firstly	 comparing	 key	 policy	 drivers	




examines	 the	 discourse	 to	 understand	 the	 way	 that	 the	 donors	 frame	 and	
legitimise	 the	 PWC,	 looking	 to	 expose	 the	 ideological	 underpinnings	 of	 the	
programmes.	
	
A	 PRSP	 typically	 contains	 a	 thorough	 assessment	 of	 the	 current	 situation	 of	
poverty,	identifying	the	scope	and	roots	of	poverty	across	themes	and	sectors.	Its	
strategy	section	then	outlines	the	vision	and	objectives	across	the	key	sectors	that	
it	 identifies.	 A	 section	 is	 usually	 dedicated	 towards	 delineating	 the	









of	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF,	 reinforcing	 the	 austerity	 agenda.	 Where	







both	 in	practice	 and	 in	 language	 -	 are	better	understood	as	mechanisms	of	 re-
embedding	the	conditions	of	poverty	 in	peripheral	countries.	The	 failure	of	 the	








cuts	 elsewhere,	 and	 beginning	 to	 increase	 resources	 to	 these	 sectors	 through	
reallocating	budgets.	The	next	 few	paragraphs	demonstrate	that	under	the	PRS	
framework,	 the	 donors	 (and	 now	 the	 governments)	 continued	 along	 this	











as	 well	 as	 ensuring	 that	 the	 general	 public	 would	 have	 access	 to	 health	 care	
through	a	universal	health	insurance	programme	(Republic	of	Côte	d’Ivoire,	2002,	
p.	15).	They	planned	for	an	increase	 in	the	proportion	of	government	spending	
dedicated	 to	 improving	 access	 to	 basic	 social	 services,	 from	 63.5%	 in	 2001	 to	




its	 ambitions	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 to	 16%	 by	 2015,	 and	 announced	 its	 health	
insurance	programme	again	(Republic	of	Côte	d’Ivoire,	2009,	p.	 iv).	All	 three	of	
these	 programmes	 projected	 increases	 in	 allocations	 for	 poverty-relevant	
expenditures,	in	particular	in	primary	education	and	health.		
	
In	 Haiti	 too,	 health	 and	 education	were	 repeatedly	 identified	 as	 key	 areas	 for	
investment,	both	by	the	donors	and	by	the	Haitian	authorities.	Successive	SMPs	
with	the	IMF	made	commitments	to	prioritise	‘social	expenditures	that	benefit	the	
poor’	 (IMF,	 2004,	 p.	 24).	 The	 2004	 ICF	 announced	 plans	 to	 develop	 15	 health	
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districts,	where	resources	would	flow	towards	increasing	access	to	essential	drugs	
and	medical	 supplies	 and	preventative	 care	 for	 vulnerable	people	 (Republic	 of	
Haiti,	2004,	p.	 xv).	 	Within	education,	 the	programme	set	out	 to	 finance	school	
supplies	 and	 increase	 and	 improve	 professional	 training.	 The	 2008	 PRSP	
announced	plans	to	improve	enrolment	and	quality	of	education	and	the	quality,	
accessibility	 and	 coverage	 of	 health	 services.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 the	 government	
planned	 the	 building	 and	 refurbishment	 of	 classrooms	 and	 the	 training	 of	









The	 I-PRSP	 announced	 that	 the	 ‘strategic	 aim	 of	 the	 government	 of	 Chad	 is	 to	
combat	 poverty	 and	 improve	 the	 living	 conditions	 of	 its	 citizens’	 (Republic	 of	
Chad,	2000,	p.	5).	The	full	2003	PRSP	included	a	more	thorough	assessment	of	the	
poverty	situation	and	outlined	the	government’s	strategy	in	the	oil	era,	setting	out	
plans	 to	provide	 the	population	with	access	 to	quality	basic	services,	gradually	




and	 to	 make	 more	 high-quality	 services	 more	 widely	 available,	 constructing	
health	centres	and	hospitals,	hiring	more	staff,	and	providing	high	quality	drugs	
(Republic	of	Chad,	2008,	p.	11).	The	proportion	of	the	government’s	budget	set	








education	 as	 key	 areas	 for	 investment,	 announcing	 specific	 interventions	 and	
investments	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 improve	 access	 to	 essential	 services.	Reading	
these	 sections	 of	 the	 policy	 programmes	 and	 these	 sections	 alone	 suggests	 a	











more	 on	 strengthening	 the	 links	 between	 debt	 relief	 and	 poverty-reduction	
efforts,	 by	 linking	 the	 stages	 of	 the	 initiative	 to	 progress	 in	 implementing	 a	
national	 PRS.	 The	 donors	 argued	 that	 the	 initiative	would	 relieve	 the	 financial	
pressures	 on	 developing	 countries	 by	 reducing	 their	 debt	 burdens,	 thereby	
freeing	 up	 resources	 for	 implementing	 critical	 social	 reforms	 as	 part	 of	 an	
integrated	 long-term	 development	 approach.	 If	 the	 HIPC	 initiative	 has	 been	






exports	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 (well	 above	 the	 150%	 threshold	 required	 for	
eligibility)	(IMF	&	IDA,	2001a,	p.	19).	Despite	the	fact	that	Haiti’s	debt-to-exports	
ratio	exceeded	that	of	Chad’s	at	279.1%,	Haiti	was	deemed	ineligible	for	debt	relief	
under	 the	 initiative	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 decade,	 due	 to	 a	 purported	 lack	 of	
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commitment	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 governance	 and	 poverty	 reduction,	 as	 well	 as	





1998	 (IMF	 &	 IDA,	 1998).	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 political	 crisis	 and	 subsequent	
fallout	with	the	donors,	Decision	Point	was	not	reached	and	the	country	did	not	
receive	any	debt	 relief.	The	country	was	not	considered	 for	 the	 initiative	again	
until	2009	after	two	years	of	the	EPCA	with	the	IMF.	Upon	assessment,	the	donors	





case,	 arrears	 had	 reached	 an	 enormous	 $5.2	 billion	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2007	 (the	
financial	year	in	which	the	donors	conducted	their	debt	analysis).	These	arrears	





















and	 2015	 for	 Chad	 (IMF,	 2015b).	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 continued	 role	 for	
conditionality	 in	 the	 lending	 and	 debt	 relief	 instruments	 of	 the	 BWIs.	 IMF	











This	shows	that	 in	each	case,	 the	 interim	debt	relief	 that	arrived	with	Decision	
Point	had	a	fairly	insignificant	influence	on	the	overall	debt	stock	as	a	proportion	
	












































































almost	 identical	 across	 the	 three	 countries	 and	 a	 number	 of	 them	 are	 directly	







HIPC	 initiative	 was	 the	 maintenance	 of	 ‘macroeconomic	 stability’,	 which	
continued	to	be	defined	in	narrow	neoliberal	terms,	emphasising	keeping	down	
expenditures	 in	 order	 to	 balance	 the	 public	 budget.	 A	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 fiscal	
framework	 of	 the	 PRSPs,	 as	 they	 sought	 to	 meet	 the	 macroeconomic	
conditionalities	of	the	HIPC	initiative,	demonstrates	that	these	poverty	alleviation	
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objectives	 were	 constrained	 by	 this	 continued	 emphasis	 on	 macroeconomic	
stability.	 In	 other	 words,	 increasing	 access	 to	 basic	 services	 was	 ostensibly	






Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 the	 IMF	 demanded	 more	 austerity	 measures	 to	 cut	 the	 current	
account	deficit,	calling	for	 ‘rigorous	spending	controls’	and	imposing	budgetary	
ceilings	 on	 current	 expenditures	 (IMF,	 2001e,	 p.	 5).	 Per	 capita	 spending	 on	
education	 fell	 from	 2000	 to	 2001	 (see	 Appendix	 8)	 and	 in	 reviewing	 the	
government’s	 I-PRSP,	 the	 donors	 persuaded	 the	 government	 to	 abandon	 its	






	The	 2007	 EPCA	 re-emphasised	 the	 need	 to	 rein	 in	 and	 restructure	 public	
spending,	and	demonstrates	the	relative	emphasis	that	the	IMF	places	on	keeping	
expenditures	down,	over	meeting	basic	 service	needs.	Due	 to	 the	 ‘considerable	
share’	of	the	budget	taken	up	post-conflict	expenditures	(redeployment,	elections,	
etc.),	the	donors	argued	that	increasing	resources	towards	health	and	education	
































(UNEP,	2014).	The	2004	SMP	 initiated	 further	 ‘large	expenditure	cuts’	over	the	
next	 year	 (IMF,	 2004b,	 p.	 5).	 These	were	 reflected	 in	 a	 reduction	 in	 education	
spending	per	capita	from	$8	in	2004	to	$6	in	2005,	and	health	spending	stagnating	
at	 $2.50	 (see	 Appendix	 9).	 Equally,	 despite	 the	 ICF’s	 purported	 emphasis	 on	
improving	social	services,	the	programme	remained	anchored	within	an	austerity	
framework	 (Republic	 of	 Haiti,	 2004).	 It	 was	 not	 until	 2006	 and	 the	







growth	 rate	 of	 education	 spending	 (16%)	 and	 health	 spending	 (8%)	 was	 far	
outpaced	by	the	growth	in	per	capita	debt	servicing;	this	figure	grew	by	29%	(See	
Appendix	 9).	 This	 reflects	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 HIPC	 initiative	 to	 truly	 free	 up	
resources	 for	social	spending.	For	example,	 in	2004,	 the	government	spent	$11	
per	 person	 servicing	 its	 debts	 which	 amounted	 to	 more	 than	 its	 spending	 on	
health	and	education	combined	($10)	(See	Appendix	9).	Again,	 this	reflects	 the	
contradictions	of	the	triple	imperative	of	increasing	social	spending,	meeting	debt	
obligations	 and	 keep	 expenditures	 in	 check.	 In	 2009,	 at	 an	 Executive	 Board	











other	 austerity	 measures,	 the	 programme	 announced	 plans	 to	 replace	 the	
turnover	 tax	 with	 VAT,	 which	 the	 government	 acknowledged	 would	 lead	 to	
increases	in	prices	that	would	‘negatively	affect	the	population,	especially	the	very	
poorest’	 (Republic	 of	 Chad,	 2000,	 p.	 23).	 In	 approving	 the	 I-PRSP,	 the	 donors	
expressed	 concern	 at	 the	 risk	 in	 developing	 the	 full	PRSP,	 that	 the	 process	 of	
participation	 might	 generate	 ‘a	 laundry	 list	 of	 wishes’	 with	 unrealistic	
expectations	for	change	that	was	not	 feasible	within	the	austerity	budget.	They	
therefore	 advised	 the	 authorities	 to	 focus	 the	 process	 on	 ‘identifying	 strategic	
options	and	on	analysing	trade-offs’	(IMF	&	IDA,	2000,	p.	6).	This	 is	yet	 further	
evidence	of	the	donors’	 insincerity	with	regards	to	 ‘participatory’	and	 ‘country-
owned’	 values	 of	 the	 new	 lending	 framework.	 If	 listening	 to	 a	 range	 of	
stakeholders,	including	low-income	communities,	reveals	the	need	for	significant	
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budget	 execution	was	 a	 problem	under	 this	 programme;	 some	 sectors	 did	 not	
receive	the	resources	that	they	were	allocated,	including	health,	which	received	
just	 88%	 of	 allocated	 funds,	 and	 education,	 receiving	 90%.	 This,	 the	 donors	
suggest,	 was	 due	 to	 the	 crowding	 out	 by	 military	 expenditures	 (World	 Bank,	
2011).	 Government	 revenues	 increased	more	 than	 six-fold	 between	 2003	 and	
their	 height	 in	 2008,	 reflecting	 increased	 oil	 production	 and	 higher	 than	
anticipated	oil	prices	(World	Bank,	2011,	p.	1).	Spending	on	health	did	not	increase	










and	 a	 health	 insurance	 policy	 were	 outlined	 as	 more	 ‘long	 term’	 ambitions	
(Republic	of	Chad,	2008,	p.	11).	The	donors	approved	 the	programme	 in	2010,	




What	 this	 policy	 analysis	 has	 demonstrated	 is	 clear	 continuity	 from	 the	 SAPs	
through	the	PRSPs	with	regards	to	spending	policy.	Despite	bold	and	ambitious	
projects	 and	 plans	 developed	 in	 the	 PRSPs,	 the	 governments	 were	 routinely	
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communities	 themselves,	 would	 take	 responsibility	 for	 service	 provision	 and	





One	way	 of	 shifting	 the	 burden	 of	 social	 service	 provision	 from	 the	 state	was	



















IMF	 encouraged	 the	 government	 to	 license	 and	 support	 private	 schools	 (IMF,	
2006b,	p.	4).	This	is	in	spite	of	the	reality	that	in	2002,	the	World	Bank	wrote	that	
privatisation	 ‘proved	 to	 be	 contentious’	 (World	 Bank,	 2002b,	 p.	 6)	 and	 ‘is	 a	
politically	charged	issue	in	Haiti	and	should	be	approached	carefully’	(World	Bank,	
2002b,	p.	20).	The	proportion	of	primary	school	enrolment	represented	by	private	
schools	 rose	 from	an	 already	high	80%	 in	2002	 to	90%	 in	2009	 (World	Bank,	
2009c,	p.	53;	2002b,	p.	9).	In	Chad,	the	government	was	also	advised	to	channel	
finances	through	NGOs	and	the	private	sector;	‘community’	schools	in	particular	
were	 promoted.	 The	 government	 planned	 to	 increase	 the	 proportion	 of	
community	teachers	from	56%	in	2000	to	80%	by	2010	(Republic	of	Chad,	2003,	
p.	 67).	 This	was	 clearly	 a	 case	 of	 ‘doing	more	with	 less’	 –	 in	Chad,	 community	



























barrier	 to	 school	 attendance’	 (Demombynes,	 Holland,	 &	 Leon,	 2010,	 p.	 15).	 In	
2006,	 the	 annual	 cost	 of	 sending	 a	 child	 to	 school	 in	 Haiti	 (including	 books,	
uniforms,	transport)	was	estimated	to	be	$131	(Adelman	&	Holland,	2015,	p.	3),	
well	out	of	the	reach	of	three	quarters	of	the	population	who	were	living	on	less	





Bank,	 2013,	 p.	 51).	 Furthermore,	 the	 marketisation	 of	 education	 entrenches	
inequalities	 because	 most	 families	 can	 only	 afford	 the	 cheapest,	 low-quality	
schools.	It	is	worth	highlighting	that	by	the	early	21st	century,	these	institutions	
would	 have	 been	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 nefarious	 consequences	 of	 user-fees	 in	
essential	basic	services;	in	2000	the	director	of	poverty	programmes	at	the	UNDP	






of	 fostering	 the	 creation	 of	 structures	 parallel	 to	 public	 institutions,	 further	
weakening	 government	 structures	 and	 contributing	 to	 even	 greater	 lack	 of	
consistency	of	the	action	taken’	(IMF,	2006b,	p.	8).	In	other	words,	by	channelling	
resources	via	private	providers	rather	 than	public	ones,	 the	strategy	pitted	 the	
government	against	NGOs,	competing	for	resources	–	both	human	and	financial,	
creating	a	parallel	NGO	state	and	a	weakened	public	sector.	This	is	all	the	more	
significant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 donors’	 stated	 commitment	 to	 country-owned	
strategies	that	improve	the	quality	and	accessibility	of	basic	services.		
	
Overall,	 the	 development	 trends	 over	 the	 period	 of	 analysis	 are	 disappointing,	
albeit	 unsurprising,	 given	 the	 continued	 donor	 obsession	with	macroeconomic	
austerity.	Côte	d’Ivoire	experienced	the	most	regression;	poverty	increased	from	
38.2%	 in	 2002	 to	 49%	 in	 2008	 (World	 Bank,	 2010b,	 p.	 i.).	 The	 country	 was	
undergoing	 a	 significant	 period	 of	 political	 turmoil	 during	 the	 best	 part	 of	 the	
2000s,	 which	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 attribute	 the	 increase	 in	 poverty	 fully	 to	
austerity,	 but	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 looking	 at	 the	 full	 period	 of	 donor	
supervision	shows	a	continued	increase	from	the	1980s	and	well	into	the	PRS	era.	
It	 is	 therefore	 fair	 to	 suggest	 that	 donor-sponsored	 austerity	 policies	 have	




	In	 contrast,	 Haiti’s	 social	 indicators	 improved	 very	 slightly	 over	 the	 period;	




158th	 in	2011	(IMF,	2013,	p.	10).	This	 shows	 that	despite	some	 improvements,	
development	was	 slower	 compared	 to	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 periphery.	
Chad	too	saw	some	improvements	in	social	indicators,	the	proportion	of	Chadians	







other	 donor-produced	 programmes	 and	 documents	 -	 ostensibly	 sought	 to	
improve	 social	 indicators,	 but	 without	 significantly	 changing	 resource	
distribution.	An	 increased	concern	 for	social	 issues	also	 finds	expression	 in	 the	
introduction	of	a	number	of	social	programmes	that	focus	directly	on	the	priority	
sectors	 of	 health	 and	 education	 with	 the	 view	 to	 reducing	 poverty.	 However,	
spending	 in	 the	 social	 sectors	 clearly	 remains	 circumscribed	 by	 the	 neoliberal	
macroeconomic	 framework	 within	 which	 the	 PRSP	 must	 operate.	 The	
fundamental	conflict	between	the	ambitions	outlined	in	the	PRSPs	produced	by	
the	authorities,	the	donors’	JSANs	and	the	IMF’s	SMPs,	highlights	that	the	PRSPs	
has	 not	 bolstered	 ownership	 or	 sovereignty.	 Rather,	 the	 new	 PRS	 lending	
represents	 an	 entrenchment	 of	 conditionality	 and	 thus	 the	 continued	
manifestation	of	coercive	power	under	the	PWC.	In	working	towards	eligibility	for	
the	 programme	 (Decision	 Point),	 or	 working	 towards	 Completion	 Point,	 and	
adhering	 to	 strict	 austerity	 budgets,	 the	 HIPC	 impeded	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
governments	to	invest	in	much	needed	social	sectors	in	any	impactful	way.	The	
recourse	to	the	private	sector	has	a	dually	damaging	effect:	 firstly,	 it	reinforces	









front.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 introduction	 to	 part	 two	 showed,	 the	 PRS	 framework	 was	
launched	to	address	 these	same	criticisms	that	were	 levelled	against	structural	













demonisation	of	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 the	discursive	 construction	of	 the	 social	
sectors	as	a	burden	on	the	economy.	This	supported	the	argument	that	austerity	




is	 identified	 primarily	 in	 the	 donor-produced	 documents:	 SMPs,	 CAS,	 and	 the	
JSANs.		
	
The	 second	 overarching	 argument	 is	 unique	 to	 the	 PRS	 era,	 and	 it	 serves	 to	














Claim	4	 The	way	 to	 improve	access	 to	social	 services	 is	by	making	
resources	more	efficient,	not	increasing	them		














Across	 numerous	 programmes	 and	 across	 the	 three	 countries,	 the	 donors	
continue	to	depict	a	grave	financial	scenario,	portraying	the	economy	as	facing	a	
















‘The	 overall	 health	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 deteriorated	
somewhat	in	2000’	(IMF,	2001e,	p.	9)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	

































allocation	 and	poor	management	 and	 control	 of	 public	 finances’	
(World	Bank,	2002c,	p.	9)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	
‘On	 the	 spending	 side,	 domestically	 financed	 expenditures	 are	






referring	 to	 its	 ‘deterioration’,	 ‘weakness’,	 ‘suffering’	 and	 ‘recovery’,	 physical	
illnesses	 become	 an	 effective	 metaphor	 for	 simplifying	 complex	 and	 abstract	
situations	in	the	economy.	This	allows	for	the	financial	crisis	to	be	imagined	as	a	
medical	 condition,	 austerity	 as	 a	medical	 treatment,	 and	 the	 donors	 as	 expert	
doctors	prescribing	solutions.		
	
The	 topos	 of	 stability	 remains	 a	 key	 device	 within	 this	 claim,	 as	 the	 donors	
emphasise	the	instability	of	the	economies,	using	adjectives	such	as	‘precarious’		
‘unsustainable’,	‘unstable’	to	depict	the	economic	situation.	However,	as	argued	in	
chapter	 three,	 the	 instrumentalisation	 of	 this	 topos	 reduces	 the	 meaning	 of	
stability	to	a	selected	number	of	financial	measures,	namely	the	budget	deficit	and	
inflation.	In	deploying	the	topos	of	stability	in	this	way,	the	donors	attribute	the	
broader	 economic,	 social	 (and	 sometimes	 political)	 crises	 that	 these	 countries	
were	facing,	fully	to	a	fiscal	crisis.	
	
In	 the	 Haitian	 context,	 for	 example,	 the	 World	 Bank	 discursively	 link	
macroeconomic	stability	and	political	stability,	framing	the	former	as	a	condition	
of	the	latter:	





political	 stability	are	blurred	 through	paratactic	grammatical	 relations,	and	 the	
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suggestion	 is	 that	 without	 macroeconomic	 stability	 (as	 understood	 through	 a	
narrow,	neoliberal	lens),	political	stability	could	not	be	achieved.	This	discursive	
conflation	 of	 fiscal	 stability	 with	 political	 stability	 is	 another	 example	 of	 the	
narrowing	of	the	meaning	of	stability,	which	ignores	other	important	reasons	for	
the	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	 challenges	 that	 these	 countries	 experienced	
during	 the	 decade.	 As	we	 have	 seen,	 neoliberal	 trade	 policies	 had	 devastating	
consequences	 on	 the	 economy,	 as	 well	 as	 austerity	 measures	 that	 fell	
disproportionately	on	the	poor.	Yet,	the	donors’	 framing	blames	exclusively	the	





SAPs.	 They	 predicate	 central	 government	 and	 public	 sector	 management	
negatively,	using	adjectives	such	as	‘poor’,	and	‘weak’,	to	depict	the	public	sector	
as	 incompetent,	 describing	 the	 ‘lacklustre	 performance’	 of	 the	 economy	 in	 the	
Chadian	 context.	 They	 also	 nominate	 non-compliance	 with	 donor	 budgets	 or	
policies	as	‘policy	slippages’,	again	drawing	on	the	topos	of	stability.	This	amounts	
to	 the	depoliticisation	of	 the	discourse,	 as	 it	presents	policies	preferred	by	 the	
donors	(including	austerity	measures),	as	objectively	good	policies,	rather	than	
political	 choices.	 This	 is	 again	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 blame	
discourse.	 It	 is	 interesting	 that	 this	 persists	 in	 the	PRSPs,	 given	 the	 significant	
control	 that	 the	donors	had	over	 financial	 and	economic	policy	during	 the	 two	
decades	 that	 precede	 these	 programmes.	 Far	 from	 acknowledging	 the	
fundamental	 problems	 of	 their	 own	 programmes,	 the	 donors	 maintain	 the	
position	that	blame	can	be	placed	squarely	at	the	door	of	government.		
	
In	 some	 excerpts,	 we	 see	 a	 harking	 back	 to	 the	 anti-state	 rhetoric	 that	






be	 trusted	with	 public	money.	 This	 discourse	 suggests	 that	 the	 role	 of	 central	
government	ought	 to	be	reduced	and	 their	powers/influence	 in	certain	sectors	
curbed,	therefore	legitimising	the	withdrawal	of	the	state	from	the	social	sectors.	
	
In	 the	 Haitian	 context,	 the	 blame	 strategy	 is	 slightly	 different.	 Rather	 than	





human	capital	and	poor	quality	of	 social	 spending;	high	 fertility;	 and	domestic	
insecurity’	(IMF,	2001c,	p.	15)		
	
Interestingly,	 the	 donors	 cite	 underinvestment	 as	 a	 key	 reason	 for	
underdevelopment.	This	represents	a	divergence	from	the	structural	adjustment	
discourse	 –	 which	 explicitly	 argued	 against	 spending	 in	 the	 social	 sectors,	
portrayed	as	a	burden	on	the	economy.	This	excerpt	neatly	glosses	over	the	reality	
that	‘underinvestment	in	human	capital’	was	a	key	policy	of	structural	adjustment.	





that	 the	 donors	 identify	 as	 contributing	 to	 the	 country’s	 problems	 are	 all	
endogenous;	 the	 authors	 accept	 no	 responsibility	 for	 the	 role	 of	 international	




in	 attributing	 the	 causes	 or	 contributing	 factors	 of	 this	 crisis	 to	 weak	 policy	
performance,	 the	donors	establish	a	rationale	 for	reform	and	begin	 to	not	only	


















‘The	 authorities	 fiscal	 policies	 in	 2002	 seek	 to	 increase	 public	
























‘Achieving	 this	 objective	 will	 critically	 depend	 on	 […]	 sound	
macroeconomic	 policies’	 (World	 Bank,	 2002e,	 p.	 11)	 (Côte	
d’Ivoire)	
‘In	 order	 to	 continue	 maintaining	 a	 sound	 macroeconomic	
framework,	 the	Government	has	prepared,	and	 intends	 to	 fully	
implement,	 a	 macroeconomic	 stabilisation	 program’	 (World	
Bank,	2004b,	p.	7)	(Haiti)	









‘The	 implementation	 of	 prudent	 macroeconomic	 policies	 […]	
reduced	financial	imbalances	and	alleviated	structural	rigidities’	
(World	Bank,	2002e,	p.	14)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	
‘Lastly,	 prospective	macroeconomic	programs	 should	 take	 into	
account	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 Haiti’s	 economy	 to	 domestic	 and	
external	 shocks,	 and	 include	 prudent	 elements	 of	 contingency	
planning’	(World	Bank,	2004c,	p.	45)	(Haiti)	




that	 austerity	 measures	 are	 both	 pragmatic	 and	 essential	 to	 ensure	 financial	
credibility.	This	is	an	argument	found	in	the	donors’	discourse,	usually	expressed	













The	donors	 focus	mainly	on	 the	 financial	 implications	of	 spending	 cuts,	with	 a	
notable	silence	around	the	question	of	the	deleterious	social	impacts	of	austerity.	
The	withdrawal	of	the	state	subsidy	on	petrol,	diesel	and	kerosene	in	Haiti	proved	
hugely	unpopular,	 leading	 to	widespread	protests.	The	government	 launched	a	







	The	 IMF	 nominate	 this	 as	 	 ‘information	 campaigns’,	 presenting	 pro-austerity	
propaganda	as	neutral	‘information’.	This	admission	also	reveals	the	insincerity	of	
the	donors’	 stated	 commitment	 to	 country-owned	and	participatory	 strategies;	









spending	 over	 the	 transfer	 of	 resources	 to	 the	 poor.	 The	 argument	 is	 that,	
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society,	 ‘to	 ensure	 the	 Bank’s	 credibility	 as	 a	 neutral	 development	 partner’	








and	 delegitimising	 any	 potential	 opposition	 as	 being	 either	 ideological	 or	 self-
serving.	
	
The	 donor	 draw	on	 the	 topos	 of	 responsibility,	 to	 suggest	 an	 association	 of	 the	
fundamental	 economic	 goal	 of	 balanced	 budgets	 with	 a	 government	 that	 is	
‘prudent’,	 ‘disciplined’	 and	 ‘responsible’,	 and	 not	 indulging	 in	 unnecessary	
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spending.	 This	 conflates	 austerity	with	 rationalism	 and	 common	 sense,	 and	 in	
doing	so	constructs	a	logic	of	equivalence	between	fiscal	responsibility	and	limited	
public	 spending.	 Just	 as	 stability	 is	 reduced	 to	 fiscal	 stability,	 the	 sense	 of	
responsibility	 is	 associated	 uniquely	 with	 fiscal	 responsibility.	 This	 allows	 the	
discourse	to	associate	responsibility,	an	unquestionable	personal	virtue,	with	an	
economic	 austerity	 policy	 paradigm	 that	 can	 and	 must	 be	 questioned	 for	 its	
devastating	consequences.	These	two	claims,	of	a	self-induced	financial	crisis	and	

















necessity	and	 instead	appeal	 to	morality	and	 the	values	of	 social	 inclusion	and	
social	 protection	 of	 vulnerable	 group.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 continued	 austerity	
measures,	this	argument	discursively	links	continued	austerity	and	privatisation	
of	the	social	sectors	to	the	goals	of	poverty	reduction	and	democracy.	In	so	doing,	











An	 obvious	 manifestation	 of	 this	 expansion	 of	 donor	 policy	 is	 the	 discursive	
foregrounding	of	poverty	reduction	in	the	PRSPs.	The	frequency	of	references	to	
poverty	 in	 the	 PRSPs	 is	 significantly	 greater	 than	 in	 the	 earlier	 SAPs:	 in	 Côte	
d’Ivoire’s	I-PRSP	the	word	poverty	is	identified	290	times	in	100	pages	and	276	in	
the	199	pages	of	the	full	2009	PRSP.	In	Haiti’s	2006	I-PRSP,	this	frequency	is	105	
times	 in	56	pages,	 and	 then	375	 times	 in	 the	277	pages	of	 the	 full	 2009	PRSP.	
Chad’s	I-PRSP	mentions	poverty	491	times	in	194	pages,	the	full	2003	PRSP	288	
times	in	142	pages,	and	the	later	2008	PRSP	494	times	in	194	pages.	This	in	itself	










of	 the	 implementation	 of	 Strategic	 Orientation	 4:	 “Improvement	 of	 the	











‘The	main	objective	 is	 to	ensure	 that	 all	Chadian	 children	have	access	 to	high-
quality	 universal	 primary	 education,	 to	 eliminate	 inequalities	 -	 by	 gender	 and	
region	-	in	access	to	education,	health,	nutrition,	and	nonfarm	employment,	and	
to	put	in	place	the	social	policies	and	institutions	necessary	for	improving	the	living	











argument,	 consistent	 with	 neoliberal	 ideas,	 trumps	 the	 priority	 of	 social	
protection.	 Having	 set	 out	 in	 their	 Executive	 Summaries	 their	 purported	
commitment	 to	 the	 values	 and	 objectives	 of	 social	 inclusion	 and	 poverty	

















‘The	 I-PRSP	 places	 too	 much	 emphasis	 on	 developing	
infrastructure	in	the	social	sectors	and	contains	little	or	no	analysis	
of	 the	 current	 inefficiencies	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources,	 the	
quality	of	services	delivered,	or	the	effectiveness	of	the	programmes	
in	 achieving	 specified	 goals’	 (World	 Bank,	 2002e,	 p.	 4)	 (Côte	
d’Ivoire)	
‘The	 education	 system	 is	 characterised	 by	 extremely	 low	 quality	
and	internal	inefficiency’	(World	Bank,	2004c,	p.	13)	(Haiti)	








competition.	 Across	 the	 case	 studies,	 the	 donors	 and	 the	 authorities	 argue	 for	
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improving	the	‘efficiency’	and	‘effectiveness’,	‘quality’	and	‘performance’	of	public	













direct	 link	 between	 improving	 the	 efficiency	 of	 spending	 and	 meeting	 social	
objectives.	Rather	 than	 increasing	 investment	 in	new	 facilities,	or	 training	new	
professionals	 in	 health	 or	 education,	 the	 emphasis	 is	 on	 more	 effective	 and	
‘focused’	spending,	to	achieve	‘maximum	results’.		A	pertinent	example	of	this	logic	
is	 found	 in	 the	 donors’	 comments	 on	 Haiti’s	 PRSP,	 in	 which	 they	 argued	 that	
‘improving	 health	 outcomes	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	
expenditure	management	in	the	sector’	(IMF,	2008,	p.	6).	
	
Central	 to	 this	 argument	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 curbing	 spending	 and	 meeting	























This	 also	 leads	 the	 reader	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 it	 is	 efficiency,	 rather	 than	
investment,	that	is	key	to	improving	the	quality	and	accessibility	of	services. This	
discourse	serves	to	downplay	both	the	scale	and	impacts	of	austerity.	This	notion	
of	 improving	 the	 existing	 services	 of	 public	 organisations,	 without	 increasing	
current	 and	 investment	 spending,	 appeals	 to	 reason	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	









efficiency	 of	 public	 spending	 and	 articulating	 a	 connection	 between	 cost-
effectiveness	 and	 poverty	 reduction,	 the	 donors	were	 able	 to	 frame	 the	 social	




improve	 the	 ‘quality’	 of	 spending	 and	 therefore	 services,	 which	 will	 lead	 to	
poverty	reduction.	As	the	policy	analysis	argued,	this	was	not	the	case	in	the	three	
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case	 studies	 –	 rather,	 continued	 budgetary	 restraint	 pushed	 governments	 to	
pursue	cheaper	ways	of	financing	services,	such	as	charging	for	services,	which	
had	 adverse	 consequences	 on	 health	 and	 education.	 The	 discourse	 therefore	
manipulates	the	reality	that	in	these	countries,	fiscal	consolidation	has	come	at	the	
expense	of	development.	The	focus	on	‘doing	more	with	less’	supports	the	notion	
that	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 basic	 services	 is	 indeed	 a	 priority	 of	 these	
programmes,	 masking	 the	 real	 consequences.	 This	 discourse	 reflects	 the	
managerial	 culture	 of	 efficiency	 and	 profit-driven	 organisation	 that	 are	 key	
characteristics	 of	 neoliberal	 ideology.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 efficiency	 gains	
through	increased	effectiveness	remain	important	considerations	in	low-income	
countries	seeking	to	improve	the	access	of	their	health	and	education	coverage.	
However,	 the	ongoing	 incorporation	of	 these	neoliberal	 ideas	within	 the	policy	





claim	 is	 that	 the	 privatisation	 and	 decentralisation	 of	 social	 services	 is	
democratic	and	pro-poor.		
	
In	announcing	plans	 to	 shift	provision	of	 services	 from	 the	state	 to	 the	private	
sector,	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies,	 the	 discourse	 couches	 the	 reforms	 in	 the	
language	 of	 democracy	 and	 participation,	 in	 order	 to	 frame	 them	 as	 both	
progressive	and	pro-poor.	Key	to	this	claim	is	the	notion	that	private	groups	are	
better	 providers	 of	 services	 than	 statutory	 ones.	 As	 this	 thesis	 has	 argued	
throughout,	 this	notion	of	efficient	markets	and	 inefficient	states	 is	germane	to	
neoliberal	thinking.	The	theoretical	assumption	that	unfettered	markets	 lead	to	
better	 utilisation	 and	 allocation	 of	 resources,	 can	 even	 apply	 to	 areas	 that	 are	
widely	considered	as	public	goods	or	even	basic	human	rights.	As	I	have	argued,	
neoliberalism	holds	 that	 the	 private	market	mechanisms	 (supply,	 demand	 and	
price)	are	more	efficient	than	public	ones,	since	they	allow	the	benefits	(choice,	
quality	and	accessibility)	to	trickle	down	to	all	citizens.		This	logic	has	been	applied	















‘Government	 […]	 has	 agreed	 to	 using	 a	 variety	 of	 implementing	
agencies	 and	 appropriate	 and	 efficient	 financing	 mechanisms,	
including	 direct	 financing	 of	 NGOs,	 community-based	
organisations	and	the	private	sector’	 (World	Bank,	2002c,	p.	22)	
(Côte	d’Ivoire)	
‘Private	 schools,	 often	 run	 by	 non-governmental	 and	 private	
organisations,	 including	 faith-based	 groups	 which	 play	 an	
important	 role	 in	 the	 education	 sector,	 enroll	 three	 times	 more	
children	than	public	schools’	(World	Bank,	2004c,	p.	13)	(Haiti)	
‘With	 a	 growth	 rate	 of	 20	 percent	 per	 year,	 these	 [community]	
schools	 are	 the	most	 dynamic	 part	 of	 Chad’s	 primary	 education	































the	 process	 of	 development	 and	 reduction	 of	 regional	 disparities’	
(Republic	of	Côte	d'Ivoire,	2009,	p.	92)	
‘This	includes	community-driven	development	approaches	to	build	
social	 inclusion,	 participation,	 transparency,	 trust	 and	 public-
private	partnerships	at	the	local	level	while	improving	basic	social	
economic,	 and	 infrastructure	 services’	 (World	 Bank,	 2004c,	 p.	
ii)(Haiti)	
‘Greater	equity	in	access	to	education	will	be	sought	by	supporting	









IMF	misrepresents	 the	 reality	 that	 chapter	 three	 explored:	 that	 the	 continued	
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underfunding	 of	 education	 through	 SAPs	 was	 the	 result	 of	 BWI-owned	 and	
imposed	 policies,	 not	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 Haitian	 government.	 This	 is	 a	 blatant	
denial	 of	 reality,	 legitimising	 the	 donors’	 roles	 as	 neutral	 experts,	 advising	 an	
inefficient	 and	 incompetent	 government.	 Furthermore,	 the	 donors	 present	
privately	 provided	 services	 as	 offering	 a	 better	 quality	 service	 than	 state	
providers,	drawing	on	the	topos	of	efficiency,	emphasising	the	enrolment	rates	of	
private	schools.	In	the	Chadian	context,	private	schools	are	praised	as	‘dynamic’	











throughout	 the	 period.	 Again,	 this	 privileging	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 allows	 the	
discourse	to	legitimise	the	marketisation	of	social	services	that	was	pursued	via	
the	PRSPs,	by	falsely	depicting	private	schools	as	both	more	grassroots	and	better	
quality.	This	bears	 little	 resemblance	 to	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 increase	of	private	
provision	 of	 health	 and	 education	 exacerbates	 inequalities	 and	 excludes	many	




services,	 as	well	 as	 the	decentralisation	of	health	and	education	 services,	were	




to	 lie	 outside	 of	 the	 domain	 of	 the	 state,	mediating	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	
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people.	 By	 increasing	 the	 role	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 in	 social	 service	
provision,	and	by	devolving	services	(but	not	funding)	out	to	municipalities,	the	
argument	 is	 that	 the	 government	 will	 become	 ‘closer	 to	 the	 people’	 and	 the	
delivery	of	services	‘closer	to	beneficiaries’.	Emphasis	on	the	‘local’,	 ‘grassroots’	








position,	 reinforcing	 the	 notion	 that	 civil	 society	 is	 one	 united	 category	 that	
represents	the	wishes	of	the	general	populace.	The	topos	of	democracy	is	used	in	
conjunction	with	the	topos	of	social	inclusion,	as	the	donors	argue	that	privatised	
and	 decentralised	 social	 services	 will	 lead	 to	 better	 equity	 in	 access	 to	 basic	
services.	Examples	of	this	set	out	in	Table	5.5	and	include	references	to	‘inclusion’,	
‘equity’	 and	 the	 need	 to	 reduce	 ‘disparities’	 in	 social	 service	 provision.	 When	
coupled	with	 the	earlier	argument	of	 the	 inefficient	and	overbearing	state,	 this	
claim	 leads	 to	 the	 framing	 of	 reduced	 spending	 as	 being	 more	 honest	 and	
therefore	more	 virtuous.	 The	moral	 argument	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 notion	 that	
NGOs	and	the	private	sector	are	more	efficient	than	the	state;	where	the	public	
sector	has	failed,	the	private	sector	will	step	in.	It	is	worth	repeating	that	this	is	





The	 discursive	 emphasis	 on	 the	 virtues	 of	 participation,	 empowerment	 and	
decentralisation,	are	deceptively	appealing,	suggestive	of	active	support	 for	 the	
ideas	 and	 aspirations	 of	 the	 common	 people.	 Within	 this	 image,	 civil	 society	
emerges	 as	 the	medium	 through	which	 to	 channel	 resources	 to	 ensure	 better	
participation	 and	 democracy.	 However,	 NGOs	 are	 not	 politically	 accountable	
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organisations.	 They	 tend	 to	 be	well-structured	 interest	 groups,	 accountable	 to	
their	 (foreign)	 funders,	 who	 are	 sometimes	 bilateral	 donors,	 such	 as	 USAID,	
accountable	 to	 the	 US,	 not	 to	 their	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 countries	 where	 they	
operate.	 In	Haiti,	 the	 tendency	 of	 donors	 to	 channel	 aid	 through	 international,	
rather	 than	 local,	 NGOs	 has	 been	well	 documented	 and	 criticised,	 for	 example	









opting	 and	 transformation,	 in	 the	 neo-Gramscian	 sense	 of	 counter-hegemonic	
ideas	of	social	inclusion,	poverty	reduction	and	democracy	in	order	to	suggest	that	
the	PRSPs	have	the	interests	of	the	poor	at	their	core,	and	that	the	redefinition	of	
the	 roles	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 the	 delivery	 of	 services	 is	 a	
democratic	 exercise.	 	This	 serves	 the	purpose	of	 legitimising,	modernising	 and	
moralising	 the	 neoliberal	 austerity	 agenda,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 new	 lending	
framework	 and	 its	 purported	 emphasis	 on	 poverty	 reduction.	 I	 identify	 this	














political	 –	 by	 appealing	 to	 democratic	 and	 moral	 values	 –	 privatisation	 and	
decentralisation.	In	arguing	that	there	is	no	alternative	to	reducing	spending	–	as	
they	did	in	the	SAPs	-	the	authors	present	austerity	as	an	exercise	of	technocratic,	
economic	 management.	 Privatisation	 is	 dressed	 up	 as	 the	 reclamation	 of	

















size-fits	 all	 development	 approach,	 with	 a	 new	 emphasis	 on	 participatory,	
country-owned,	poverty-centred	strategies,	and	on	tackling	the	problem	of	debt	
dependency.	This	chapter	has	challenged	this	notion	through	an	examination	of	





and	 some	 conditionalities	 in	 the	 form	 of	 emphasis	 on	 progress	 with	 social	
indicators.	 It	 has	 identified	 the	 central	 contradiction	 of	 the	 PRSPs	 as	 the	
incompatibility	of	neoliberal	macroeconomics	and	poverty-sensitive	social	policy.	
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The	 limits	 of	 social	 compensation	 (for	 other	 damaging	 neoliberal	 policies,	
discussed	 in	 chapters	 four	 and	 six)	 were	 set	 by	 the	 overall	 expenditure	
framework,	 which	 continues	 to	 be	 dictated	 by	 neoliberal	 monetarist	 thinking.	
Whereas	 earlier	 programmes	were	 explicit	 in	 their	 intentions	 to	 cut	 the	 social	
sectors,	 the	 continued	 underfunding	 of	 social	 services	 has	 been	 more	 of	 an	
unintended	 outcome	 of	 overall	 expenditure	 restrictions.	 Increasing	 budgetary	
allocations	 to	 the	 social	 sectors	might	be	understood	as	 an	afterthought	 to	 the	
primary	priority	of	neoliberal	macroeconomic	conditionality.	The	HIPC	initiative,	








countries,	 despite	 the	 claims	 of	 ‘national	 ownership’	 and	 ‘participation’	 in	 the	
formation	of	the	PRSPs,	suggestive	of	the	hegemonic	status	of	neoliberal	logic,	as	
well	 as	 the	 power	 of	 the	 donors	 to	 influence	 policy	 and	 politics.	 The	 inclusive	
austerity	 discourse	 is	 unique	 in	 disingenuously	 framing	 the	 reduction	 or	
restriction	of	spending	as	more	efficient,	democratic,	and	pro-poor,	representing	
a	 rebranding	 of	 austerity,	 rather	 than	 any	 fundamental	 policy	 shift.	 This	
represents	 the	co-opting	–	 in	 the	neo-Gramscian	sense	–	of	 counter-hegemonic	
ideals	and	transforming	them	to	the	ends	of	the	prevailing	ideological	hegemonic	
order	of	neoliberalism.	It	is	this	discourse	that	is	essential	to	the	justification	and	
therefore	 implementation	 of	 the	 PRSPs,	 since	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 new	 lending	
framework	was	accompanied	with	promises	of	commitment	to	pro-poor,	country-
owned	 strategies.	The	 austerity	discourse	 therefore	had	 to	be	modernised	and	






its	 ability	 to	 offer	 misleading	 but	 compelling	 arguments	 and	 explanations	 for	

































further	 entrench	 the	 neoliberal	 austerity	 agenda	 in	 these	 three	 countries,	
undermining	both	sovereignty	and	the	human	development	agenda.	The	goal	of	















with	a	discussion	of	 the	 trade	content	of	 the	PRSPs,55	with	a	 focus	on	 the	main	
export	industries.	This	is	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	discourse,	to	analyse	the	
ways	 in	 which	 the	 donors	 (and	 the	 governments)	 frame	 and	 legitimise	 their	
policies.	A	CDA	of	the	policy	documents	from	1999	onwards,	compared	with	the	
earlier	 analysis	 of	 the	 SAPs,	 will	 illuminate	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 development	
discourse	 from	 the	 Washington	 Consensus	 structural	 adjustment	 era	 into	 the	



























Chapter	 four	 demonstrated	 that	 under	 structural	 adjustment,	 the	 export	
industries	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti	were	radically	transformed	during	the	1980s	
and	 1990s	 according	 to	 neoliberal	 principles.	 They	 represent	 two	 different	
contexts	for	neoliberal	trade	reforms:	one	well-established	industry	in	which	the	
state	 is	 a	 key	 player,	 and	 one	 relatively	 young	 sector	without	much	 history	 of	
government	involvement.	The	case	of	Chad	offers	a	third	context:	the	industry	was	






















economic	 realm.	 It	 is	 this	 fundamental	 strategic	 myopia	 that	 most	 clearly	
expressed	 the	 practical	 and	 discursive	 continuation	 between	 the	 PRSPs	 and	
previous	adjustment	programmes.		
	









authorities	 (within	 the	 PRSPs)	 express	 the	 desire	 to	 pursue	 more	 domestic-
oriented	 policies	 versus	 the	 export-led	 agenda.	 The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 policy	
discussion	turns	to	role	of	the	state	in	the	economy,	considering	the	ways	in	which	
the	 trade	 strategy	has	 circumscribed	 the	ability	of	 government	 to	 regulate	and	
manage	 the	 economy	 and	 society.	 These	 sections	 also	 consider	 some	 of	 the	










the	 country,	 exports	 of	 cocoa	 actually	 declined;	 rather	 than	 seeing	 this	 as	 an	
opportunity	 to	diversify,	 in	 the	 IMF’s	2007	EPCA,	 the	donors	 sought	 to	 refocus	
attention	 onto	 agriculture,	 particularly	 for	 export,	 outlining	 plans	 to	 grow	 the	
















PRSP;	 instead	 the	 government	 planned	 to	 diversify	 and	 grow	 more	 crops	 for	
domestic	consumption	with	a	view	to	achieving	food	self-sufficiency,	in	particular	










strategy	 of	 moving	 away	 from	 export-dependency	 to	 self-sufficiency	 was	
discouraged	by	the	donors	and	ultimately	abandoned.		
	




chocolate	 (when	 final	 manufacture	 and	 marketing	 are	 taken	 into	 account),	
demonstrating	that	very	little	of	the	value-adding	activities	ultimately	took	place	
in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 (World	 Bank,	 2012,	 p.	 19).	 Furthermore,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	
processing	that	takes	place	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	is	undertaken	by	TNCs,	with	very	little	














CAISTAB,	 have	 strengthened	 the	 position	 of	 TNCs	 who	 have	 better	 access	 to	




production	 (Gayi	 &	 Tsowou,	 2016,	 p.	 14).	 There	 has	 also	 been	 increased	
concentration	 in	 national	 markets	 of	 consuming	 countries	 –	 largely	 driven	 by	
commercial	 marketing	 strategies	 -	 which	 has	 led	 to	 a	 handful	 of	 chocolate	
manufacturing	 companies	 enjoying	 significant	market	 shares	 (Gayi	 &	 Tsowou,	
2016,	p	.15).	The	deregulation	and	removal	of	the	state	from	the	cocoa	sector	in	
Côte	d’Ivoire	has	created	the	conditions	that	have	allowed	TNCs	to	increase	their	
bargaining	 power,	 creating	 a	 cocoa-chocolate	 value	 chain	 that	 has	 become	




In	Haiti,	 analysis	 of	 the	policy	programmes	produced	by	 the	donors	 compared	
with	 the	 government’s	 own	 PRSP,	 also	 suggests	 some	 conflict	 between	 the	
objectives	of	the	donors	and	the	objectives	of	the	government.	At	the	start	of	the	
decade,	 the	 development	 strategy	 continued	 to	 hinge	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	
export	 assembly	 sector.	 In	 2002,	 the	 Haitian	 parliament	 passed	 two	 laws	 that	
helped	to	consolidate	this	strategy.	The	first	was	to	facilitate	the	development	of	
export	processing	zones	(EPZs),	where	companies	operating	within	these	zones	










since	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 ratification,	 both	 had	 suspended	 assistance	 to	 Haiti.	
	




However,	 in	 2001,	 USAID	 reported	 that	 the	 aid	 freeze	 might	 soon	 be	 over,	
depending	on	the	government’s	progress	in	an	8-point	agreement	that	the	Clinton	






It	 is	 impossible	 to	 ignore	 the	 staggering	 pressure	 on	 the	 financially	 struggling	
Haitian	 government	 to	 adopt	 neoliberal	 reforms	 in	 order	 to	 re-engage	 the	
international	community,	and	therefore	provide	access	to	markets,	resources	and	
aid	 that	 the	 country	 so	 desperately	 required.	 Moreover,	 the	 new	 laws	 were	
welcomed	by	the	donors;	the	IMF	declared	that	‘Haiti’s	investment	code	of	2002	
offers	ample	incentives	to	the	export	industry’	(IMF,	2005b,	p.	45).	In	2004,	the	
World	 Bank’s	 lending	 body,	 the	 IFC,	 invested	 $20	 million	 in	 a	 garment	
manufacturing	 textile	 producer	 based	 in	 neighbouring	 Dominican	 Republic,	 to	






The	 full	 PRSP	 –	 known	 by	 its	 French	 acronym	 DSNCRP	 –	 brought	 with	 it	 an	





of	 funds	 for	 infrastructure,	 23%	 for	 agriculture	 and	 only	 2.5%	 for	 tourism,	
commerce	and	industry	(Republic	of	Haiti,	2007,	Annex	1,	no.	4).	The	assembly	





However,	 this	 approach	 was	 short-lived;	 after	 the	 2010	 earthquake,	 the	 new	
strategy,	as	laid	out	in	the	Collier	report	(Collier,	2009),	the	2009	CAS	(World	Bank,	
2009c),	the	IDB	2009	report	(IDB,	2009)	and	the	2010	PARDH	(Republic	of	Haiti,	
2010),	 returned	 its	 attention	 to	 private	 sector	 investment,	 particularly	 the	
assembly	export	industry.	It	sought	utilise	regional	trade	agreements,	particularly	
the	 HOPE	 II	 act	 (World	 Bank,	 2009c,	 p.	 24). 58 	Over	 the	 next	 few	 years,	 the	
expansion	of	EPZs	and	the	construction	of	infrastructure	to	support	them,	was	to	
be	 funded	 by	 both	 foreign	 and	 national	 direct	 investments	 (Republic	 of	 Haiti,	
2010).	 In	 2011,	 Caracol	 Industrial	 Park	 was	 built,	 supported	 by	 the	 IDB.	 This	
significant	 shift	 in	 policy	 came	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 IMF’s	 admission	 that	 as	 the	





the	 donors	 the	 opportunity	 to	 once	 again	 locate	 the	 country	within	 the	 global	
landscape	of	apparel	production,	with	the	vulnerable	Haitian	government	left	with	
little	choice	but	to	accept	the	donors’	plans,	given	their	desperate	need	for	foreign	










treatment	 further	 still	 and	 eased	 some	 quantitative	 restrictions	 of	 HOPE	 I.	 However,	
HOPE	 II	 excludes	 t-shirts	 and	 sweatshirts,	 which	 make	 up	 three	 quarters	 of	 Haiti’s	






the	 economy	became	much	more	 specialised.59	By	 the	 IMF’s	 own	 admission	 in	
2004,	 the	 textile	 assembly	 sector	 ‘imports	 85%	 of	 its	 inputs	 from	 overseas,	
especially	from	the	United	States’	and	the	goods	assembled	from	those	inputs	are	
shipped	 ‘almost	exclusively’	back	to	the	US	(IMF,	2004a,	p.	42).	The	 industry	 is	
highly	 concentrated	 among	 a	 small	 number	 of	 US	 firms	 and	 Haitian	
manufacturers;	in	2009,	there	were	23	manufacturing	firms	producing	apparel	in	
Haiti,	13	of	which	are	Haitian-owned	and	the	remainder	owned	by	foreign	(mostly	
US)	 investors	 (World	Bank,	2009b,	p.	28).	The	ultimate	 result	 therefore	nearly	
echoes	the	cocoa	experience	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	discussed	above.		
	
In	 both	 Haiti	 and	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 the	 governments	 set	 out	 their	 visions	 for	
alternative	 trade	strategies	 in	 their	PRSPs,	but	ultimately,	 it	was	 the	export-led	
paradigm	that	the	BWIs	had	been	promoting	in	both	countries	for	several	decades,	
that	prevailed.	The	case	of	Chad	presents	another	example	of	this.	As	discussed	in	




was	not	 realised.	According	 to	 the	 IMF,	 the	 firm	 in	charge	built	a	 conduit	 from	
Sédigui	to	N’Djamena	that	was	of	such	poor	quality	that	it	was	unable	to	transport	













Transportation	 Company	 S.A.	 (TOTCO)	was	 established	 to	 own	 and	 operate	 the	 Chad	
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which	 included	 the	 drilling	 of	 about	 300	 wells	 and	 associated	 facilities	 and	
infrastructure,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 1,070km	 pipeline,	 to	 transport	
Chadian	oil	across	Cameroon	to	Kribi	in	the	Gulf	of	Guinea,	from	where	it	would	
be	 shipped	off	 the	coast.	No	 refineries	were	constructed	 in	Chad	or	Cameroon,	
despite	the	evidence	supporting	a	correlation	between	refineries	and	a	decrease	
in	mineral	dependence	(Baur,	2014).	This	is	an	important	parallel	with	the	Ivorian	
case;	both	 industries	were	 structured	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 the	value-added	 took	
place	 outside	 of	 these	 countries.	 The	 number	 of	 Chadians	 actually	 employed	
through	the	pipeline	project	was	minimal	and	mostly	came	in	the	form	of	short-














This	 section	 considers	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 donors	 continued	 with	 the	
Washington	Consensus	policy	of	rolling	back	the	state	in	the	economy,	in	order	to	









Chapter	 four	 argued	 that	 the	 devastating	 consequences	 of	 the	 cocoa	 producer	
price	 drop	 were	 instrumental	 in	 worsening	 economic	 and	 social	 indicators	 –	
particularly	the	disproportionate	increase	in	poverty	in	rural	areas.	Despite	this,	
the	 2000s	 saw	 the	 donors	 press	 on	with	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 cocoa	 reforms.	
During	2000	 and	2001,	 the	 government	 created	 several	 small	 organisations	 to	







































have	 the	 access	 to	 financial	 services	 or	 the	 expertise	 in	 order	 to	 use	 such	
instruments	 (Gayi	 &	 Tsowou,	 2016,	 p.	 34).	 Ultimately,	 forward	 buying	 and	
minimum	price	 guarantees	have	not	proven	 strong	enough	 to	protect	 farmers;	
producers	have	been	reduced	 to	 ‘price	 takers’	with	very	 low	bargaining	power	








but	 the	 Ivorian	 government	 did	 not	 agree	 that	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 tax	 would	
translate	into	higher	prices	for	farmers,	and	saw	a	continued	role	for	the	taxes	to	
finance	rural	 infrastructure	(IMF,	2007d,	pp.	25-26).	However,	 the	reduction	of	























The	 consequences	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 cocoa	 sector	 have	 been	 far-
reaching.	 In	 2010,	 just	 seven	 years	 after	 their	 completion,	 the	 World	 Bank	






















the	 assembly	 sector,	 as	 chapter	 four	 demonstrated.	 Concerns	 about	 rights	 to	
labour	 organising	 within	 the	 EPZs	 have	 been	 raised	 by	 a	 number	 of	 groups,	
including	Haitian	and	international	trade	unions,	and	local	and	international	NGOs	
(Coughlin	 &	 Ives,	 2011;	 ITUC,	 2011;	 Solidarity	 Center,	 2014;	 WRC,	 2013).	
Regulations	were	so	lenient	in	2006	that	to	fire	someone	in	the	formal	sector,	the	
equivalent	 of	 just	 26	 weeks’	 salary	 was	 required	 to	 be	 paid	 in	 compensation,	







per	 day,	 or	 the	 equivalent	 of	 about	 $5,	 an	 increase	 that	 would	 still	 have	 seen	
(largely	North	American)	factory	owners	paying	Haitian	workers	less	a	day	than	
the	minimum	hourly	wage	of	$7.25	in	the	US	at	the	time.	Factory	owners	lobbied	














where	 Haiti	 and	 other	 peripheral	 nations	 are	 competing	 for	 investment.	 The	
sweatshop	conditions	and	low	pay	in	Haiti	factories	has	been	widely	documented	
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was	 about	 $607	 per	 month,	 meaning	 that	 they	 must	 earn	 $23.34	 per	 day	 to	
adequately	provide	for	themselves	and	their	families	(Solidarity	Center,	2014,	p.	
6).	As	in	the	Ivorian	cocoa	sector,	the	workers	in	Haiti’s	assembly	industry	have	





pipeline	project	–	 the	 legal	Conventions	 –	were	engineered	 in	 such	a	way	as	 to	
exclude	the	role	of	the	Chadian	state	from	the	very	beginning.	The	legal	framework	
rendered	Chadian	law	subordinate	to	the	commercial	interests	of	the	consortium.	
The	World	 Bank’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 project	 also	 undermined	 the	 role	 of	 the	
government	 in	 the	 oil	 economy.	 Just	 as	 they	 had	 done	 with	 the	 removal	 of	
subsidies	and	the	privatisation	of	CAISTAB	in	the	Ivorian	cocoa	sector,	the	World	
Bank	asserted	that	the	government’s	strategy	must	be	designed	to	leave	almost	all	
aspects	 of	 the	 project	 –	 exploration	 and	 production,	 importing,	marketing	 and	







other	African	oil	producers.62	In	addition,	 the	government	 receives	a	 corporate	
income	tax	from	the	consortium,	from	TOTCO,	and	dividends	from	its	small	equity	
	




in	TOTCO	(World	Bank	&	 IFC,	2000).63	At	 the	 start	of	 the	project,	 assuming	oil	
price	to	be	$15	per	barrel	(price	in	1999),	the	World	Bank	predicted	that	the	total	
























far	 from	 holding	 it	 to	 account,	 was	 instead	 reduced	 largely	 to	 reinforcing	 the	










enforced	 an	 evening	 curfew.	 Local	 people	 complained	 on	 numerous	 occasions	











bonus	 on	 its	military	 budget	 and	 continually	 defied	 the	 Revenue	Management	
Plan,	even	rewriting	law	so	as	to	bypass	the	contract	terms	and	divert	funds	into	
an	unmonitored	account.64	In	September	2008,	 the	World	Bank	withdrew	from	
the	project,	 and	 in	doing	so	cut	 funding	 for	 those	bodies	 set	up	 to	monitor	 the	





promotes	 development	 and	poverty	 reduction.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 sought	 to	
protect	 the	 commercial	 interests	 of	 the	 consortium	 by	 creating	 an	 enabling	
environment	 for	oil	extraction.	Ultimately,	 continuing	 to	endorse	a	project	 that	
was	directly	 financing	 the	President’s	 crackdown	on	 rebels	 in	 the	 country	was	
untenable	 for	 the	World	 Bank.	 However,	 the	 political	 and	 historical	 context	 of	
Chad’s	leadership	is	important.	Déby	was	brought	to	power	with	the	support	of	
the	 French	 secret	 services	 in	 1990	 and	 has	 received	 continued	 support	 from	
	





nearly	 three-decade	 reign	 (Chafer,	2019).	Whilst	 the	 country	holds	multi-party	
elections,	 the	 democratic	 process	 his	 hotly	 contested	 and	widely	 viewed	 to	 be	
fraudulent.	 Discussions	 about	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 Chadian	 government	 are	
therefore	problematic,	as	the	stage	of	electoral	democracy	has	never	truly	arrived	
in	 Chad.	Whilst	 democratic	 processes	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	Haiti	 have	 not	 been	
without	 contestation,	 corruption	 in	 elections	 and	politics	 is	much	more	widely	
documented	in	Chad.65		
	
Explanations	 and	 understandings	 of	 the	 pipeline	 project	 and	 the	 roles	 of	 the	
Chadian	government,	the	World	Bank	and	the	consortium,	must	be	contextualised	
within	 this	 historical	 relationship	 between	 the	 Chadian	 government	 and	 the	













141).	 In	 2007,	 independent	 consultants	 commissioned	 by	 the	 consortium	 to	
evaluate	 the	 compensation	 and	 resettlement	 programme	 reported	 that	 1,640	









Koppert,	2007,	p.	 ii).	Furthermore,	 the	process	of	compensating	those	who	 lost	
land	and	 livelihoods	was	 far	 from	satisfactory;	one-time	payments	 to	cover	 the	
loss	 of	 land	 were	 either	 insufficient	 or	 not	 received,	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
colonial	law,	which	stipulates	that	the	land	did	not	belong	to	the	farmers	in	the	
first	 place	 (Leonard,	 2016).	 In	 departing	 the	 project,	 the	 World	 Bank	 handed	








continued	 austerity	 in	 the	PRSPs.	 The	 failure	 to	 significantly	 reduce	 poverty	 is	
even	more	 shocking	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	 immense	profitability	of	 the	pipeline	
project,	 which	 represents	 ‘a	 serious	 shortcoming	 for	 a	 program	 whose	 main	
objective	was	 poverty	 reduction	 through	 the	 use	 of	 oil	 revenue’	 (IEG,	 2009,	 p.	
xiii).67	This	meant	that	the	IEG	was	unable	to	analyse	poverty	developments	since	
2000.	In	2009,	the	report	stated	that	there	was	‘as	yet	no	evidence	of	the	hoped-
for	 positive	 improvements’	 (IEG,	 2009,	 p.	 xii).	 In	 2017,	 an	 independent	 study	
found	that	poverty	actually	increased	in	the	oil-producing	region	of	Chad	between	




the	 context	 of	 the	 pipeline	 project	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 reality	 that	 President	
Déby	 has	 established	 himself	 as	 an	 authoritarian	 ruler	 and	 has	 used	 the	 oil	
revenues	to	tighten	his	grip	on	power,	financing	his	fight	against	rebels	and	co-
opting	 political	 opponents	 (Hicks,	 2015).	 However,	 this	 thesis	 is	 primarily	










that	 handed	 over	 power	 to	 an	 oil	 consortium.	 The	 consortium	 has	 proven	 its	
commitments	 to	developing	Chad	were	disingenuous,	 through	 its	neglect	of	 its	
resettlement	 and	 compensation	 duties,	 amongst	 other	 environmental	 scandals	








during	 the	 1980s	 and	 the	 1990s.	 Today,	 these	 three	 quite	 different	 industries,	
having	been	subjected	to	neoliberalisation	(or	established	in	a	neoliberal	mould),	
share	several	 important	 features.	 In	 focussing	on	export-markets,	 a	 race	 to	 the	
bottom	has	emerged	where,	by	seeking	competitive	advantage,	countries	(advised	
by	 the	 donors)	 have	 pursued	 the	 suppression	 of	 wages,	 labour	 market	
deregulation	 and	 the	 creation	of	 EPZs.	As	 a	 result,	 these	 sectors	 have	 failed	 to	
improve	incomes	or	reduce	poverty.	Furthermore,	more	sinister	trends	have	been	
documented,	such	as	state-enforced	violence	and	unfree	labour.	This	is	not	to	say	





corrupt	 government.	 It	 is	 the	 imposition	 of	 these	 policies	 that	 is	 especially	
shocking,	in	light	of	the	discourse	around	the	launch	of	PWC	and	the	PRSPs,	which	



















How	 then,	 to	 legitimise	 these	 strategies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 widespread	
discrediting	of	this	development	model?	This	section	borrows	from	CDA	to	try	to	
understand	 how	 the	 neoliberal	 trade	 agenda	 has	 sustained	 itself	 discursively,	
during	this	transition	period	from	the	SAP	framework	to	the	ostensibly	different	
PRSP	model.		The	analysis	identifies	two	overarching	arguments,	upon	which	the	
donors	 continue	 to	 legitimise	 neoliberal	 trade	 reforms,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
discredited	 structural	 adjustment	 model.	 The	 first	 argument	 identified	 in	 the	
policy	 documents	 is	 effectively	 the	 repackaging	 of	 the	 state-market	 binary	









route	 to	development	 remains	dominant.	Like	 the	austerity	discourse	 that	was	
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identified	in	chapter	five,	the	PRSP	trade	discourse	also	co-opts	the	values	of	social	
inclusion,	democracy	and	poverty	 reduction,	 in	order	 to	 repackage	 remarkably	
similar	neoliberal	 trade	 reforms	as	democratic	and	serving	 the	 interests	of	 the	
poor.		
	
Together	 these	 two	 main	 arguments	 legitimise	 trade	 policy,	 via	 six	 sub-
arguments:		
	

















involvement	 in	 the	 economy,	 legitimised	 by	 a	 discourse	 that	 portrayed	 state	
interventions	as	synonymous	with	inefficient	and	even	oppressive	tendencies.	In	














and	alleviate	poverty	was	 the	 result	 of	 ‘bad	governance’	 as	opposed	 to	market	
failures,	reinforcing	the	idea	that	neoliberal	policies	themselves	were	sound,	but	




















‘Inadequate	 producer	 incentives	 and	 poor	 management	 in	 the	
sector’s	 agencies	 have	 limited	 its	 contribution	 to	 rural	 growth’	
(IMF,	2007d,	p.	25)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	












‘Years	 of	 political	 and	military	 crisis	 and	 poor	 governance	 have	
taken	 a	 heavy	 toll	 on	 the	 country,	 transforming	 the	 once-model	
African	nation	into	a	fragile	state’	(World	Bank,	2010b,	p.	i)	(Côte	
d’Ivoire)	
‘Poor	 governance	 is	 the	 greatest	 impediment	 to	 effective	
development	assistance	in	Haiti’	(World	Bank,	2002b,	p.	3)	(Haiti)	
‘Costly	mistakes	in	public	investment	for	petroleum	exploration	or	













research	 and	 extension,	 predatory	 tax	 policies	 and	 related	
















Some	 passages	 echo	 the	 more	 aggressively	 anti-state	 rhetoric,	 in	 line	 with	
Bourdieu	and	Wacquant’s	neoliberal	planetary	vulgate,	discussed	in	chapter	four.	











broadly	 as	 ‘mistakes’,	 ‘impediments’	 and	 ‘obstacles’.	 By	 nominalising	 complex	
processes	–	such	as	regulation	and	price	setting	-	and	evaluating	them	negatively,	


































‘Poor	 economic	 governance	 and	 weak	 institutional	 capacity	 across	 the	 entire	









In	 these	 three	excerpts,	 the	donors	 implicate	certain	 factors	 in	 these	countries’	
economic,	 political	 and	 social	 underdevelopment,	 whilst	 masking	 others.	 Poor	
governance	 in	 particular,	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 key	 reason	 for	 slow	 or	 reverse	
development.	This	line	of	argument	deliberately	excludes	exogenous	factors,	such	
as	 IMF	and	World	Bank-sponsored	austerity,	 the	debt	burden,	 interruptions	 in	
foreign	 aid,	 the	 damaging	 legacy	 of	 colonial	 exploitation,	 volatile	 prices	 for	
exports,	 or	 the	 neoliberal	 trade	 reforms	 pursued	 under	 structural	 adjustment,	
which	were	 instrumental	 in	 the	 entrenchment	 of	 these	 countries	 in	 the	 global	
periphery.	This	reinforces	the	notion	that	poor	government	policy	is	responsible	
for	the	country’s	development	difficulties,	contributing	to	the	undermining	of	the	
state,	 both	 discursively	 and	 practically,	 by	 legitimising	 limiting	 its	 role	 in	 the	
economic	sphere.	 In	 the	 two	African	cases,	 the	donors	 invoke	civil	 conflict	as	a	








Even	 in	 those	 excerpts	 that	 display	 some	discussion	of	what	went	wrong	with	
structural	 adjustment,	 the	 donors	 avoid	 accepting	 any	 responsibility.	 A	 key	





















the	discussion,	 the	discourse	 instead	places	 the	 responsibility	 onto	 the	 Ivorian	





Together,	 these	 strategies	 attribute	 economic	 shortcomings	 to	 fundamental	




responsibility	 for	 their	 circumstances.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 to	 show	 that	 in	 shifting	 the	
blame	 entirely	 onto	 internal	 problems	 of	 corruption	 and	 governance	 and	
downplaying	their	own	responsibilities,	the	donors	and	their	neoliberal	policies	
remain	 uncontested	 and	 legitimate.	 This	 reinforces	 the	 subsequent	 course	 of	
action,	 which	 is	 to	 continue	 the	 pursuit	 of	 neoliberal	 policies.	 The	 discourse	










strengthening’	 so	 that	 public	 institutions	would	 be	 better	 able	 to	manage	 and	
govern	the	economy.	This	represents	a	more	nuanced	discourse	around	the	state-
market	 relationship	 than	 that	 of	 earlier	 programmes,	 whose	 response	 to	 the	
critique	of	the	state	was	to	‘limit’,	‘roll	back’	and	‘constrain’	state	institutions	in	the	
economy.	This	new	discourse	emphasises	instead	the	complementary	roles	that	






















to	 the	 population	 and	 restore	 credibility	 in	 public	 institutions	 by	
helping	 the	 government	 deliver	 quick	 wins	 and	 launch	 reforms	
that	promote	 longer-term	economic	governance	 and	 institutional	
development’	(World	Bank,	2004c,	p.	i)	(Haiti)	










were	 often	 decided	 on	 behind	 closed	 doors,	 insulated	 from	 public	 debate	 or	
scrutiny	 and	 without	 the	 participation	 of	 recipient	 country’s	 governments	 or	
citizens.	By	utilising	the	appealing	language	of	good	governance	in	order	to	argue	
that	 PRSPs	 will	 strengthen	 state	 capacity	 and	 participatory	 democracy,	 rather	
than	 undermine	 it,	 the	 donors	 can	 discursively	 reject	 critiques	 that	 their	
programmes	 are	 a	 breach	 of	 national	 sovereignty,	 despite	 the	 reality	 that	 the	
policy	analysis	in	chapters	five	and	six	has	shown.	
	
This	 represents	 a	 divergence	 from	 early	 SAP	 discourse,	 whose	 focus	 was	 on	
constructing	 a	 state-market	 binary	 and	 contained	 little	 conception	 of	
‘governance’.	 Rather	 than	 legitimising	 their	 assault	 on	 the	 state	 by	 pitting	
government	inefficiencies	against	the	efficient	private	sector,	the	PWC	argument	
brings	 efficiency	 into	 the	 public	 sector,	 via	 ‘good	 governance’	 and	 ‘capacity	
building’.	 However,	 as	 the	 policy	 discussion	 of	 the	 present	 chapter	 has	









worth	 first	 considering	 the	 concept	 more	 generally.	 Governance,	 as	 a	 term,	
corresponds	to	the	action	of	governing;	in	the	context	of	the	PRSPs,	it	therefore	
broadly	refers	to	the	processes	in	government	actions	and	how	things	are	done.	It	
is	 a	 multifaceted	 concept,	 involving	 a	 number	 of	 key	 principles:	 participation;	
decency;	transparency;	accountability;	fairness;	and	efficiency	(Alizadeh	&	Zarei,	












If	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 improve	 democratic	 governance	 to	 alleviate	 poverty,	 we	
might	expect	capacity	building	activities	to	empower	communities	to	participate	
in	 decision-making,	 and	 to	 build	 capacity	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 government,	
strengthening	government	ministries	and	the	civil	service.		
	
However,	 upon	 closer	 analysis,	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘good	 governance’	 within	 the	
discourse	 of	 the	 PWC	 (and	 indeed	 in	 practice)	 is	 problematically	 reduced	 to	 a	
normative	view	of	governance.	Just	as	the	inclusive	and	pro-poor	language	that	
accompanied	austerity	and	privatisation	of	public	services	was	underpinned	by	
neoliberal	reasoning	of	 ‘doing	more	with	 less’,	 the	conceptual	understanding	of	
good	governance	is	also	narrow.	In	discussing	the	need	and	plan	to	institute	better	
governance,	the	donors	understand	economic	governance	issues	predominantly	
in	 terms	 of	 reducing	 corruption,	 maintaining	 macroeconomic	 stability,	 and	
providing	 the	 conditions	 for	 effective	 and	 efficient	markets.	 Capacity	 building,	































reduced	 role	 for	 the	 public	 sector,	 to	 providing	 the	 institutional	 framework	 to	
allow	a	great	proportion	of	the	price	to	accrue	to	producers	naturally,	rather	than	
intervening	 more	 directly	 in	 price-setting,	 or	 supporting	 farmers	 to	 negotiate	




enabling	 milieu	 for	 the	 private	 sector.	 Providing	 the	 appropriate	 regulatory	
framework	 for	 ‘market	 formulation’,	 ‘private	 sector	 confidence’	 and	 ‘oil	








This	 is	 perhaps	best	 exemplified	by	 this	 excerpt	 on	 the	World	Bank’s	 Capacity	
Building	Project	for	the	Chadian	government	to	prepare	for	the	oil	project:	
	




• Public	 information	 on	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 adjustment	
programmes;	
• Seminars	on	good	governance;	




and	 apolitical	 roles.	 The	 donors’	 narrow	 understanding	 of	 governance	 as	 the	
effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	governmental	institutions	demonstrates	that	their	
discourse	 remains	 firmly	 embedded	 within	 a	 dominant	 neoliberal	 tradition.	
Improving	governance	is	therefore	not	about	improving	the	systematic	conditions	
to	 create	 an	 enabling	 environment	 for	 poverty	 reduction,	 but	maintaining	 and	
improving	 the	 conditions	 to	 create	 a	 favourable	 environment	 for	 the	 private	
sector.	This	 goes	 some	way	 to	explaining	 the	 superficial	nature	of	 the	 capacity	
building	and	governance	reform	projects	undertaken	and	financed	by	the	donors.		
	
The	World	Bank’s	 ‘capacity	building’	efforts	within	the	cocoa	 industry	 included	
the	 pilot	 project	 to	 train	 cocoa	 producers	 and	 organisations	 to	 minimise	 the	
volatility	of	cocoa	prices	through	hedging	on	futures	markets	(ICCO,	2008).	The	
hedging	 strategy	 showed	 promise	 of	 being	 able	 to	 somewhat	 counteract	 the	
volatility	of	prices,	but	these	remained	at	levels	so	low	that	many	cocoa	growers	




in	 physical	 infrastructure	 that	 would	 support	 the	 assembly	 sector,	 such	 as	
	 255	
transport,	electricity,	ports	and	EPZs	as	well	as	‘strengthening’	legal	infrastructure	
-	 favourable	 regulation	 to	 foreign	 direct	 investment.	 In	 reality,	 the	 continued	
downwards	 pressure	 on	 wages	 and	 labour	 rights	 is	 better	 understood	 as	 the	
systematic	weakening	of	legal	infrastructure,	to	the	detriment	of	factory	workers	
and	 their	 families.	 In	 Chad,	 millions	 of	 dollars	 were	 invested	 into	 institutions	
whose	role	was	ostensibly	to	monitor	the	oil	consortium.	Yet,	these	efforts	were	
focussed	on	 temporary	 entities	with	no	political	 or	 operational	 authority	 (IEG,	
2009).	 The	 oversight	 committee	was	 unable	 to	 play	 its	 role	 of	monitoring	 the	
pipeline	project	due	to	a	lack	of	transparency	both	from	the	consortium	and	from	
the	Chadian	government.	In	the	end,	the	IEG	concluded	that	‘the	[consortium]	is	
almost	 entirely	 self-regulating,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 independent	 government	
presence	on	the	ground’	(IEG,	2009,	p.	88).68	
	
What	 is	 common	 here,	 and	 cannot	 be	 overemphasised,	 is	 that	 these	 efforts	 to	
‘strengthen	 capacity’,	whether	 genuine	 or	 not,	 have	 ultimately	 been	 limited	 by	
deeply	 unequal	 power	 relationships	 between	 the	 TNCs	 investing	 in	 these	
industries	and	domestic	stakeholders.	They	have	not	resulted	in	strong	regulatory	
bodies	 able	 to	 enshrine	 workers’	 rights,	 fair	 wages	 or	 just	 resettlement	 and	
compensation	for	displaced	people.	This	is	because	they	have	taken	place	within	
a	neoliberal	development	paradigm	that	has	systematically	weakened	the	state	





is	appealing	because	 it	 is	able	 to	 translate	complex	and	sometimes	contentious	
economic	processes	into	manageable	issues	of	governance	and	policy	(Demmers,	
Jilberto,	&	Hogenboom,	2004).	 It	has	allowed	the	donors	 to	present	 their	 trade	
strategies	-	which	remain	very	much	influenced	by	the	ideology	of	neoliberalism	-	








shifts	 attention	 from	 the	 systemic	 problems	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 development	
framework	 –	 unfair	 markets	 and	 inappropriate	 reforms	 –	 to	 the	 borrowing	





























‘The	 following	 objectives	 […]	 jump	 starting	 economic	 recovery	
































‘A	 more	 competitive	 and	 resilient	 rural	 economy	 would	 raise	
performance	overall	and	also	produce	for	the	farmers	a	growing	









of	 priorities,	 notably	 on	 creating	 a	 business	 climate	 that	 is	




most	 efficient	 method	 of	 organisation	 within	 the	 economy.	 Like	 in	 earlier	
programmes,	 we	 see	 the	 donors	 suggest	 that	 the	 more	 that	 economic	
responsibilities	 are	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 more	 efficient	 the	
economy	will	become.	The	donors	employ	the	mechanical	metaphor	to	elevate	the	
private	sector,	by	identifying	policies	that	transferred	responsibility	to	the	market	






prices	 had	 become	 ‘freely	 determined’,	 the	 EPZs	 being	 set	 up	 in	 Haiti	 are	
nominated	as	‘free	zones’	and	trade	in	Chad	had	been	‘liberalised’.		This	topos	is	
particularly	prominent	in	the	Haitian	case,	when	discussing	the	country’s	labour	
regulations.	 Low	wages	 and	 regulation	 are	 evaluated	 positively,	 predicated	 as	
‘flexible’.	For	example,	the	easy	disposal	of	workers,	compared	to	other	countries	
in	the	region,	is	discussed	positively,	using	the	topos	of	freedom,	as	allowing	‘few	
constraints’	 and	 ‘restrictions’	 to	 economic	 growth.	 Clearly,	 the	 very	 narrowed	
understanding	of	flexibility	that	was	discussed	in	chapter	four	remains	central	to	
the	World	Bank’s	discourse.	Flexibility	 is	 reduced	 to	minimal	regulation,	which	
allows	factory	managers	to	remove	employees	without	notice	or	justification.		
	
In	 the	 Ivorian	 case,	 the	 donors	 frame	 the	 issue	 of	 volatile	 prices	 as	 the	




















By	 assigning	 agency	 to	 abstract	 concepts	 such	 as	 the	 market	 and	 the	 apparel	







complex	processes.	The	above	example	 from	 the	Haitian	 context	might	 instead	
have	been	phrased	instead	as:	
	








apparel	 production,	 through	 US	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 HOPE	 Act	 and	 the	 US	
Department	 of	 State’s	 role	 in	 suppressing	 the	 minimum	 wage	 in	 Haiti.	 The	
discourse	 depoliticises	 the	 neoliberal	 low-wage	 economy.	 Equally,	 the	
exploitation	of	factory	workers	is	backgrounded	in	the	original	text,	nominalised	
as	‘labour	costs’	–	removing	the	human	agency	from	exploited	factory	workers.	In	
thinking	 about	 the	 social	 effects	 of	 texts	 here,	 this	 silence	 on	 the	 real	 human	
consequences	of	the	consistent	downward	pressure	on	wages	and	regulation	from	
the	donors	and	the	private	sector,	contributes	to	the	 legitimisation	of	the	trade	








poverty	 in	 rural	 areas,	 as	 higher	 pass-through	 of	 world	 market	 prices	 to	











policy	 analysis	 demonstrated,	 this	 is	 a	 gross	 misrepresentation	 of	 the	 reality.	
Indeed,	 the	 cocoa	 sector	 has	 become	 more	 concentrated	 (less	 competitive),	








continued	 rolling	 back	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Haiti	 and	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 in	 these	 policy	
documents	continues	to	rest	on	the	neoliberal	rationale	that	the	private	sector	is	
efficient	 and	 self-regulating.	 The	 critique	 of	 the	 state	 is	more	 nuanced	 than	 in	




focusing	on	 institutions	and	 the	 technical,	 over	 the	policies	 and	 the	political.	A	






The	 second	 overarching	 argument,	 identified	 through	 analysis	 of	 the	 policy	
documents,	is	that	inclusive	export-led	growth	is	essential	for	poverty	reduction.	
This	argument,	as	this	section	will	demonstrate,	represents	an	evolution	from	the	
earlier	 SAP	 discourse	 that	 prioritised	 GDP	 growth	 above	 all	 other	 objectives.	





in	 order	 to	 construct	 development	 policies	 that	 support	 a	 more	 capable	 and	
democratic	state,	whilst	retaining	the	state-market	binary	in	order	to	legitimise	
the	continued	handover	of	economic	activities	and	resources	to	the	private	sector.	





growth	 is	 a/the	 route	 to	 poverty	 reduction.	 In	 the	 programme	 papers	













‘The	 promotion	 of	 social	 services,	 environmental	 preservation,	











to	 strong	 and	 sustained	 high	 growth	 and	 the	 development	 of	
human	 resources	 able	 to	 participate	 in	 and	 contribute	 to	 such	
growth’	(World	Bank,	2002d,	p.	19)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	
For	Haiti	to	put	the	current	economic	crisis	firmly	behind	it	and	set	
out	 on	 a	 path	 of	 sustainable	 growth	 and	 development’	 (World	
Bank,	2009c,	p.	9)	(Haiti)	
‘The	PRSP	rightly	emphasises	this	unprecedented	developmental	






will	 clearly	 be	 required	 in	 order	 to	 make	 significant	 inroads	 in	
poverty’	(IMF,	2009c,	p.	3)	(Côte	d’Ivoire)	
‘Policies	 that	 promote	 pro-poor	 growth	 are	 needed	 to	 reduce	
poverty’	(World	Bank,	2006b,	p.	76)	(Haiti)	
‘Chad’s	 central	 development	 objective	 is	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 by	
















authors	emphasised	their	preference	 for	 the	expression	 ‘inclusive	growth’	over	
‘pro-poor	growth’,	since	the	latter	is	mainly	interested	in	the	welfare	of	the	poor,	
whereas	inclusive	growth	is	concerned	with	opportunities	for	the	majority	of	the	
workforce	–	poor	and	middle-class	alike.	 ‘Broad-based’	 refers	 to	growth	 that	 is	
spread	 across	 sectors	 (Ianchovichina	&	Lundstrom,	2009).	 Yet,	 the	 terms	 ‘pro-
poor’	 and	 ‘inclusive’	 as	 prefixes	 to	 growth	 are	 used	 interchangeably	 in	 policy	
documents,	 without	 unpacking	 what	 either	 term	 means.	 This	 vagueness	 is	
suggestive	of	their	superficiality.	
	
Like	 in	 earlier	 SAPs,	 the	 discursive	 conflation	 of	 growth	 and	 development	 is	
achieved	 implicitly	 within	 the	 texts.	 Both	 paratactic	 and	 hypotactic	 relations	
between	 clauses	 allow	 the	 reader	 to	 associate	 growth	with	 poverty	 reduction,	
without	 having	 to	 explain	 the	 relationship.	 This	 amounts	 to	 the	 discursive	
alignment	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	to	human	development	outcomes.	The	claim	is	
that	 the	 fruits	 of	GDP	 growth	will	 be	 shared	 in	 an	 equitable	way	 that	 drives	 a	
reduction	in	poverty.	This	rests	upon	trickle-down	assumptions	about	how	wealth	















This	 argument	 is	 reinforced	 when	 the	 programmes,	 in	 defining	 quantitative	




points	 between	 2009	 and	 2015	 through	 economic	 growth’	 (Republic	 of	 Côte	
d’Ivoire,	2009,	pp.	90	–	91).	
		
This	 reinforces	 the	 discursive	 relationship	 between	 growth	 and	 poverty	
reduction.	However,	the	discursive	conflation	of	these	objectives	does	not	mean	
that	 they	 have	 equal	 standing	 within	 the	 donors’	 development	 agenda.	 GDP	
growth	 remains	 privileged	 –	 it	 is	 poverty	 reduction	 that	 is	 drawn	 into	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 economic	 growth	 agenda,	 rather	 than	 the	 other	 way	





Comparing	 the	 discourse	 across	 the	 two	 lending	 frameworks,	 there	 is	 clear	







The	 discrepancies	 between	 this	 discourse	 and	 the	 tangible	 realities	 of	 these	
programmes	are	stark.	The	articulation	of	the	export-led	growth	strategy	as	‘pro-
poor’	and	‘inclusive’	serves	to	sanitise	deeply	unequal	trade	systems.	The	reality	
of	 impoverished	 factory	workers	 in	 Haiti,	 child	 labourers	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	
displaced	 farmers	 in	 Chad,	 bears	 little	 material	 resemblance	 to	 the	 donor-
constructed	 images	 of	 pro-poor	 private	 sector	 growth.	 The	 constructed	
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relationship	between	growth	and	poverty	therefore	amounts	to	the	co-opting	of	
counter-hegemonic	 values	 of	 social	 inclusion	 and	 pro-poor	 development.	 The	
donors	 have	 incorporated	 some	 of	 the	 main	 concerns	 of	 critics	 of	 structural	
adjustment	 into	 their	 discourse	 only	 to	 transform	 them	 to	 create	 consensus	
around	their	policy	agenda,	ensuring	that	neoliberalisation	would	continue	to	be	
adopted,	legitimised	and	implemented.	This	is	not	to	deny	that	increasing	growth	
rates	 can,	 and	 have,	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 reducing	 poverty	 in	 many	









economies.	 The	 underlying	 assumption	 in	 the	 conflation	 of	 growth	 with	
development	-	and	in	the	neoliberal	ideology	more	broadly	-	is	that	these	countries	













































‘The	 proposed	 project	 offers	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 improve	




This	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 enormity	 of	 the	 development	
challenges	 facing	 the	 countries,	 with	 the	 topos	 of	 danger/threat	 serving	 to	
reinforce	the	image	of	these	countries	as	desperately	needing	urgent	investment.	



















the	 image	 of	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 as	 a	 preferred	 regional	 location	 for	 foreign	 direct	
investment.	 Economic	 performance	 declined,	 investment	 levels	 plummeted,	







increasing	 poverty	 levels	 –	 through	 harsh	 austerity	 measures	 and	 exposing	
farmers	to	volatile	cocoa	prices	–	shifting	the	blame	onto	internal	factors,	like	the	
political	conflict.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	political	crisis	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	did	
not	 play	 role	 in	 impeding	 investment,	 nor	 that	 investment	 isn’t	 important	 for	
economic	 development.	 However,	 it	 represents	 a	 gross	 simplification	 of	 the	




envisioned,	 not	 as	 self-serving	 corporations,	 but	 as	 champions	 of	 pro-poor	
development.	These	images	bear	little	resemblance	to	the	reality;	ExxonMobil,	the	








of	 poverty	 reduction,	 equality	 and	 inclusivity,	 the	 programmes	 can	 be	 seen	 as	




poor	 outcomes,	 at	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown.	 What	 has	 been	 achieved	 through	
neoliberal	reforms	is	the	creation	of	a	global	production	zone	in	which	TNCs	can	
establish	 export-production	 platforms	 for	 markets	 in	 the	 global	 core.	 The	
discursive	 moralisation	 of	 neoliberal	 trade	 strategies	 disguises	 the	 true	
consequences	of	the	export-led	commercial	development	model.	The	PRS	lending	
framework	 is	 therefore	 better	 understood,	 not	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 country-owned,	





the	 case	 study	 countries.	 Much	 like	 the	 austerity	 discourse,	 the	 discourse	 has	
retained	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 SAPs,	 including	 a	 fundamental	 favouring	 of	 the	
market	over	the	state	in	the	economy,	regardless	of	circumstance.	However,	it	has	
also	 co-opted,	 through	 a)	 its	 incorporation	 of	 ‘good	 governance’	 and	 ‘capacity	
building’	into	its	programmes;	and	b)	the	notion	that	private	sector	can	be	not	only	












the	 economy	 and	 traps	 the	 producer	 nations	 in	 a	 cycle	 of	 debt,	 poverty	 and	
resource	exploitation.		
	
This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies,	 the	 economic	
development	 strategy	 pursued	 by	 the	 donors	 under	 the	 PRS	 framework	 has	
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continued	along	a	startlingly	similar	trajectory	to	the	structural	adjustment	era.	
The	 overall	 approach	 remains	 anchored	 in	 a	 neoliberal	 vision	 of	 export	
promotion,	 support	 for	 large	 TNCs	 and	 world	market	 integration.	 Despite	 the	





divergence	 from	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 discourse,	with	 a	 new	 emphasis	 on	





The	 good	 governance	 discourse	 represents	 PRSPs	 as	 a	 more	 technocratic	 and	
managerial	 approach	 to	 development,	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 a	 more	 conducive	
political	 environment	 for	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	 neoliberal	 reforms.	
This	 depoliticised	 notion	 of	 governance	 allows	 the	 discourse	 to	 present	 donor	
policy	as	different	from	the	SAPs	in	its	rediscovery	of	the	state.	Beneath	the	notion	
of	 good	 governance,	 remains	 the	 neoliberal	 ideology	 that	 underlines	 the	
importance	of	an	enabling	private	sector	environment	for	market	forces.	The	new	
discursive	emphasis	on	the	linkages	between	a	market-based	economy	and	pro-
poor	 development	 objectives	 represents	 the	 co-opting	 of	 counter-hegemonic	
ideals.	This	is	crucial	to	legitimising	the	continuation	of	dependency-deepening,	




Chapters	 five	 and	 six	 have	 analysed	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 under	 the	 PWC,	
development	policy	in	Côte	d’Ivoire,	Haiti	and	Chad	has	become	more	pro-poor	
and	 country-owned,	 as	 its	 proponents	 argued	 that	 it	would,	 or	whether	PRSPs	









	By	 tying	 the	 conflicting	 objectives	 of	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 fiscal	 austerity	 as	
conditions	 for	 much-needed	 debt	 relief,	 the	 donors	 have	 further	 entrenched	
conditionality	 into	 their	 lending,	 deepening	 dependency	 and	 undermining	
sovereignty.	Importantly,	reading	of	the	PRSPs	has	shown	that	when	governments	
sought	 to	 diverge	 from	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda,	 by	 making	 ambitious	 social	
investments,	 or	 investing	 in	domestic	markets,	 they	have	been	dissuaded	 from	
doing	so.	The	debt	burden	has	continued	to	play	a	key	role	in	according	coercive	
power	to	the	BWIs,	allowing	them	to	dictate	the	policy	agenda	and	determine	the	




Importantly,	 the	way	 that	 the	 donors	 have	 framed	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	
failures	 of	 structural	 adjustment	 as	 the	 fault	 of	 the	 state,	 has	 served	 as	 a	 self-
fulfilling	 prophecy,	 in	 which	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 improve	 human	
development	indicators	is	a	result	of	not	enough	structural	adjustment.	Within	this	






establish	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 expatriation	of	 profits	 by	 transnational	 capital,	
undermining	the	sovereignty	and	genuine	emancipatory	development.		Together,	






This	 concluding	 chapter	 reviews	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 and	 synthesises	 the	
arguments	put	forward	in	this	thesis.	I	return	to	the	concept	of	neo-colonialism	







inequality,	 this	 thesis	presents	a	critical	exploration	of	 the	role	of	 international	
institutions	 in	the	economic	development	of	 former	French	colonies	Chad,	Côte	
d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti.	 It	 set	 out	 to	 challenge	 dominant	 Eurocentric	 narratives	 in	
academic,	journalistic	and	policymaking	spheres,	in	which	state	‘failure’	is	cast	as	
a	 result	 of	 the	 ineptitude	 of	 peripheral	 countries	 and	 their	 inability	 to	 take	
advantage	 of	 the	 myriad	 opportunities	 of	 globalisation.	 Diverging	 from	
mainstream	accounts	that	have	been	myopically	focussed	on	the	effectiveness	of	
implementation,	or	the	appropriateness,	of	the	policies	of	the	BWIs,	this	thesis	has	
instead	 approached	 the	 development	 question	 through	 a	 postcolonial	 lens.	 In	
placing	questions	of	power	and	discourse	at	the	centre	of	the	enquiry,	it	has	thus	

















Borrowing	 from	 neo-Gramscian	 insights	 has	 enabled	 a	 more	 nuanced	
comprehension	 of	 how	 power	 operates	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 international	
development.	In	line	with	this	theoretical	approach,	the	neoliberal	development	
agenda	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 not	 only	 as	 a	 set	 of	 policies	 and	 practices,	 as	

















former	 in	 favour	of	 the	 latter.	Contrary	 to	 claims	 that	governments	voluntarily	
entered	into	these	programmes,	this	study	has	considered	the	‘choice’	to	sign	up	
to	 SAPs	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 asymmetry	 of	 power	 between	 lender	 and	
borrower.	At	 the	 start	of	 the	 structural	 adjustment	process,	 all	 three	 countries	







financial	markets.	 The	 imposition	 of	 neoliberal	 reforms	 through	 these	 lending	





regarding	 both	 the	 benefits	 of	 neoliberalisation,	 and	 an	 exigency	 that	 these	
countries	 accept.	 The	 discourse	 presented	 as	 common	 sense	 a	 number	 of	





SAPs	 deepened	 poverty	 by	 demanding	 radical	 austerity	 programmes	 that	 cut	
health,	 education,	 public	 sector	 jobs	 and	 pro-poor	 subsidies.	 Although	 the	
austerity	 policies	 of	 the	 1990s	 were	 less	 severe,	 ‘fiscal	 discipline’	 remained	
preponderant,	which,	when	coupled	with	the	pursuit	of	export-led	markets	at	the	
expense	 of	 protecting	 local	 industries	 and	 workers,	 had	 devastating	




‘At	 times,	 however,	 reform	 programmes	 have	 failed	 to	 deliver	 as	 much	 as	
expected	–	and	at	times	reforms	have	failed	entirely	[…]	The	grim	lessons	of	these	
















debt	 relief;	 a	 key	 demand	 of	 civic	 organisation.	 Private	 sector	 and	 export-led	
growth	has	been	explicitly	linked	to	poverty	reduction	objectives,	as	the	donors	
emphasise	that	increased	resources	for	social	spending	would	be	made	available	
through	 GDP	 growth.	 Yet,	 the	 focus	 on	 poverty	 alleviation	 remains	 embedded	
within	 a	 policy	 framework	 derived	 from	 the	 same	 neoliberal	 principles	 that	
dominated	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 era.	 The	 neoliberal	 trade	 strategy	 has	










blatant	 contradiction	 that	 lies	 in	 the	 tension	 between	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	
human	 development	 agenda.	 Expansive	 social	 policies	 cannot	 be	 implemented	
alongside	 a	 restrictive	 fiscal	 policy,	 as	 the	 per	 capita	 spending	 on	 health	 and	
education	 figures	 in	 these	 countries	 show.	 Importantly,	 the	HIPC	 initiative	 has	
further	embedded	conditionality,	reinforcing	the	dependency	dynamic	between	
borrowing	states	and	the	BWIs,	and	circumscribing	their	national	and	economic	








onto	 governments,	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 and	 communities.	 The	 progressive	
critiques	of	structural	adjustment	are	co-opted	by	the	donors	under	the	PWC,	in	
order	to	legitimise	the	further	embedding	of	the	neoliberal	development	agenda.		
In	 this	 way,	 the	 discourse	 was	 essential	 in	 further	 embedding	 neoliberalism,	




This	 thesis	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 over	 the	 course	 of	 a	 thirty-year	 period	 of	
policymaking	at	the	BWIs,	the	SAPs	and	PRSPs	myopically	embedded	a	neoliberal	
development	 agenda	 in	 Chad,	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 and	 Haiti.	 By	 creating	 a	 unique	
analytical	framework,	which	is	grounded	in	neo-Gramscian	theory	and	considers	
how	 both	material	 (policy)	and	 ideational	 (discourse)	 power	manifests	within	
these	programmes,	this	study	has	shown	how	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	have	
entrenched	neoliberalism	and	restricted	sovereignty	in	three	countries,	thereby	




not	 take	 place	 in	 a	 vacuum.	 Rather,	 the	 position	 that	 these	 countries	 found	
themselves	in	at	the	start	of	the	structural	adjustment	process	was	a	direct	legacy	
of	 colonialism.	 In	 the	 African	 context,	 the	 Françafrique	 network	 ensured	 the	
continued	 exploitation	 of	 resources	 –	 natural,	 human	 and	 financial	 –	 after	
decolonisation	to	protect	French	commercial	interests.	Haiti’s	ability	to	develop	










colonised	 relationship	 finds	 a	 contemporary	 host	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	
these	nominally	independent	states	and	the	BWIs.	Over	the	thirty-year	period	of	
development	 policy,	 conditional	 lending	 has	 entrenched	 debt	 dependency	 and	
further	weakened	the	national	sovereignty	of	Chad,	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Haiti.	In	this	
way,	 it	 is	 the	 asymmetrical	 power	 relations	 embedded	 in	 the	 international	 aid	
system	that	have	played	a	crucial	role	in	embedding	neoliberalism	in	these	former	
colonies.	The	process	of	embedding	neoliberalism	has	dovetailed	with	the	process	
of	 circumscribing	 sovereignty,	 due	 to	 the	 anti-state	 nature	 of	 the	 neoliberal	
development	policy	agenda.	Fiscal	austerity	has	further	undermined	government	
capacity	to	carry	out	basic	functions,	which	has	both	fuelled,	and	been	fuelled	by,	
the	 privatisation	 of	 social	 services	 and	 capture	 of	 resources	 by	 TNCs.	 The	
neoliberal	trade	strategy	has	largely	removed	the	state	from	the	economy,	leaving	







explicit,	 and	 provide	 critical	 evidence,	 as	 to	 how	 the	 development	 discourse	
operates	 and	 evolves	 over	 time,	 perpetuating	 neoliberal	 common	 sense	 and	
legitimising	the	neoliberal	project.	The	unique	combination	of	analytical	discourse	
approaches	 has	 facilitated	 a	 structured	 and	 consistent	 approach,	 enabling	 the	
demonstration	of	how	argumentation	devices	and	conceptual	metaphor	work	to	
legitimise	the	neoliberal	development	agenda.	This	approach	has	demonstrated	
how	 the	 donors	 created	 a	 depoliticising	 discourse,	 which	 conveyed	 the	
inevitability	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	 and	 perpetuated	 Eurocentric	 myths	 of	 the	
inability	of	the	periphery	to	self-govern.	Removing	politics	from	the	development	








the	 evolution	 of	 the	 discourse	 to	 generate	 consent	 for	what	 had	 proven	 to	 be	










The	 approach	 adopted	 by	 this	 thesis	 therefore	 sheds	 a	 unique	 light	 upon	 the	
relationship	 between	 policy,	 power	 and	 discourse.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	
neoliberal	development	agenda	has	been	enabled	by	a	power	 imbalance	 in	 the	
global	economy	that	has	its	roots	firmly	in	colonialism.	This	policy	framework	is	
legitimised	by	a	neoliberal	discourse,	which	reproduces	those	power	imbalances	















global	 periphery.	 This	 study	 has	 demonstrated	 how	 sovereignty	 has	 been	
circumscribed	by	SAPs	and	PRSPs,	 as	 the	donors	have	strongly	determined	 the	






















EPZs,	 or	 abuse	 by	 the	gendarmerie	 along	 the	 Chadian	 pipeline.	However,	 their	
reforms	 have	 created	 the	 conditions,	 which	 have	 handed	 power	 over	 to	
transnational	capital	and	-	in	the	case	of	Chad	-	a	corrupt	government.		
	
The	 parallels	with	 the	 colonial	 experience	 are	 stark.	 Imperialism	 constituted	 a	
major	process	of	primitive	capital	accumulation,	through	the	coercive	extraction	
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of	 value,	 which	 produced	 systematic	 impoverishment.	 This	 thesis	 has	
demonstrated	 that	 by	 exporting	 neoliberalism	 to	 the	 global	 periphery,	 these	
processes	have	been	further	embedded	in	the	global	political	economy.	In	essence,	







to	 challenge	 the	 dominant	 narrative,	 which	 shifts	 the	 blame	 entirely	 onto	
governments	 and	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 inoculating	 external	 agents	 from	 any	
responsibility	 for	 the	 drastic	 failures	 of	 development	 finance.	 I	 do	 not	 seek	 to	
reduce	these	governments	to	mere	victims.	 Indeed,	 in	the	case	of	Chad	and	the	
country’s	 pipeline	 project,	 President	 Déby	 used	 the	 World	 Bank	 to	 his	 own	
advantage,	gaining	access	to	credit	and	using	the	revenues	from	the	oil	in	order	to	
maintain	his	precarious	grip	on	power.	This	does	not	contradict	the	neo-colonial	
nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Chad	 and	 the	 international	 community.	 As	
Nkrumah	argued	and	Langan	emphasises,	the	elites	of	neo-colonial	regimes	can	
play	 the	 game	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 advantages	 for	 themselves	 (Langan,	 2018;	
Nkrumah,	1965).	Fundamentally,	therefore,	the	postcolonial	states	retain	agency	
as	 political	 and	 economic	 actors,	 however	 this	 has	 been	 circumscribed	 by	
increasingly	powerful	 institutions	 that	 act	within	 a	highly	 asymmetrical	power	
relationship	that	manufactures	coercion	and	consent.	
	





itself,	 thereby	offering	a	unique	contribution	 to	 the	neo-colonial	 literature.	The	
salience	of	power	–	both	coercive	and	consensual	 -	 in	the	manner	 in	which	the	






This	 thesis	 has	 created	 a	 model	 for	 exploring	 the	 interaction	 between	 policy,	
power	and	discourse	in	the	context	of	the	development	policy	of	the	World	Bank	
and	the	IMF.	This	triumvirate	model	demonstrates	how	the	BWIs	have	embedded	





for	the	 insight	that	can	be	gleaned	by	using	a	comparative	 lens.	This	 thesis	has	
been	 ambitious	 in	 its	 scope,	 examining	 the	 development	 experience	 of	 three	
countries	 with	 distinctive	 economic	 and	 political	 contexts	 over	 a	 thirty-year	
period.	As	a	result,	some	of	specificities	of	the	three	case	studies	may	have	been	
lost	in	the	analysis.	Moreover,	other	policy	themes	within	the	BWI	programmes	
have	 been	 intentionally	 neglected.	 Reforms	 in	 the	 wider	 arena	 of	 finance	
(exchange	rates,	currency,	financial	deregulation)	and	trade	beyond	the	primary	





neoliberal	 policy	 paradigm	 during	 the	 1990s	 as	 the	 evidence	 condemning	 the	
Washington	 Consensus	 mounted.	 The	 temporal	 and	 comparative	 scope	 of	 the	
thesis	has	therefore	allowed	me	to	demonstrate	the	intent	of	the	donors	and	their	








fostering	 of	 neo-colonial	 relations	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 enabling	 the	
implementation	of	the	SAPs.	However,	in	Haiti,	the	US	had	long	eclipsed	France	in	
terms	 of	 its	 commercial	 interests	 and	 political	 influence	 in	 the	 country	 by	 the	
1980s.	This	 complicates	 any	 conclusions	 that	we	might	draw	 from	 these	 three	
former	French	colonies.	Moreover,	having	focussed	uniquely	on	the	Francophone	
experience,	this	study	is	unable	to	confirm	whether	this	phenomenon	is	unique	to	
the	 French	 postcolonial	 context,	 or	 is	 something	 that	 extends	 throughout	 the	
formerly	 colonised	world.69	It	would	be	 interesting	 to	 investigate	 the	 extent	 to	

















hegemony.	At	 the	 time	of	writing,	development	 lending	at	 the	World	Bank	and	
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27.6	 30.5	 30	 32.5	 31.1	 -	 40.3	 41.3	 36.8	 35.4	 38.9	 49.7	 43.4	 52.9	 62.7	 65.5	 69.7	 77.5	 67.9	 70.1	
Debt	Service	
72	($	Million)	
921	 964	 798	 635	 1192	 1537	 1318	 1060	 1106	 941	 1004	 912	 917	 1137	 929	 1285	 1229	 1285	 1367	 904	
Population	
73(million)		
8.413	 8.699	 8.995	 9.301	 9.617	 -	 10.698	 10.8	 11.1	 11.6	 12.1	 12.5	 13	 13.5	 14.2	 14.7	 14.9	 15.4	 15.9	 16.4	
Exchange	
Rate74		
271	 328	 381	 436	 449	 -	 300	 297	 320	 272	 282	 265	 283	 555	 499	 511	 584	 590	 615.7	 712	
Education	per	
capita75	
71.14	 65	 53.95	 45.20	 43.31	 -	 64.81	 67.62	 60.73	 67.70	 60.61	 59.71	 54.28	 28.55	 33.55	 33.64	 31.88	 33.28	 31.90	 25.59	
Health	per	
capita76	
12.11	 10.69	 8.75	 8.01	 7.20	 -	 12.56	 12.88	 10.36	 11.22	 11.40	 15	 11.8	 7.06	 8.85	 8.72	 8.01	 8.53	 6.94	 6	
Debt	Service	
per	capita77	
109.47	 110.82	 88.72	 68.27	 123.95	 149.12	 123.2	 98.15	 99.64	 81.12	 82.98	 72.96	 70.54	 84.22	 65.42	 87.41	 82.48	 83.44	 85.97	 55.12	
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Appendix	2:	Selected	Indicators	for	Haiti,	1982	-	2000	












15	 14.1	 17.6	 18	 14	 23	 23	 24	 11.5	 12.4	 0.7	 0.4	 0.5	 54.8	 20.7	 31	 32	 34	 33	
Population81	
(millions)		
5.995	 6.096	 6.240	 6.384	 6.527	 6.675	 6.813	 6.956	 7.099	 7.243	 7.387	 7.531	 7.675	 7.819	 7.966	 8.112	 8.258	 8.404	 8.549	
Exchange	
Rate	82	
5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 6	 9.8	 12.8	 15	 15.2	 15.7	 16.7	 16.8	 16.9	 17.46	
Education	per	
capita83	
2.86	 2.86	 2.99	 3.10	 3.20	 4.81	 5.08	 5.1	 5.12	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Health	per	
capita	($)	84	










































0.5	 1.2	 0.3	 3.3	 12	 5	 5	 6	 5	 6.5	 8.7	 9.6	 14.1	 15	 7.4	 22.9	 22	 22	 27	 24	
Population	
(million)	88	
4.61	 4.715	 4.829	 4.954	 5.091	 5.243	 5.408	 5.584	 5.768	 5.957	 6.15	 6.349	 6.555	 6.772	 7.001	 7.241	 7.493	 7.759	 8.042	 8.342	
Exchange	
Rate	89	
271	 328	 381	 436	 449	 	 300	 297	 320	 272	 282	 265	 283	 555	 499	 511	 584	 590	 615.7	 712	
Education	per	
capita	($)90	


















































































































































































































































































































Year	 Wage	Rate	(HTG	per	day)97	 Real	Wage	Index98	 Real	Wage	(HTG	per	day)99	
1981	 13.2	 100	 13.2	
1982	 13.2	 92.4	 12.2	
1983	 13.2	 85.2	 11.2	
1984	 13.2	 78.9	 10.4	
1985	 15	 72.8	 10.9	
1986	 15	 67.1	 10.1	
1987	 15	 70.6	 10.6	
1988	 15	 68.7	 10.3	
1989	 15	 61.9	 9.3	
1990	 15	 51.4	 7.7	
1991	 15	 43.2	 6.5	
1992	 15	 35.6	 5.3	
1993	 15	 30	 4.5	
1994	 15	 21.8	 3.3	
1995	 36	 16.7	 6.0	
1996	 36	 13.7	 4.9	
1997	 36	 11.8	 4.2	
1998	 36	 10.5	 3.8	
































































‘The	public	 sector	 in	Haiti	 is	both	extremely	weak	and	overextended;	 its	objectives	are	not	well	defined,	 its	 structure	


































































































































































































































	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	
Education	 Spending		
(CFAF	million)100	
298.8	 292.3	 338.3	 377.1	 384.3	 392.8	 411.2	 345	 496.9	 533.1	 590.1	
Health	Spending	
(CFAF	million)101	
70.1	 55.2	 96.1	 97.7	 110.9	 99.4	 107.6	 88.8	 98.3	 118.4	 113.6	
EDT/GNI	(%)102	 124.8	 117.1	 109.2	 93.6	 89.4	 76.2	 76.9	 73.3	 56	 52.6	 48.6	
XGS	103	($	million)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7,873	 8,726	 9,522	 11,338	 12,562	 12,811	
TDS/XGS	104	(%)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.5	 2.8	 4.4	 9.2	 9	 5.9	
TDS	($	million)105	 904	 518	 716	 831	 572	 433	 244	 419	 1043	 1131	 756	
Population	(million)106		 16.4	 16.9	 17.3	 17.6	 17.9	 18.2	 18.5	 19.1	 19.5	 19.9	 20.4	
Exchange	 Rate	 1$	 =	
CFAF107	
712	 733	 696	 581	 528	 528	 523	 479	 449	 472	 460	
Education	 per	 capita 108	
($)	
25.59	 23.60	 28.10	 36.88	 40.66	 40.88	 42.50	 37.71	 56.75	 56.76	 62.88	
Health	per	capita	109	($)	 6	 4.46	 7.98	 9.55	 11.73	 10.34	 11.12	 9.71	 11.23	 12.61	 12.11	
Debt	Service	per	capita110	
($)	




















	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	
Education	Expenditure111	
(HTG	million)	
-	 2,898	 3024.7	 1,718.3	 2,639.6	 1,957.5	 4,134.8	 5,329.8	 5,508.7	 5,960.4	 -	
Health	Expenditure	(HTG	
Million)112	
-	 1,331.8	 1,266.6	 695.3	 809.2	 796.2	 1,142.7	 1,597.7	 1,773.1	 1,840.5	 -	
EDT/GNI	(%)	113	 31.1	 35	 36.6	 45.8	 33.1	 30.3	 30.3	 25.8	 27.8	 22.3	 14.8	
XGS114	($	million)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1,450	 1,591	 1,771	 2,026	 945	 1,065	 1,049	
TDS/XGS115	(%)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6.9	 3.6	 3.4	 4.5	 6.1	 4.2	 12.5	
Debt	Service		($	Million)116	 33	 21	 15	 35	 100	 57	 60	 91	 58	 45	 131	
Population	(million)	117	 8.55	 8.69	 8.83	 8.98	 9.12	 9.26	 9.41	 9.56	 9.71	 9.85	 9.99	
Exchange	Rate	1$	=	HTG	118	 17.46	 21.3	 25.8	 35.8	 40.8	 35.9	 43.4	 36.9	 36.5	 39.2	 40.3	
Education	per	capita119	($)	 -	 7.13	 6.21	 4.55	 8.17	 6.34	 10.13	 15.11	 15.5	 15.43	 -	
Health	per	capita120	($)	 -	 3.28	 2.60	 1.84	 2.50	 2.58	 2.80	 4.53	 5.01	 4.77	 -	
Debt	Service	per	capita121	
($)	























-	 30,115	 26,188	 47,249	 47,600	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
External	Debt	to	GNI	
(%)	123	
83.4	 67.6	 68.8	 71.9	 44.1	 32.7	 33.2	 30.9	 26.1	 27.4	 23.1	
Debt	Service		($	
Million)124	
26	 23	 26	 47	 46	 61	 47	 56	 123	 65	 62	
Population	
(millions)125		
8.343	 8.663	 9.002	 9.353	 9.710	 10.067	 10.422	 10.776	 11.113	 11.503	 11.887	
Exchange	Rate	$1	=	
CFAF	126	
712	 733	 696	 581	 528	 528	 523	 479	 449	 472	 460	
Education	per	capita	
($)127	
-	 4.74	 4.18	 8.69	 9.28	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Health	per	capita	
($)128	
3.87	 4.1	 5.2	 5.7	 9.9	 9.5	 7.1	 8.2	 7.4	 7.5	 7.7	
Debt	Service	per	
capita	($)129	

























































































































expenditures	adjusted	accordingly.	 Should	 the	 revenue	objectives	become	unrealistic,	 staffs	 recommend	 that	 the	expenditure	










Topos	 of	 stability/	 topos	 of	
reality	
‘The	Staff	welcomes	the	significant	corrective	actions	taken	by	the	authorities’	(IMF,	2003b,	p.	12)	








‘In	 order	 to	 continue	maintaining	 a	 sound	 macroeconomic	 framework,	 the	 Government	 has	 prepared,	 and	 intends	 to	 fully	
implement,	a	macroeconomic	stabilisation	program’	(World	Bank,	2004,	p.	7)	






























































































‘The	 Government	was	 encouraged	 to	 explore	 less	 costly	grassroots	 approaches	 […]	which	would	 be	more	 accommodating	 of	
capacity	and	resource	constraints’	(ibid.,	p.	11.)	
















































































































‘The	workshop	concluded	 that	 the	major	constraints	 to	growth	and	equitable	development	 in	Côte	d’Ivoire	were:	 (i)	






















































































‘A	more	 competitive	 and	 resilient	 rural	 economy	would	 raise	 performance	 overall	 and	 also	 produce	 for	 the	 farmers	 a	
growing	share	of	the	value	of	their	products’	(World	Bank,	2002d,	p.	4)	















‘The	TSS	defines	 a	 two-year	 strategy	 for	 the	Bank	 to	deliver	 hope	 to	 the	population	 and	 restore	 credibility	 in	 public	



























































































































‘Agriculture	 has	 traditionally	 been	 the	 backbone	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 there	 is	 ample	 opportunity	 to	 improve	 the	
livelihoods	of	those	engaged	in	the	sector.	The	PRSP’s	emphasis	on	coffee-cocoa	and	cashews	is	welcome.	Cocoa	is	the	
single	most	important	export	sector	involving	the	poor’	(World	Bank,	2002e,	p.	6)	





Agricultural	policies	and	prices	are	 therefore	key	determinants	of	 income	and	employment	opportunities,	 and	 thus	of	
poverty,	in	rural	areas’	(Ibid.,	p.	5)	













































fits	well	with	Bank	Group’s	 strategy	of	stimulating	 private	 sector-led	growth	by	playing	a	 leading	 role	 in	 attracting	
significant	foreign	direct	investment	to	Chad’	(World	Bank	&	IFC,	2000,	p.	4).	
Chad	must	drastically	increase	investment	[…]	to	make	up	for	the	development	lag	created	by	its	post-independence	history	
and	to	meet	its	development	objectives’	(Ibid.,	p.	5)	
‘The	proposed	project	offers	a	unique	opportunity	to	improve	Chad’s	development	prospects	significantly’	(Ibid.,	p.	7)	
Machine	
	
Human	Body	
	
Topos	of	danger/threat	
	
Topos	of	opportunity	
‘Oil	revenues	[…]	represent	an	exceptional	opportunity	for	Chad’	(World	Bank,	2003a,	p.	i)	 Topos	of	opportunity	
	
